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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation brings together, as an integrated analytical field, political-economy 
in Britain and practices of agrarian governance in various parts of British India, 
focusing on the Cuttack division of Bengal Presidency in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Following a trail of methodological debates through thinkers like 
David Ricardo, Richard Jones, James Mill, William Whewell, John Stuart Mill, and 
others, it argues that there was a major transformation in the epistemological field of 
political economy, which established the categories of production and distribution as 
contingent on globally varying assemblages of property and political power. During 
the same period, in British India, I further contend, the object of agrarian governance 
was shaped as a complex of property and political power—which I call the 
“political”—distributed between a range of landholders and landholding bodies, such 
as the state, big landlords, village headmen, cultivators, and the village itself. As I 
trace the governance of the “political” in Cuttack over the first half of the nineteenth 
century, through chapters on rent, property and village, I highlight its interconnections 
with other regions of British India, like the North Western Provinces or the Madras 
Presidency. These interconnections, I argue, emerged out of a spatio-temporal 
classificatory logic which assigned particular forms of the “political” for different 
localities, as varying instances of an original form prevailing in a putative ancient 
Hindu India. Finally, I turn towards quotidian disputes over appropriate locations in 
the “political” between a variety of landholders in Cuttack, which help in 
understanding the specific nature of agrarian power in Cuttack, by pointing out the 
limits of, and further reorientations in, the framework of governance. This dissertation 
is informed by a critique of several conceptual separations in the relevant 
historiography—between “metropolitan” and “local”, “theory” and “practice”, and 
“liberal theory” and “indigenous reality”.      
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Chapter One 
 
Beyond the inside-outside of agrarian pasts: political economy as local power in 
early nineteenth century British India 
 
 
This dissertation grew out of an unease with the analytical commonsense of South 
Asian agrarian history. Almost all of these works seemed to suggest that the past, and 
the present, of agrarian societies in South Asia was inescapably defined by what went 
on at the level of the small, the particular, the proximate, or the local. Quite 
expectedly, this isolation of the spatial level was also an analytical one. The 
simultaneous identification of the small as a distinct geographical site and a powerful 
explanatory tool rested on a series of hierarchized categorial binaries. These 
binaries—between abstract and concrete, universal and particular, theory and practice, 
imperial and local, western theory and indigenous reality—were the epistemological 
conditions of possibility of the analytical isolation of the local. The local was 
fashioned out of a seamless interweaving of geographical and epistemological 
metaphors. It stood for any form of social reality which, by being located at a 
geographical distance from the centre, seemed to be necessarily capable of lying in a 
space epistemologically distant and different from the universal. Its geographically 
bounded nature seemed to be its mark of difference from the boundless expanse of the 
universal. The local was distance as difference. Framed in this manner, it fast became 
an explanatory orthodoxy for the agrarian histories of South Asia.
1
 
Immensely rich and insightful works emerged under the banner of the local. 
There was a proliferation in the studies of localities in British India which finely 
nuanced understandings of agrarian life in South Asia from the time of the beginnings 
of the East India Company’s government to the present. It was clear that there was 
much to be gained by taking a deep, close, intense look at the lanes and by-lanes of 
multitudes of villages. The seduction of the small was irresistible. This dissertation 
could not avoid it. Despite the unease, it got fatally attracted to the agrarian conditions 
of one such locality in British India. I attempted to take a peek at the agrarian affairs 
                                                 
1
A detailed analysis of these works, in relation to the argument of the dissertation, will be made in the 
final section of this chapter. 
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of Cuttack, the nineteenth division of the Bengal Presidency, from 1803, when the 
Company’s government entered this place, till the 1850s. And indeed, the alleys of 
agrarian life in Cuttack were mesmerizing. Yet often I stopped, to turn, look around, 
and re-locate myself in the quotidian maze of agrarian affairs in Cuttack. 
Interestingly, every time I found myself somewhere else. It was puzzling, as I knew I 
was in Cuttack, but not quite. The agrarian alleys of Cuttack did not take me to other 
places. They themselves were other places. If it is at all possible to name them, I will 
say, they were at the same time the myriad tiny villages of Cuttack, of the North 
Western Provinces, of the Madras Presidency, the Leadenhall street in London, the 
halls of the British Parliament, the lecture-rooms of the East India College in 
Hertfordshire, the impenetrable forests of Bamangatti, the fort of the ancient Raja of 
Orissa, and many more unnameable, unidentifiable locales.  
This dissertation admits the analytical power of the local, but refuses to 
perceive the local as equivalent to a locality. Instead of positing the local as a specific 
geographical space which has the power of transforming everything that comes into it 
from outside, it questions the very binary of inside-outside, in order to recast the local 
as all those possible situations within an integrated analytical space where 
transformations of powerful categorial and institutional rationalities take place 
ceaselessly. The inside-outside binary is, in a certain sense, central to this dissertation. 
It is a recurrent motif in both the practices of agrarian governance in early nineteenth 
century British India, and the agrarian histories examining that period. It repeats itself 
in various guises, as oppositions between metropole and colony, theory and practice, 
western perceptions and indigenous reality, abstract and concrete, and other similar 
ones. In this dissertation, I try to unpack this binary by tracking a few of the many 
investments that went into the creation of an inside and an outside of agrarian affairs 
in British India. Over five chapters, I discuss epistemological debates within political 
economy in nineteenth century Britain, contentions between officials at various levels 
of the imperial and British Indian bureaucracy over categories and principles of 
agrarian governance, practices of agrarian governance in several localities, along with 
Cuttack, and a variety of strategies by landholders of different kinds in Cuttack 
negotiating the rationalities of rule.  
These chapters put together a dynamic field of interrelations, conceptualized 
along the lines of a Deleuzian understanding of Foucault’s dispositif. Deleuze notes 
that the dispositif or apparatus is, “…a tangle, a multilinear ensemble. It is composed 
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of lines, each having a different nature. And the lines in the apparatus do not surround 
systems which are homogeneous in their own right, object, subject, language, and so 
on, but follow directions, trace balances which are always off balance, now drawing 
together and then distancing themselves from one another.”2 The lines in the 
apparatus, he further argues, have four characteristics. There are lines which 
determine conditions of visibility and enunciation. There are lines of force, which 
generate continuous dynamism within the apparatus. Finally, there are lines of 
subjectification, which are points of breakage and fracture in the apparatus. They 
generate subjectivities which “escape from the powers and the forms of knowledge of 
one social apparatus in order to be reinserted in another, in forms which are yet to 
come into being.”3 In this dissertation, such a reading of the apparatus is welded to 
Deleuze’s own concept of multiplicity. The space that is studied and made here, it can 
be said, is that of the multiplicity. It has, in Deleuze and Guattari’s words, “...neither 
subject, nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot 
increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature…There are no points 
and positions…such as those found in a structure, tree, or root. There are only 
lines…All multiplicities are flat.”4 
It is not a story of the empire, though. It does not have the intention to argue, 
as Cooper and Stoler does, that “Europe was made by its imperial projects, as much as 
colonial encounters were shaped by conflicts within Europe itself.”5 Their project, 
despite establishing the dynamic space of imperial circuits as the object of analysis, 
does not wish to dissolve the metropole-colony division.
6
 This methodological move, 
however, has hardly inspired agrarian histories of South Asia. The only attempt 
imaginable, of rewriting South Asian agrarian history in the light of imperial 
formations, has been carried out by Richard Drayton. In his work Drayton throws up 
images of a vibrant, imperial theatre of “improvement”. He weaves together the 
emergence of Botanical science, imperial rivalries over control of science and its 
application in colonies, English nationalism emerging around questions of land and 
                                                 
2Gilles Deleuze, ‘What is a Dispositif?’ in Michel Foucault Philosopher, ed. Timothy J. Armstrong, 
New York, 1992, 159. 
3
Ibid, 162.  
4
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Minneapolis, 
1987, 8-9. 
5
Introduction to Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeoisie World, ed. Frederick Cooper 
and Ann Laura Stoler, Berkeley, 1997, 1.  
6“…we treat metropole and colony in a single analytic field, addressing the weight one gives to causal 
connection and the primacy of agency in its different parts.” Ibid, 4.  
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agriculture and several other issues. But even Drayton’s history remains trapped 
within the model of a diffusionist relation between the metropole and the colony. 
Ultimately, it becomes a history of the Kew Gardens in the context of the Victorian 
“revolution in government”. It displays none of the dynamism that might be expected 
of what Cooper and Stoler identifies as an “imperial” space, generated by 
contestations at various levels of a network of practices in the unified analytical field 
of the metropole-colony. In Drayton’s work, the regime of agricultural 
“improvement” remains essentially metropolitan.7 
By exploring contestations within political economy in Britain over the first 
half of the nineteenth century, along with the agrarian conditions of an obscure 
locality in British India during the same period, I do not invoke the empire as the 
organizing space of these connections. I retain a spatial category as an analytical one 
precisely by questioning its essentially geographical meaning. For my purposes, the 
local remains important, but only as all those situations where dynamic 
transformations of meanings-in-practices take place. I do not argue that the local is 
already-always implicated in other more expansive spaces, like the regional, the 
national, the colonial, the metropolitan, the imperial, or the global. Such an argument 
implies that expansion of spatial scales necessarily lead to a refinement of the 
analytic. This approach is founded by a geographical reductionism, which ultimately 
reproduces the logic of those histories which reduce the explanatory power of the 
local to a geographical foundation. This dissertation attempts to write a history of 
agrarian conditions in Cuttack over the first half of the nineteenth century as a densely 
interwoven network of practices of knowledge and governance. In the process it 
demonstrates a series of transformations in the rationality of these practices, which 
took place in, and drew upon, a diversity of locales. I define this network as an 
apparatus. As Giorgio Agamben notes, an apparatus “…is a heterogeneous set that 
includes virtually anything, linguistic and non-linguistic, under the same heading: 
discourses, institutions, buildings, laws, police measures, philosophical propositions, 
and so on. The apparatus itself is the network that is established between these 
elements…”8       
                                                 
7
See Richard Drayton, Nature’s Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the ‘Improvement’ of the 
World, New Delhi, 2005.  
8Agamben further argues that “The apparatus always has a concrete strategic function and is always 
located in a power relation…As such, it appears at the intersection of power relations and relations of 
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Contextualizing Cuttack 
 
I will begin by noting the reasons behind choosing Cuttack as the point around which 
the apparatus is woven in this study. Cuttack was the nineteenth division of the 
Bengal Presidency, which the Company’s government occupied in 1803, defeating its 
erstwhile Maratha rulers. The conquest of Cuttack was crucial to a geographic 
consolidation of Company rule. Cuttack occupied an area along the eastern coast of 
British India which began beyond the borders of the Midnapore district of the Bengal 
Presidency and continued up to the districts of Ganjam and Koraput, which were part 
of the Madras Presidency. Evidently, Cuttack was the missing link in the possibility 
of a continuous territorial consolidation of the Company’s government. On top of that, 
being ruled by a strong regional force, the Marathas, from their headquarters in 
Nagpur, the area of Cuttack remained a potential gateway for threatening incursions 
of the Marathas into Company territory. This was reason enough for Wellesley to 
propose to the Raja of Nagpur the establishment of a British subsidiary force in the 
Raja’s territories. Given its strategic location, it can be assumed that a total military 
control of this territory was necessary for the government. Predictably, therefore, as 
the Raja of Nagpur refused to permit the posting of Company soldiers in his territory, 
troops marched in and conquered the area of Cuttack. In December 1803, as the 
Treaty of Deogaon got concluded with Raghuji Bhonsla, the Raja of Nagpur and the 
Maratha chief, Cuttack came under Company rule. 
The Company’s government divided Cuttack was divided into two 
administrative areas—the Mughalbandi and the Garhjat. Mughalbandi was governed 
by Company regulations, while the Garhjat comprised of princely states. The 
Mughalbandi was divided into three districts, namely, Balasore, Cuttack and Puri. In 
1804, the annual revenue of the Mughalbandi was estimated at Rs. 11,78000. As an 
entire division within the Bengal Presidency, in terms of its revenue-yielding 
capacity, Cuttack was a tiny dot on the Company’s financial map. Accordingly, it has 
been considered as an insignificant area of inquiry by agrarian historians of Bengal, 
who have fixed their attention to the bigger financial territories of Bengal. Also, these 
                                                                                                                                            
knowledge.” Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus and Other Essays, Stanford, 2009, 2-3, 
emphasis mine. 
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histories have defined Bengal only in terms of its permanently-settled areas, thereby 
excluding those vast tracts within it which were temporarily-settled. Consequently, 
their conclusions about Bengal’s agrarian development have been skewed.9   
However, as this dissertation bears out, in the organization of its agrarian 
territory, Cuttack received a distinct kind of governmental attention. Right from the 
beginning it was set up as an anomalous zone. In spite of being a part of the Bengal 
Presidency, a permanent zemindary settlement—the framework within which revenue 
was collected in the greater part of this presidency—was never introduced in Cuttack. 
During the initial years, settlements spanning brief periods, like one, three, or five 
years, were made with zemindars. Very soon, in the aftermath of an insurgency led by 
a group of Paiks—the erstwhile private militia of the descendant of the putative 
ancient sovereign of Orissa, the Raja of Khurda—in 1817, changes were introduced in 
the nature of land settlement in several areas of Cuttack. More significant changes 
were introduced over the years 1837-45 when an extensive survey and settlement 
operation was launched in Cuttack, which fixed rents and classified proprietary titles 
to lands. Most importantly, throughout the first half of the nineteenth century an 
intense debate went on at various levels of the imperial bureaucracy regarding the 
distinctiveness of the agrarian conditions of Cuttack. It is in the light of this debate 
that the Bengal Code, or the regulations pertaining primarily to revenue 
administration, was perceived as inapplicable to the local conditions of Cuttack.
10
  
This dissertation follows lines and circulations that were spun by this debate 
around a variety of localities, about local particularities of agrarian conditions. I locate 
Cuttack as various congealed moments in this interconnected field of motion, only to 
point towards their continuous decomposition and recomposition. I demonstrate how 
the agrarian conditions in Cuttack could be read as an outcome of a multi-layered, 
dispersed, and interconstitutive network of knowledge and governance. That Cuttack 
was important, and that it was not only one of the innumerable localities, if not an 
obscure one, in British India, but stood for something much greater than itself, that is, 
                                                 
9
None of the seminal works on agrarian Bengal consider temporarily-settled areas of the presidency. 
See Sugata Bose, Peasant Labor and Colonial Capital: Rural Bengal since 1770, Cambridge, 1993, 
Sirajul Islam, Bengal Land Tenure: The origin and growth of intermediate interests in the 19
th
 century, 
Rotterdam, 1985, and Ratnalekha Ray, Change in Bengal Agrarian Society: 1760-1850, New Delhi, 
1979.  
10
See N. R. Patnaik (ed.) Economic History of Orissa, New Delhi, 1997, K. M. Patra, Orissa under the 
East India Company, New Delhi, 1971, J. K. Samal, History of Modern Orissa, Kolkata, 1989, and 
T.K. Mukhopadhyay, The Agrarian Society of Orissa: Nineteenth Century, Kolkata, 2008.     
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an important moment in a ceaseless debate over varieties in indigenous agrarian 
conditions and general principles of agrarian governance, came out in several official 
enunciations. Perhaps, their pinnacle was reached when Cuttack found an exclusive 
mention in John Stuart Mill’s ‘Memorandum of the Improvements In the 
Administration of India During the Last Thirty Years’ presented in 1858 to the British 
Parliament. Mill argued that Cuttack represented the best system of settlement, which 
combined the respective advantages of both ryotwari and mahalwari. It was a territory 
which, despite being in Bengal, was not governed according to Cornwallis’s 
permanent settlement. Yet, Mill argued that it should serve as the leading model of 
agrarian governance, and proposed its extension to other recently-conquered 
territories of the Company.
11
 Cuttack was simultaneously anomalous and exemplary. 
This dissertation takes one of its cues from this enunciation to argue, and demonstrate, 
that just as J.S. Mill was both a Company servant and one of the leading political 
economists of his time, Cuttack was not only a nodal point in British Indian agrarian 
governance, it was also a crucial analytical constituent of the epistemological universe 
of early nineteenth century political economy in Britain. In order to understand the 
peculiar characterisation of Cuttack in official discourse, it is important to take a look 
at debates over specificities in the interconnected networks of political economy and 
agrarian governance. Accordingly, this dissertation begins with a chapter on political 
economy.  
It is widely accepted that with the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
theoretical field of political economy in Britain was predominantly defined in terms of 
David Ricardo’s system. Historians have, however, qualified the extent of the 
intellectual authority of Ricardian principles within political economy circles. 
Ricardian principles were critiqued within political economy from different 
perspectives. One of the major strands of this internal critique was articulated by a 
group identified by Boyd Hilton as the “Christian economists”, who “….assailed what 
they took to be its dominant, anti-landlord, anti-clerical, and viciously secular 
formulation by Ricardo and the Westminster Review radicals.”12 There are two other 
                                                 
11John Stuart Mill, “Memorandum of the Improvements In the Administration of India During the Last 
Thirty Years” (1858), in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, XXX—Writings on India, ed. J.M. 
Robson, M. Moir, and Z. Moir, Toronto, 1990, 127-28.  
12
Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic 
Thought, 1785-1865, Oxford, 1988, 37. In a similar vein, Harro Maas argues that political economists, 
like William Whewell and Richard Jones in Cambridge, and Richard Whately in Oxford, critiqued 
Ricardianism from perspectives deeply rooted in natural theology. Harro Maas, “‘A Hard Battle to 
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extreme assessments of the impact of Ricardo’s ideas in contemporary Britain. One of 
them is put forward by Keynes who argues that, “Ricardo conquered England as 
completely as the Holy inquisition conquered Spain.”13 In radical opposition to this 
view, Schumpeter holds that, “…the Ricardians were always in the minority, even in 
England, and it is only Ricardo’s personal force which, as we look back, creates the 
impression that his teaching…dominated the thought of the time….The opposite is 
nearer the truth.”14 Mark Blaug reinterprets both positions by stating that in the 
process of the popularization of Ricardo’s views, carried out by his ardent devotees, 
his ideas underwent substantial modification. He notes that, “…as Ricardian 
economics was disseminated, the Ricardianism which conquered England would 
probably not have received Ricardo’s personal endorsement. A series of amendments 
and defences thrown up against criticism soon covered and in the end almost buried 
the original doctrine.”15 
In the context of British India, however, the singularity of the authority of 
Ricardo’s doctrines have been taken for granted in the historiography since Eric 
Stokes’s pioneering work, especially so because Stokes identifies Ricardianism as the 
core of Utilitarianism.
16
 He argues that Ricardo’s close friend and the scholar-
administrator James Mill was the critical conduit, through which Ricardian political 
economy made its way to the agrarian affairs of British India.
17
 It is through agrarian 
governance, therefore, according to Stokes, that the authoritarian, universal, reforming 
impulse of western liberal principles, specifically its utilitarian avatar, made its most 
forceful mark on an indigenous society. In contrast to interventionist liberalism, 
Stokes argues, stood a preservationist tradition, “the ‘Romantic’ generation in British 
Indian history”.18 This tradition approached Indian/indigenous society with a 
sentiment “with which Wordsworth and the Romantics invested the noble peasant”.19 
Stokes remarks that “They brought to the Indian problem Burke’s notion of 
history…The Bengal system they saw as the denial of this touchstone of history and 
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experience…”20 Thus, for Stokes, even though this entry-point into agrarian 
governance in British India was different from, and opposed to, the utilitarian/liberal 
one, it still was identified as originating from a metropolitan philosophical 
imperative.
21
  
Stokes’s characterization of the philosophical basis of governance—not only 
agrarian, but in general—in nineteenth century British India in terms of a division 
between the utilitarians/liberals and the romantics/conservatives has been repeated 
later.
22
 Lynn Zastoupil, for example, critiques the absence in Stokes’s work of any 
consideration of John Stuart Mill’s entanglement with British India. He fills up this 
gap by providing a rich discussion of the influence the younger Mill exerted in 
formulating policies in various areas of governance in British India.
23
 In narrating this 
involvement, Zastoupil understands J.S. Mill’s philosophical outlook as composed of 
a mixture of the course of his intellectual development as a thinker, and that of his 
experience at the India House as an administrator. Accordingly, he interprets Mill’s 
philosophy as a reinterpretation of the senior Mill’s abstract authoritarian 
universalism in the light of an appreciation of historical and cultural specificities. This 
reworking, Zastoupil argues, emerged out of the simultaneous impact on Mill of the 
romantic sensibilities of his time and the ideas of the “empire of opinion” group of 
British Indian administrators, who espoused a Burkean sensitivity towards indigenous 
life.
24
 It is important to point out here that Zastoupil’s “empire of opinion” group 
consisted exactly of those administrators who, in Stokes’s work, were categorized as 
                                                 
20
Ibid.  
21
For a different perspective on Burke which analyzes his emphasis on cultural and historical 
specificity as the mark of a philosophy tolerant and appreciative of difference, in contrast to the 
exclusivist, aggressive universalism of thinkers commonly viewed as liberals, like the Mills, and 
thereby more genuinely liberal than the latter, see Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study 
in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought, Chicago, 1999. Another work which investigates the 
“imperial” dimension in the thought of major eighteenth and nineteenth century British and French 
thinkers is Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France, 
Princeton, 2005.    
22
David Arnold provides an important critique of the binary between a reforming, improving 
utilitarianism and a preserving romanticism. He argues that the romantic imagination acted as a 
complimentary vision to the utilitarian ideologies of “improvement”. Although the romantic strain in 
colonial imaginations of landscape adored nostalgia and cried out loud for the lost glory of a golden 
past and a return to the primitive state of nature, its ideal of a perfect communion of man with nature 
was couched entirely in terms of a vision of agriculture which would create order out of a chaotic and 
disarranged nature by techniques of “improvement”. See David Arnold, The Tropics and The Traveling 
Gaze: India, Landscape, and Science, 1800-1856, New Delhi, 2005, 74-109. For a similar critique, see 
Neeladri Bhattacharya, “Pastoralists in a Colonial World”, in Nature, Culture, Imperialism: Essays on 
the Environmental History of South Asia ed. David Arnold and Ramachandra Guha, Delhi, 1985, 49-
86.   
23
Lynn Zastoupil, John Stuart Mill and India, Stanford, 1994, 3.  
24
Ibid, 182. 
 18 
the “Romantic generation”. Although he insists that Mill’s enunciations not only 
reflected engagements with varied strands of metropolitan thought, but were also 
shaped by the imperial experience of administration through the ideas of the “empire 
of opinion” group, in reading these latter ideas in turn as Burkean and Whiggish 
articulations, Zastoupil ends up rewriting the “imperial” mind of J.S. Mill as a 
metropolitan one. In an attempt to explain Mill’s philosophy in terms of an imperial 
intercourse, he ends up reproducing Stokes’s analytical framework. The diffusionist 
model is retained, along with a series of binaries, like metropole-colony, western 
liberal theory-indigenous reality, abstract utilitarian universalism-concrete romantic 
particularism, whig-liberal, inside-outside, and many others. Keeping in mind these 
historiographical trends, the very epistemological conditions of possibility of a 
relation between political economy in Britain and agrarian governance in British India 
in the first half of the nineteenth century is tackled in the second chapter of the 
dissertation. In the process, I demonstrate my difference from both the line of 
argument set up by Stokes, as well as its critiques. 
 
Transformed Categories 
 
In the second chapter, I provide a different reading of political economy in Britain, by 
examining a range of debates in the first half of the nineteenth century over the 
methodology of political economy. While different positions in these debates 
remained embedded in the Ricardian framework, still there was a transformation in 
the meanings of Ricardian categories. In this chapter, I argue that these changed 
meanings, of the dominant categories of political economy, like production, 
distribution, labor, rent, profit, wages and others, effected a more general 
reinterpretation of the epistemological object of political economy. I trace this 
transformation over the writings of Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, J. R. 
McCulloch, William Whewell, James Mill and Richard Jones. Major contentions 
emerged amongst them over the methodology appropriate to this mode of developing 
knowledge about human societies. I identify various positions, in terms of their 
differences from each other, while at the same time delineating, within these positions 
only, a shared direction of movement towards a general epistemological redefinition.  
The debates arose when Richard Jones and William Whewell critiqued 
Ricardo’s formulation of political economy as comprising of false generalizations. 
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They argued that the manner in which Ricardo defined the chief constituent categories 
of his system made them inapplicable to, even meaningless for, the vast majority of 
the peoples living in different nations of the world. Jones and Whewell termed 
Ricardo’s methodology as deductive, constituted by a form of reasoning which 
defined categories on the basis of sweeping a priori generalizations about production 
and distribution of wealth in human societies. As against this, they claimed that an 
inductive methodology must be followed in building up knowledge in all forms of 
sciences. Along with John Herschel, and Charles Babbage, Richard Jones and 
William Whewell formed an academic circle when they were students in Cambridge, 
which tried to programmatically develop an inductive methodology as the 
epistemological ground of all branches of science. Whewell emerged as the 
intellectual centre of this movement.
25
 Whewell’s efforts were directed towards a 
systematic exposition of the nature of true knowledge. True knowledge, he argued, 
can be obtained only by a process of “collecting general truths from observed facts, 
which process is termed Induction.”26 He noted that while successive generalizations 
and the progressive truths corresponding to them can be traced through the evolution 
of the physical sciences, such truths have not yet been established in the domains of 
other sciences, like political economy, philology, morals, or fine art.
27
 But he believed 
that hereafter it will be possible to show that these sciences are governed by the same 
laws of inductive knowledge as that of the physical sciences. 
It is in the spirit of this emphasis on observed facts that Richard Jones 
articulated his critique of the Ricardian system. Jones announced the project of an 
inductive political economy with a sharp attack on Ricardian categories: “Mr. 
Ricardo…produced a system very ingeniously combined, of purely hypothetical 
truths; which, however, a single comprehensive glance at the world as it actually 
exists, is sufficient to show to be utterly inconsistent with the past and present 
condition of mankind.”28 In this chapter, I elaborate upon Jones’s formulation of 
political economy, and its differences from the Ricardian system. I do not, however, 
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project the Ricardo-Jones, or the deductive-inductive opposition as the cardinal 
principle of this difference. I document how these apparently opposed positions 
shared similar epistemological ambitions. But at the same time, I argue, there was a 
transformation of Ricardo’s categories, which took place at an analytical level 
different from the self-stylized positions of the participants in these debates. That is 
why this transformation was evident even in a devout Ricardian, like James Mill, or in 
the language of Thomas Malthus, with whom Ricardo shared many of his theoretical 
premises. This chapter both accepts and denies the claims of difference the various 
positions articulate, by tracing certain invisible lines of consensus to indicate a shift at 
a semantic level different from the visible one.  
The opposition between a priori generalizations and observed facts was 
translated in these debates as that between theory and practice. It is from this vantage 
point that Malthus criticized Ricardo’s conclusions as inapplicable to practical 
conditions of the world. Rising rents, Malthus argued against Ricardo, did not 
necessarily indicate a push towards the margins of cultivation. Practically, rents were 
found to increase due to agricultural improvements, out of an increase in the total 
produce. In this chapter, I argue that Malthus’s differences with Ricardo over 
theoretical and practical forms of political economic categories ultimately stemmed 
from their different perspectives on value. Thus, although the point of difference was 
staged as that between theory and practice, they reflected different theoretical 
positions on value.
29
  
The quarrel between theory and practice took firm root in the contestations 
over the epistemological status of political economy after the publication of Jones’s 
book. Following the reviews of Jones’s book—both positive, by Whewell and 
negative, by McCulloch—I argue that each position, despite opposing theory to 
practice, claimed greater universality over the other. The program of induction had a 
totalizing ambition. It wanted to develop a theoretical framework capable of 
explaining the innumerable and strikingly different particularities of the world. It had 
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the ambition of a super-synoptic eye, which, in one compact look, would be able to 
introduce an integrated meaning into the bewildering variety of the world.
30
  
McCulloch carved out a selective domain of universality for Ricardian 
principles. In contrast to this, James Mill devised a greater universality for Ricardian 
political economy by interpreting the conditions under which land was held in British 
India in the light of Ricardian categories. Stokes correctly notes that this application 
of Ricardian ideas crucially determined both the standard of assessment, and the 
classification of proprietary rights in British India. But he fails to understand the 
crucial reinterpretation that Ricardo’s political economy underwent in the process of 
informing agrarian governance in British India. The context of this reinterpretation, as 
this chapter shows, was a battle for greater universality of political economic 
categories. What Stokes also overlooks is Mill’s presentation of this reinterpreted 
Ricardianism as the authentic indigenous framework of property rights and revenue 
policy. Although James Mill used Ricardian definitions in explaining the relationship 
between property and land-tax in India, he argued that his articulations were rooted in 
the ancient, historically continuous, autochthonous regime of property in India and the 
form of taxation based on it. I argue that Mill’s reinterpretations, albeit unknowingly, 
contributed crucially to the epistemological refashioning of Ricardian political 
economy.    
Richard Jones’s work went further in rewriting political economy in the light 
of the indigenous conditions of different nations in the world. Jones argued that rents, 
wages, and profits are determined by the variety of conditions under which production 
and distribution take place all over the world. He emphasised that agricultural 
production, or the very act of labouring on land, was always-already grounded in 
multifarious frameworks of the distribution of produce. These conditions of 
distribution, in turn, were historical outcomes of complex and multilayered 
entanglements between property and political power. Jones elucidated his perspective 
by highlighting the various kinds of rents existing in different nations, explaining 
them as emerging out of varying relations of power between proprietors of different 
kinds. Even James Mill argues that the relationship between property and political 
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power determined the chief constituents of political economy, namely, production and 
distribution. But Mill ultimately reproduced Ricardian classifications in devising a 
political economy for “indigenous” conditions. He retained a definition of rent, which 
was naturalistic, but more importantly, premised on the Ricardian segregation of the 
domain of distribution in India into the landlord-state, and the farmer-cultivator ryot. 
Jones, on the contrary, construed the domain of distribution in India as a more 
diffused ensemble of proprietary and political power, constituted by the state, the 
zamindars, the ryots, the village-headmen, and the village. In this scheme, the 
proprietary field, which was also the political field, was seen as made up of a variety 
of relations, rights, and capacities. Rent was understood as a crucial transaction 
between these actors, which defined the contours of this field of power.
31
  
This was the moment of transformation of Ricardian political economy. With 
Richard Jones, the epistemological object of political economy was redefined as the 
“political”. Political economy was no longer viewed as naturally divisible into the 
universal compartments of production and distribution. Rather, these compartments 
were seen as conditioned by complex constellations of property and political power. 
Accordingly, all the categorial constituents of these domains, namely, rent, wage, 
profit, and most importantly, labor itself, was framed by the “political” as contingent 
on power. This remapping of political economy in the second chapter sets up tracks 
for forays into agrarian governance in British India in the subsequent chapters. It also 
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establishes the line of critique central to this dissertation. It destabilizes the series of 
interchangeable binary oppositions which have constituted the analytic of most works 
of South Asian agrarian history. The division between abstract political economy and 
concrete indigenous reality is invalidated as I show how the indigenous was internal 
to the discourse of political economy in early nineteenth century Britain. The 
emphasis on historical specificity which Stokes and others associate with the 
preservationist, romantic-conservative sensibilities, as opposed to the interventionist 
utilitarian liberalism, is critiqued by this interpretive move. I argue that history, 
indigeneity, specificity, and preservation, were not opposed to the universality of 
political economic categories. On the contrary, they were constitutive of its 
universality. Although Ricardian political economy was critiqued by Jones, its 
structure was never abandoned. Rather, specificity, history, and indigeneity were 
those elements in the totalizing program of inductivism, which invested the 
constituents of classical political economy, like production, distribution, rent, wage, 
profit, and labor with an unprecedented form of universality. 
 
The Meaning of Production 
 
This dissertation argues that the critique of Ricardianism was not, however, a simple 
replacement of one universal by another. At this point, I turn towards an engagement 
with Foucault’s characterisation of political economy as a domain of knowledge in the 
modern episteme. Foucault argues that the shift in the structure of discourse from the 
Classical to the Modern episteme was marked by a change from representation to its 
limits. As he demonstrates, by the end of the eighteenth century, a new discursive 
constellation emerged, constituted by an interconnected, shared analytic of producing 
knowledge about life, labor and language, congealing around the disciplines of 
biology, philology, and political economy respectively.  
Within this new episteme, labor, as production, emerged as the organizing 
epistemological framework of political economy. The manner in which the category 
of labor-as-production was formulated in political economy, from the time of Adam 
Smith, and especially with Ricardo, Foucault notes, reveals changes at a deeper level 
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of thought.
32
 Henceforth, the mode of being of things was no longer considered as 
representable. They could not be horizontally distributed over a table of equivalence 
in terms of identities and differences. Rather “they turn in upon themselves, posit their 
own volumes, and define for themselves an internal space which, to our 
representation, is on the exterior… The very being of that which is represented is now 
going to fall outside representation itself.”33 It is this archaeological shift which 
determined a move away from exchange as the basis of analysis of wealth to labor as 
the condition of possibility of all exchange. In the Classical episteme value was 
defined as representation of the equivalence of all objects established through 
exchange. In the Modern episteme, value was seen as rooted in a deep, primordial, 
organic force, beyond and beneath representation—in the activity of labor. 
Accordingly, production displaced circulation, in becoming the foundational principle 
of political economy. All constituents of the process of production were seen as 
ultimately reducible to units of labor, applied at different moments of time.
34
 In 
Ricardo’s system, production was invested with a historicity, which was the 
continuous historical time of the application of successive units of labor.
35
 
         This dissertation both agrees and disagrees with Foucault’s analysis of political 
economy. I concur with the argument that Ricardo’s framework was constitutive of 
the continuous temporality of production. Even Jones, despite overwriting production 
with concatenations of property and political power, retained its analytical importance 
in a certain sense, by arguing that each specific arrangement of the “political” 
conditioned the productive efficiency of labor differently. He also implied, without 
emphasizing, that the different circumstances of labouring were plotted within a 
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hierarchy, with the conditions of capitalist agriculture representing their most 
advanced form. But I argue that, ultimately, through the foregrounding of the 
“political”, there was a significant transformation in the epistemological orientation of 
political economy. Production remained important, but only as the “political”, which, 
as I show in the later chapters, had crucial consequences for agrarian governance, and 
the consolidation of agrarian power in a variety of localities in British India. I argue 
that the “political” effectuated a critical change in the meaning of production. It 
reorganized production as a heterogeneous field of power, emanating from the 
varying interrelations between property and political power in different nations of the 
world.  
A hermeneutic impulse informs this emphasis on reconstructing the meaning 
of production out of the discourse of political economy in early nineteenth century 
Britain. This exercise, however, differs from what Quentin Skinner proposes as the 
correct method of interpreting texts. Skinner argues that in order to understand a 
particular text, “we must be able to give an account not merely of the meaning of 
what was said, but also of what the writer in question may have meant by saying what 
was said.”36 In reading utterances in terms of “illocutionary intentions”, he identifies 
an internally rational, intending subject as the author of meaning. This dissertation 
critiques such subjectivism, by pointing out that meanings are formed as part of an 
apparatus. They stabilize in certain locations, only to get transformed in others.  
Skinner raises another question, which is critical for my reading of political 
economy. He asks, “Can we ascribe to past thinkers concepts they had no linguistic 
mean to express?”37 As it will be evident in the chapters, nowhere in the contestations 
is there a self-conscious recognition of the “political” as the transformed 
epistemological foundation of political economy. Skinner argues that coherence 
should not be the concern of historians trying to understand meanings in the texts of 
past thinkers. But this dissertation is all about coherence. It establishes various kinds 
of coherence from political economy in Britain to the agrarian conflicts of Cuttack by 
weaving them together, through points of refashioning, into a single analytical space. 
Contrary to Skinner, it puts great emphasis on coherence. It agrees, to a great extent, 
with Mark Bevir, a critic of Skinner, who argues that “the reconstruction of a coherent 
set of beliefs is in part a philosophical task because it relies on the identification of 
                                                 
36
Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Volume I: Regarding Method, Cambridge, 2002, 79.  
37
Ibid, 49.  
 26 
intelligible connections between the beliefs concerned. Historians of ideas analyze the 
relationships that bind concepts together…”38 However, I disagree with Bevir’s 
concept of “belief” which retains a subjectivism, arguing that coherence can be 
identified in and through the beliefs of particular individuals.
39
 Instead, I use the 
concepts of the “political”, and later, that of the “local”, as formed out of complex 
inter-constitutions. In doing this I follow Bartleson, who, borrowing from Deleuze 
and Guattari, argues that a concept is always produced out of constituents of other 
concepts. Thus, “concepts have no intrinsic meaning but draw together multiple 
components from other concepts and furnish them with meaning. Yet every concept is 
autonomous, since it renders components from other concepts inseparable within 
itself...”40          
 
Localities and the ‘local’: The foundations of agrarian power in British India 
 
Over the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters, I examine practices of agrarian 
governance in British India. The third chapter traces the production of the category of 
rent through these practices in various localities, including Cuttack. Specificities, as 
“local” conditions, were construed in practices of governance as a hierarchized 
gradation of property-rights distributed over different localities in British India. Rent 
was used as a historical clue to determine, and assemble, these proprietary conditions. 
This, I argue, inaugurated the “political” in British Indian agrarian governance. 
Moving away from the Ricardian definition of rent, as the measure of differences in 
soil-fertility, rent was staged as a transaction, which brought out various combinations 
of property and political power in different localities in British India. This chapter 
further tracks the career of rent, in the aftermath of the permanent settlement of 
Bengal, over several sites of governance. It shows how John Herbert Harrington 
reinterpreted the proprietary provisions of the permanent settlement, in the light of 
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rent as the chief vehicle of power in agrarian territories. It further argues that there 
were attempts to identify rent in Ricardian terms by an investigation of the productive 
capacities of fields in the North Western Provinces, which witnessed a detailed 
settlement in the early decades of the nineteenth century. These attempts were, 
however, quickly abandoned. The chapter traces through the writings of influential 
administrators like Mackenzie, Bird, and the Governor-General Bentinck, how rent 
got defined, time and again, as the key vehicle of power in agrarian societies.  
The chapter also examines practices of settlement in Cuttack over the years 
1836-45. It argues that despite a few attempts to ground rent in differential soil 
fertility, generally it was seen as a regulator of political power. Accordingly, it was 
fixed by granting proprietary privileges to village leaders and hereditary cultivators. 
The course of the “political” is rounded up by yet another text on rent, where rent was 
defined as that transaction of power which shaped the productive possibilities of labor 
in a locality. In this chapter, therefore, I demonstrate how rent operated in agrarian 
governance as a crucial articulation of the political economic discourse of production 
from within the analytic of the “political”, which set up proprietary power-relations 
between the state and landholders of various descriptions as the constitutive 
conditions of production.  
The fourth chapter enters into a comprehensive examination of this distributed 
field of proprietary power. It begins with the “5th Report of the Select Committee of 
East India Affairs”, presented to the British Parliament in 1812, arguing that this 
report was the first structured presentation of the topography of the “political”. This 
chapter demonstrates how the “political”, in finding its way to the by-lanes of agrarian 
governance in British India, got transformed in meaning as the “local”. The framing 
principle of the “local” was a putative ancient Hindu India which was also the original 
site of the indigenous “political”. It was defined by a direct proprietary relation 
between the state and the peasant cultivator, which was believed to have been 
distorted, obfuscated, or lost over time. With time, other landholders emerged in 
between these two primary constituents of the “political”, displacing their unmediated 
intercourse. Accordingly, by the “local” was meant a hierarchized gradation of 
localities, constituted by specific arrangements of power, between the state, the big 
landlords, the village leaders, the peasant cultivators, and the village itself. It was 
construed in such a manner that it could act both as a range and as a point.  
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The differences between localities were envisioned by governance as the 
outcomes of different spatio-temporal interconstitutivities. Different kinds of 
landholders in every locality were understood in terms of their connections with the 
original form of the proprietary cultivator. They were considered as absent presences, 
as transformed representatives of a lost origin. Their claims to proprietary privileges 
were accordingly adjudged on the basis of the authenticity of the marks of the past 
they exhibited in the present. Through this interpretive grid, localities emerged 
simultaneously as traces of lost times and lost spaces. One kind of landholder was 
fixed as the authentic proprietary figure in each locality. Others were not completely 
displaced. They were granted positions depending on the degree of authenticity they 
could evince. The selection took place over circulating practices of governance, which 
continuously drew upon other localities in order to justify a specific selection in a 
specific locality. In this manner, the “local”, as the reconfigured articulation of the 
“political”, was established as the object of agrarian governance in British India over 
the first half of the nineteenth century.  
Determining the prospects of production, or agricultural “improvement”, I 
argue, was also one of the major aims of these practices. This was also an effort to 
select a prospective improver. The “political” was not the only political-economic 
principle which, in a refashioned manner, informed the “local”. The “local” was 
equally grounded in a preference of peasant-proprietors over big landlords, as ideal 
agricultural improvers, which was another critical stand of the discourse of political 
economy in early nineteenth century Britain. Clive Dewey observes a resurgence of 
the peasant-cultivator in the debates over agricultural improvement in nineteenth 
century Britain. Dewey puts together an entire tradition in political economy, 
consisting of William Thornton, Richard Jones, J.S. Mill, and Alfred Marshall, 
championing the cause of the peasant-proprietor.
41
 This chapter disagrees slightly 
with this grouping. Although Richard Jones developed an elaborate classification of 
peasant rents, he never argued that the peasant proprietor was a superior improver.
42
 
While discussing the Company’s revenue policy, as part of his political economy of 
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indigeneity, he only noted that the rent burden on the cultivators should be lightened 
in order to improve production. Most importantly, the move away from big landlords 
in practices of agrarian governance in British India did not signify a straightforward 
translation of the categories of this discourse. As this chapter shows, none of the 
figures who were selected as the chief proprietors of a locality, or its potential 
improver—the “village-zemindars”, or the proprietary-ryot grounded in the 
putteedaree tenure, or the mukaddams and surburakars of Cuttack—reproduced the 
figure of the farmer-like peasant-proprietor of the discourse of political economy. The 
figure of the improving peasant-farmer of the continent was significantly transformed 
by the discourse of the “local”, and recast in terms of the authentic indigenous 
“political”.        
This chapter ends with John Stuart Mill. It argues that even the younger Mill’s 
political economy moved away from the classical Ricardian frame. Here also, the 
epistemological object of political economy was refashioned as the “political”, but in 
a manner different from Jones. The relationship between Mill’s political economy, 
and British India is generally summarised as an influence on British Indian revenue 
policy of Mill’s exaltation of the peasant-proprietor. It is argued that the shift of focus 
in agrarian governance, from big landlords to peasant-proprietors, reflected this 
influence. In some works, this argument is further grounded in an imperial context of 
Mill’s engagement with the Irish land question along similar lines.43 But these works, 
as I have argued about Zastoupil, thrive on the imperial-local binary. Cook 
problematizes the Britain-India, empire-colony model by introducing Ireland to the 
field of exchange. He argues that this field was shaped by multilateral circuits.
44
 But 
he retains the metropole-colony distinction, in identifying clear pathways of influence 
from one to another.
45
 I analyze Mill’s entanglements with India, by contextualizing 
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his political economy within its own discursive field in Britain, and pursuing its 
further transformations in the discourse of the “local” in British India. Therefore, what 
become important in this analysis are the transformations within the apparatus, not the 
direction of flows between analytically separable points.  
J.S. Mill, I argue, forged a critical link between property and production in his 
political economy. His was the first among the series of treatises entitled “Principles 
of Political Economy”, published during this period in Britain, which had an entire 
chapter devoted to the different kinds of proprietary relations in land existing in 
different parts of the world. Even Mill argued that these relations, as the matrix of the 
distribution of produce, significantly influenced production. But what defined Mill’s 
articulation of the “political”, and made it different from Jones’s, was the former’s 
definition of the category of property. Mill argued that since land was the fundamental 
source of human sustenance, a collective right of proprietorship was ingrained in it. 
State ownership of landed property, he maintained, was legitimate, as it represented a 
general will, or the humankind’s right to this gift of nature and basic source of life. 
Thus, private ownership of land, he insisted, was only justified if the proprietor was 
an improver/producer. It is on the basis of this distinctive interrelationship between 
property, production, and political power, understood as being immanent in land, that 
Mill refashioned the epistemological object of political economy as the “political”. 
The championing of the peasant-proprietor, I argue, has to be understood in the light 
of changing articulations of the “political”, from Jones to Mill. Mill believed that the 
peasant-cultivator in British India, being a productive, improving agent, was a 
legitimate proprietor. 
Mill’s political economy has not been analyzed in this manner. My reading, as 
I have noted earlier, follows from a hermeneutic urge to understand the refashioned 
meanings of certain classical political economic categories, like production and 
distribution. This attempt goes beyond examining Mill’s difference from the classical 
framework in terms of its self-conscious articulations. Samuel Hollander and Laura 
Snyder carry out such an exercise by analyzing Mill’s methodological relationship 
with the program of induction, as espoused by Whewell. Accordingly, they try to 
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measure how much each of them was tilted towards inductivism or deductivism, in 
formulating their own methodologies. While Hollander argues that both incorporated 
some element of each methodology, Snyder notes that, “In the end…Mill 
characterized political economy as the geometrical science of his father and Bentham, 
without successfully uniting the inductive element of the Coleridgian method.”46 In 
both works, Mill’s political economy is contextualised in terms of its self-conscious 
binary of differentiation, namely, inductive-deductive. In this dissertation, however, 
Mill is re-contextualised in the light of a tradition of transformations within political 
economy. This makes him simultaneously continuous with, and different from, the 
framework of the “political”. I argue that by accepting the self-evident inductive-
deductive binary as the appropriate level of analysis, the works discussed above fail to 
capture both the invisibilized consensus between these apparently opposed 
methodologies—which I analyse as different ambitions of universalism—and the 
transformations in the universality of the “political”.  
The fourth chapter suggests that the village played a crucial role in defining 
the arena of property and political power in British India. The fifth chapter 
demonstrates how the village was produced by the practices of agrarian governance as 
a distinct territorial field of property, power, and production. Even J.S. Mill identified 
it as the customary domain which organized production by protecting the proprietary 
status of the peasant-cultivator from the encroaching tendencies of the big 
landholders. Custom, here, was a category internal to the discourse of political 
economy, not construed as opposed, and external to it.
47
 The village was defined as 
the most fundamental field of power and unit of governance in India. Its authenticity 
was once again traced back to an ancient Hindu India. The village was seen as the 
smallest territorial unit of power, formed by interrelations between different kinds of 
cultivators, occupational groups, and officers of the state engaged in the supervision 
of production and collection of revenue. It was argued that over time it degenerated 
into a hub of corruption and intrigue. Henceforth, practices of agrarian governance, 
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through privileging of village-based proprietary titles, surveys, granting of rent-free 
lands to occupational groups and officers of the state, organised the village as the 
quintessential domain of power and production in India, and the primary unit of 
agrarian governance.  
Residence in the village emerged as the basis of classification of cultivators. 
Cultivators residing in the village were given proprietary benefits. Those residing 
outside were deprived of these privileges. I argue that a discourse of occupancy 
played a critical role in the governmental production of the village. It was pivotal to 
the appreciation of the superior productive capacities of the peasant-proprietor. This 
was particularly evident in the writings of William Thornton and J.S. Mill. For them, 
the peasant-proprietor’s attachment to his dwelling structured his sense of property 
and invigorated his productive commitments. In contrast to this, the migratory, 
dwelling-less agricultural labourer was wasteful, improvident, and unproductive. The 
meaning of productivity was fashioned by the category of occupancy. This 
constitutive linkage between productivity and occupancy, I argue, operated in a 
transformed manner in the production of the village as a major component of the 
indigenous “political” in British India. The distinction between thanee and pahee 
ryots, and their further differentiation from the agricultural labourer were built upon a 
discourse of occupancy. As the chapter shows, occupancy functioned as the 
determinant of authenticity of titles and testimonies as well in establishing the 
governmental contours of the village.  
The fifth chapter focuses entirely on Cuttack. It documents a variety of 
moments when the stability of the “political”, as the organizing framework of agrarian 
power, collapsed, only in order to get reinforced again. Here I examine situations 
where the government found it difficult to identify proprietors according to its own 
classificatory categories. I take a close look at governmental strategies of abstraction 
which tried to recast different kinds of payments around land as rent. In the process, 
these practices redefined other relations of power into those which fit into the frames 
of the “political”. This chapter also carefully examines the myriad ways in which 
dominant landholders of Cuttack articulated their identities in terms of governmental 
categories, in order to overturn older equations of power, and create new relations of 
hierarchy. I show how the privileging of dominant landholders of the village was 
immanent in the discourse of the “local”, although it posited itself as a move away 
from big landholders to cultivators in fixing proprietary endowments. It was not a gap 
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between the “theory” and “practice” of governance. The figure of the proprietary-
ryot—central to the discursive practices of agrarian governance—was fashioned in a 
manner which could never identify it with the actual cultivators of the land. That is 
why, as this chapter shows, it could be easily used by the dominant landholders of 
Cuttack, the mukaddams and the surburakars, in establishing their dominance over 
both subordinate cultivators and erstwhile zamindars. The chapter shows how the 
“political”, as a transformed discourse of production, got articulated as ceaseless 
battles over the leadership of a locality. The meaning of production by the end of the 
first half of the nineteenth century became, therefore, conflict over agrarian power in 
the locality. 
 
The return of the local 
 
I began with a critique of those works of South Asian agrarian history which use the 
local as the primary explanatory category. It is time now to take a closer look at the 
various shades of these arguments. Frykenberg’s work clearly represents their 
extreme articulation. He argues, along with Nilmani Mukherjee, that Company 
policies were helpless in the face of the complexity and variety of the traditional 
Indian social order inhabiting the localities. They contend that, the ryotwari in 
Southern India, despite upholding the individual ryot, failed to remove the hold of the 
village elites in the localities. They also observe that the village system of settlement 
was the pre-existing indigenous form in these territories.
48
 I disagree with this 
position by demonstrating that what is uncritically accepted here as “indigeneity”, or 
the “traditional” Indian social order, represented by the village system, was produced 
over the first half of the nineteenth century as transformed articulations of political 
economic categories. In considering them as an objective arena of indigeneity, these 
works speak in the language of the same discourse which produced them. In Walter 
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Neale’s work, the indigenous is further reified as a coherent “unit of thought”, 
revealing itself as the difference between European and Indian ways of perceiving 
land. Neale argues that while in the European system of thought land was an 
“economic” category, associated with productivity, profit, efficiency, in the Indian 
one, it was a “political” category associated with faction, village power, and local 
conflict.
49
 I argue that it is precisely these interchangeable binary divisions, between 
“Europe” and “India”, “economic” and “political”, explicitly posited by Neale as the 
principles of objectively existing difference, that were produced within an apparatus 
of political economy and agrarian governance in the nineteenth century. As it is 
evident, they were further reproduced in a range of agrarian histories in various 
guises.  
The force of indigeneity is also highlighted in the work of Ratnalekha Ray, 
who argues that the permanent settlement could not fundamentally change the social 
structure of indigenous society, because the British failed to understand that it was the 
local, village-level elites, or the jotedars, who wielded power in the agrarian society, 
rather than the big landlords, or the zemindars.
50
 Ray’s argument is buttressed by 
Sirajul Islam who notes that all the legal provisions of the permanent settlement were 
aimed at two groups, namely, the zemindars and the ryots. But there was a 
proliferation of village-level groups in Bengal throughout the nineteenth century, 
described by Islam as “intermediaries”, who were the centres of power in Bengal’s 
agrarian society. They relentlessly resisted all attempts of the zemindars’ to gain a 
hold on the agrarian interior. Under pressure, soon the colonial government had to 
settle for a compromise by recognizing these tenures as legitimate proprietary titles. 
Islam draws a binary between colonial legality and indigenous social reality, arguing 
that the former was powerless in the face of the latter. He remarks that, “No statutory 
power could be more powerful than the social power of the jotedars.”51  
This was the theoretical core of the indigenist thesis in South Asian agrarian 
historiography. These village-level groups were represented as the substance of the 
‘social’ of India—immutable, unaffected by Company governance.52 What Islam and 
Ray do not recognize, because of their uncritical celebration of indigeneity, is that the 
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rise of village-level groups in Bengal did not mean a gap between governmental 
orientations and indigenous social reality. Neither did their acceptance imply an 
overturning of the former by the latter. These “indigenous” forces were not outside, or 
opposed to, the governmental rationality.
53
 On the contrary, as I have argued, they 
were central to the way the “local” and the “political” came together in practices of 
agrarian governance to foreground the village-zemindar as the original proprietor, and 
the village as the most authentic unit of administration, in regions both inside and 
outside Bengal.    
Agrarian histories upholding this indigenous inside also oppose it to the 
primary expression of an outside, namely, western political economic theory. They 
argue that colonial policy worked within a grammar of expediency and pragmatism, 
articulating itself as various accommodative reactions to the specificities of agrarian 
localities. Accordingly, they argue that such contingent policies cannot be read in 
terms of contemporary political-economic discourse. Thomas Metcalfe, for example, 
observes that in the North Western Provinces, “…The relative scarcity of large 
landholders…meant that the British had in the long run no option but to deal directly 
with the village-level zamindars...”54 What Metcalfe understands as a policy formed 
out of local exigencies, is demonstrated in this dissertation as constituted by 
categories of political economy. The choice of village-zemindars by practices of 
governance as the preferred agent of settlement, as I have argued, was an articulation 
of a network of meanings created by interrelations between the “local”, the 
“political”, and the championing of the peasant-proprietor in the discourse of 
“improvement”. The analytical temptation of the pragmatist thesis does not even 
escape Stokes, who revises his position in one of his later works, arguing that while 
colonial policy cannot be “reduced entirely to a near-sighted pragmatism”55, “…the 
last word appeared to lie with local society irrespective of European intentions and 
attitudes…”56 The binary continues, despite revisions. The power of the “local” is 
reified and reinforced. The resistive capacity of the inside is highlighted by Bernard 
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Cohn as well in his study of Banaras. He demonstrates that despite losing land in sales 
due to arrears of revenue, the majority of the old landholders “retained their positions, 
economically, politically, and socially within the local areas in which they had held 
rights as zemindars.”57 The new men were merely juridical owners. Being located at a 
distance from the areas where they gained lands, they were not able to loosen the grip 
of those landholders who resided in the locality, and, therefore, controlled its lands.  
Stokes argues that discourse of governance made a separation between two 
distinct kinds of proprietary rights to land—a right to revenue collection from the land 
and a right to the land itself. It was not a case of confusing these two rights as one and 
the same, as Ratna Ray states, due to a gap between the western theory of absolute 
private property rights and the indigenous reality of multiple, dispersed, shared rights 
in land. Stokes nuances this opposition, but only to a certain extent. He maintains that 
despite this awareness, the British always tried to join these two rights. However, they 
failed in the long run to incorporate the social reality of a field of dispersed land rights 
to their empty juridical categories. Thus, he concludes, “The legal description of 
society failed to fit the economic and sociological.”58 The binary continues. This 
thesis critiques this position by showing that the “political” articulated two tendencies 
simultaneously—of unity and dispersal. The move towards the figure of the 
cultivating-proprietor in the discourse of governance signified an effort to unite these 
two rights by planting them in the same figure. However, the other articulation of the 
“political”, construed the proprietary field of India as a dispersed one, distributed as 
various kinds of rights—both to revenue and to the land itself—amongst the state, 
zemindars, village leaders, and cultivators. That is why, this thesis argues, although 
the cultivating-proprietor was privileged, other players in this dispersed field were 
never displaced. What Stokes, Ray and others posit as the objective reality of the 
inside and the outside, I argue, is produced by the discourse, and, therefore, internal to 
the apparatus itself.  
There are works which try to strike a balance. Peter Robb carries out a 
meticulous examination of rent, custom and other aspects of agrarian governance in 
nineteenth century Bihar. Arguing, for example, that the conflict between utility and 
history characterised Bentham’s differences with Blackstone, he makes binaries 
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internal to metropolitan philosophical traditions. He doesn’t flatten the sphere of 
European thought by characterising it as a univocal universality. He notes that 
specificities and the problem of appropriateness, “producing fierce debate about 
India’s past and India’s supposedly inherent qualities”,59 marked the discourse of 
governance. Robb puts forward an interactive model, arguing that the tenancy debates 
represented the “peculiar combination of British colonialism….with Indian rural 
society…”60 But interaction, like hybridity, or dialogue61, is based on a prior 
analytical isolation, and separation between two pure elements. Robb, thus, preserves 
established binaries, as some of his statements clearly reveal: “Europe supplied 
principles and regulations, but India required pragmatism and flexibility.”62 
One of the finer examples of an indigenist reading of agrarian society, based 
on the pragmatist analytic, can be found in an essay written by David Washbrook. 
Washbrook argues that contradictory articulations of law played a crucial role in the 
development of India’s agrarian society under British rule. While on one hand the law 
created provisions for the development of an individualist, market-oriented society, on 
the other it kept on limiting the same sphere by preserving traditional rights and 
privileges of communities. He interprets the course of agrarian legislations in the light 
of this model of the law, as constituted by two-way, contradictory movements. He 
argues that while the permanent settlement of Bengal aimed at enabling the individual 
to accumulate capital and wealth through a free operation of the market, subsequent 
legislations in North and South India qualified these rights by upholding the 
customary privileges of the tenant, or the village-based corporate groups. In this 
manner, the early Raj reinforced existing, local, indigenous power-relations.
63
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This analysis, as it is evident, maintains the western-indigenous, metropolitan-
local binary. It fails to realize that restriction of the landlords’ rights was not 
antithetical to intentions of creating a market-based agrarian society, as the “tenants”, 
or “village-zemindars”, whose rights were upheld after the permanent settlement, 
were imagined as substantial peasant-proprietors, better suited than big landlords to 
promote an agrarian capitalism. Neeladri Bhattacharya makes this insightful critique 
in a review of agrarian histories of colonial India.
64
 I add to this line of critique by 
pointing out that the indigenous was in any case internal to political economy. Its 
supposed preservation was, thus, different modes of its production by the varied 
articulations of the “political” and the “local”. The inside-outside binary is, however, 
reproduced by Neeladri as well, this time as state-society, or even, theory (policy)-
practice. Although he argues that there was a dialectical relationship between state 
policies and social reality, as both changed in the process of negotiating each other, 
his framework ultimately falls back upon analytically isolable domains of the 
(indigenous) “social” and its outside.65 
Jon Wilson’s recent work offers an interesting analytical entry-point to the 
world of governance in early nineteenth century British India. Wilson argues that, 
breaking off from the customary, affective, local political culture of the eighteenth 
century, an abstract, universal, specifically utilitarian, modern governance emerged 
with the beginning of the nineteenth century in colonial Bengal. This new form of 
governance, however, Wilson argues, did not reflect a confident imperial mind. 
Rather, it emerged out of anxieties and insecurities of colonial officials, and the 
correspondent search for certainty in a world perceived as strange and alien. Wilson 
also notes that this was not a process where ideas flowed from the metropole to the 
colony, but rather one which contributed to the formation of a political culture in the 
metropole as well.  
Ambivalence did not signify a weak colonial state. On the contrary, as Wilson 
contends, it was the unconscious basis of power. Nevertheless, since, in Wilson’s 
framework, governance was underpinned by ambivalence, it remained uncertain, 
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unstable, and restless, in the face of an intractable real world which kept on escaping 
its categorizing clutches. This is where, I argue, he returns to the abstract-concrete, 
representation-reality, inside-outside binaries. It is particularly evident in his analysis 
of agrarian governance, where he keeps insisting that colonial codes failed to capture 
the reality of the agrarian interiors. As he notes, “Hidden away in their offices, 
collectors rarely physically encountered rural social relations. District tours became 
commonplace by the middle of the nineteenth century. In the 1790s, officers only left 
their station because of sickness or leave.”66 Wilson seems to suggest that the very act 
of physical confinement also signified an imprisonment in the false structures of 
representation, from where one could break free by tasting the free air of the 
countryside, the organic reality outside. As this dissertation shows, such an 
opposition, between inside and outside, code and practice, was part of the discursive 
vocabulary of political economy and agrarian governance in nineteenth century 
British India. Wilson speaks in the same language.                    
            Wilson’s is an analytic which suspects writing, finds it less authentic, 
derivative, representative, superficial, fallen, and unnatural. It assumes that the written 
word is the facile outside of an organic inside. It belongs to, following Jacques 
Derrida, “The epoch of the logos”, which “debases writing considered as mediation of 
mediation and as a fall into the exteriority of meaning.”67 This dissertation is 
positioned against all such formulations which believe in a hierarchized binary 
between a direct, unmediated, essential truth, or the being-as-presence, and its 
derived, displaced, secondary representation.
68
 The binary, which creates an inside 
and an outside of agrarian affairs of British India, I demonstrate, is all-pervasive. It 
reappears, in nineteenth century British India as well as in today’s agrarian histories. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The “political” in political economy: inaugurating an analytic  
 
    The universal, in fact, explains nothing: it is the universal which needs to be 
explained. 
Gilles Deleuze
1
 
 
It is intended in this dissertation to re-write the agrarian history of early-nineteenth 
century Cuttack as an apparatus. This chapter opens up one of the lines in that 
apparatus into which the agrarian conditions of Cuttack were inextricably interwoven. 
Here I document a key transformation within political economy in early nineteenth-
century Britain. I examine debates over the methodology of political economy 
through the writings of some of the leading practitioners in this field. These 
contentions, I demonstrate, were structured primarily around the binary of theory and 
practice. This opposition was posited in the debates as one between abstract and 
concrete, a priori and observational, universal and particular, deductive and inductive 
modes of acquiring knowledge about human societies. This chapter argues that 
despite the visible positions of opposition, there was an invisible analytical space of 
consensus in them. Overwriting differences, each of these positions worked within a 
framework of universality. But still, these were articulations of different kinds of 
universality. In the process of becoming different, categories constituting one kind of 
universality got transformed into another. Their meanings changed. The chapter, 
therefore, attempts to achieve two analytical operations. On one hand, it unpacks 
oppositions by digging out their shared assumptions. On the other, it documents 
difference by highlighting transformations in meanings of categories, which took 
place in the process of a critique of, and debates over, universality. While I challenge 
binaries, I also retain a hermeneutic intent of reconstructing meanings from past 
statements.  
This chapter elaborates upon the argument about the meaning of production 
stated in the introduction. It argues that the critique of Ricardian categories, posed as a 
methodological one by the inductivists, namely Richard Jones and William Whewell, 
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marked a fundamental transformation in the epistemological object of political 
economy. This transformation took place as the chief categorial constituents of 
political economy, production and distribution, were redefined as contingent 
outcomes of an ensemble of property and political power. In other words, it was 
argued that the meanings of production and distribution were conditioned by the 
different interrelations between property and political power in different nations of the 
world. This was also a moment of localization within the apparatus, a moment of 
congealing of meaning, which I call the “political”. This reconfiguration did not 
emerge out only of the critique of Ricardo’s framework. Even in James Mill’s 
attempted reinterpretation of Ricardian categories, in the context of British India, 
there was a clear indication of this refashioning of political economy, irrespective of 
Mill’s explicit acknowledgment of it. Within the framework of the “political”, 
“production” was seen as conditioned by the field of “distribution”, which was, in 
turn, construed as an ensemble of property and political power, varying across the 
world. By this epistemological move, I argue, particularity, indigeneity and local 
power became key conceptual constituents of political economy. They were no longer 
considered as opposed to, or outside of the universality of political-economic 
categories. On the contrary, they became the defining markers of a new kind of 
universality, of a new programme of totalization. This chapter narrates the process 
which made the “local” internal to the core of political economy, namely, production. 
The category of rent, as I demonstrate, played a formative role in this 
epistemological refashioning. It was posited as an entry-point to the methodological 
conflict over theory-practice, abstract-concrete, and deductive-inductive, by all kinds 
of positions, from Malthus, to James Mill, to Richard Jones. It was identified as the 
chief emblem of Ricardianism; accordingly, both the proponents and the opponents of 
the latter devoted a great deal of analytical attention to rent. In this manner, it became 
one of the sites over which local power was made immanent to political economy. It 
emerged as one of the building blocks of the “political”.  
This reading of rent is also a substantive critique of the relationship Eric 
Stokes sets up between utilitarianism in Britain and agrarian governance in British 
India. Stokes argues that, “The core of utilitarian philosophy, its professed scientific 
foundation, was the new political economy developed by Ricardo. At the heart of 
Indian administration lay the land revenue system. The one was to react upon the 
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other with results of deepest importance for Indian society.”2 He further argues that it 
was the Ricardian definition of rent which underpinned the land revenue policy of 
nineteenth century British India. This chapter shows that with the epistemological turn 
in political economy, the relationship between it and British Indian agrarian 
governance did not remain restricted to Ricardianism/Utilitarianism. However, even 
in this changed conceptual context, rent remained a critical marker. This new career 
of rent, however, was built upon a critique of its Ricardian articulation. Henceforth, 
rent signified one of those strands of local power which tied together the indigenized 
analytical vocabulary of political economy.    
 
Land: Malthus explains divinity to Ricardo 
 
This section opens up a varied analytical field within political economy in early 
nineteenth-century Britain, where methodological conflicts were shaped in complex 
ways by differences over the category of rent. It led to more fundamental questions 
regarding the assumptions of Ricardian political economy. It served as an analytical 
power-house generating significant markers of differentiation within contemporary 
political economy. This section will highlight the differences between Thomas 
Malthus’s and David Ricardo’s analytical deployment of rent, which will, in turn, also 
indicate the different epistemological assumptions underpinning their respective 
political-economic frames. By outlining the limits of this distinction, this section will 
also hint at the direction in which such contentions went.   
In his essay on rent, Thomas Malthus expressed his dissent from the 
contemporary understanding of the subject. Rent, he argued, was perceived to be 
caused by the excess of price over the cost of production at which raw produce sells. 
This made, “…all these writers…to consider rent as too nearly resembling in its 
nature…the characteristic of a monopoly.”3 Malthus pointed out that one of them, 
David Buchanan, the editor of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, even described this 
monopoly as “…prejudicial, and as depriving the consumer of what it gives to the 
landlord.”4 Rent, Malthus argued, was indeed linked to differential fertility of soil, 
and the comparative scarcity of the best lands did create a situation of natural 
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monopoly. But he emphasized that, “On this account, perhaps, the term partial 
monopoly might be fairly applicable…”,5 because scarcity was not the basis of the 
excess of price over the cost of production, which generated rent. On the contrary, he 
argued, this excess primarily reflected the peculiar capacity of land to generate a 
much greater amount of the bare necessities of life than what was required to support 
the persons cultivating it. Further, the excess of price was also linked to that peculiar 
tendency of the bare necessities of life to raise its demand in proportion to the amount 
produced by the land. Malthus pointed out that along with these two major factors, a 
comparative scarcity of fertile lands also functioned to create rent. 
It can be seen that Malthus understood the monopolistic element in land to 
emanate from its unique capacity to generate an excess of the fundamental 
requirements of life. Land, Malthus argued, harboured “…a most estimable 
quality…which God has bestowed on man—the quality of being able to maintain 
more persons than are necessary to work it.”6 As long as this “bountiful gift of 
providence” was equally available to all, the surplus appeared more as high profits 
and high wages, and less as rent. However, as the population and the demand for 
produce increase, production gets pushed to less fertile lands. This results in the 
reduction of profits and wages, but the rising demand increases the price of produce. 
In these conditions, the surplus over the cost of production emerged as rent. In this 
manner, Malthus traced rent, like profits and wages, fundamentally to the unique 
characteristic of land to produce a surplus in the necessaries of life beyond the 
requirements of its producers. It is this divinely ordained surplus which, at a certain 
stage of society, marked by an increasing population, and a comparative scarcity of 
fertile land, was found to differentiate itself into falling profits and wages, and rising 
rents.
7
 
Even Ricardo believed that rent, as a separately distinguishable portion of the 
produce of land, could emerge only at such an advanced state of society when 
production was taken to the margin of fertility. But he was critical of rent, as it was 
created by differential fertility of soil, which was not the source of value. 
Exchangeable value, Ricardo argued, was generated by the quantity of labour 
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involved in the production of raw produce on the least fertile land, which did not pay 
rent. In other words, value was entirely an expression of the amount of labour 
involved in the production of any commodity. With an increase in population, and the 
demand for food, as cultivation is forced to the less fertile lands, difficulties of 
production also increased. The cost of production at such margins increased, because 
more labour than usual was required to produce a particular quantity of produce. This 
led to a rise in prices. Ricardo clearly pointed out, that “The reason then, why raw 
produce rises in comparative value, is because more labour is employed in the 
production of the last portion obtained, and not because a rent is paid to the landlord. 
The value of corn is regulated by the quantity of labour bestowed on its production on 
that quality of land, or with that portion of capital, which pays no rent. Corn is not 
high because a rent is paid, but a rent is paid because corn is high…”8 Unlike 
Malthus, Ricardo did not believe that land was the fulcrum of life because it 
possessed a unique capacity to create a bountiful surplus of necessaries. His theory of 
diminishing returns established labour, not land, as the quintessential reservoir of 
value. As civilization advanced, Ricardo predicted, “Man would do more by the sweat 
of his brow, and nature perform less; and the land would be no longer pre-eminent for 
its limited powers.”9 
But it is precisely at this juncture, when man laboured more, and nature 
offered less, that rent emerged. Labouring on less fertile lands hiked the cost of 
production and the price of raw produce. As successively poorer soils came under the 
fold of cultivation, the relative value of more fertile soils increased. Labour’s loss was 
the landlord’s gain. In other words, rents went up only when profits and wages fell. 
The landlord was enriched at the cost of capital and labour. Ricardo noted that, “it is 
obvious that the landlord is doubly benefited by difficulty of production. First he 
obtains a greater share, and secondly the commodity in which he is paid is of greater 
value.”10 Quite naturally, he concluded, that the interest of the landlord is opposed to 
the interest of the rest of the community. 
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Malthus, however, maintained that “…it seems scarcely possible to consider 
the interests of the landlord as separated from the general interests of the society.”11 
He countered Ricardo’s argument with his views on agricultural improvement. Rising 
rents did not necessarily signify declining cultivation, Malthus retorted. He refused to 
accept Ricardo’s deduction that landlords were opposed to improvements which led to 
a fall in both prices and rents. It is here that the theory-practice and abstract-concrete 
binaries were invoked as an internal critique of political economy. Ricardo’s views, 
Malthus argued, were the result of erroneous abstract reasoning. He observed that, 
“…I doubt, if a single instance in the history of Europe, or any other part of the world, 
can be produced, where improvements in agriculture have been practically found to 
lower rents.”12 Improvements, even if they are considerable, are always followed by a 
corresponding power of population to increase up to the additional limit of 
production. The high elasticity of the demand for necessaries, caused by the inherent 
tendency of biological life to grow, immediately attracted new lands to cultivation. In 
this way, all over the world, Malthus argued with examples, rents increased out of an 
increase of the total produce, which was engendered by improvements. Ricardo failed 
to take this into account because he thought that rents increased only with the 
increasing difficulty of production. For Malthus, this was a narrow view of rent, and 
he noted, once again, that “…such a view of rent embraces only a very small part of 
the subject, and consequently that any general inferences from it must be utterly 
inapplicable to practice…”13  
However, what Malthus presented as a practical viewpoint, I argue, was 
evidently rooted in his own theoretical presuppositions. It emerged from his view of 
land as the ever-abundant fundamental provider, i.e. God. As various scholars have 
noted, Malthus had a strong agrarian bias in his conceptual formulations regarding the 
economy of a nation. His support for the Corn Laws emerged from this position. He 
believed that the situation of rising prices and food scarcity in contemporary Britain 
could not be effectively solved, on a long-term basis, by importing food. In order to 
develop a strong economy, a country must be self-sufficient in the production of the 
basic necessaries of life. Even if such agricultural protectionism generated a rise in 
prices, and a decline in wages, these factors would act as natural restrictions to a 
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growing population. But it was more necessary for the population to have a greater 
command over the necessaries of life drawn from agriculture, than lead an 
“unwholesome” existence in manufacturing. Donald Winch argues that, “this was a 
case where the conclusions of his science of morals took precedence over the science 
of wealth narrowly conceived. If vice and misery could be reduced by slowing down 
the growth of manufacturing, this should be made part of the moral calculus, even if it 
entailed lower per capita incomes on aggregate…”14 
Malthus’s difference with Ricardo, thus, reflected different 
theoretical/universal frameworks of political economy. It was not a difference over 
abstract and concrete forms of political economy, although it was posed in these 
terms. Malthus’s own abstractions came out even more clearly as he explained the 
particular conditions which defined rent in different parts of the world. In discussing 
these conditions, Malthus drew a distinction between natural and artificial monopolies 
of land. He noted that in all Eastern countries, where the sovereign is the owner of the 
soil, rent arises prematurely, much before an advanced state of cultivation demands its 
separation from wages and profits out of the general surplus.
15
 Here Malthus 
acknowledged his debt to Richard Jones’s work on rents. Although it might appear 
that Malthus shared Jones’s premises in arguing that Ricardo’s theoretical system was 
based on abstract reasoning, which was erroneous due to its inapplicability to the 
specific practical conditions of the world. However, I will argue that just like Jones, 
Malthus too had a set of theoretical presuppositions which defined and placed limits 
to what he termed “practical”. 
While Malthus agreed with Jones in describing rent in ‘eastern countries’ as an 
outcome of political power, he ultimately chose to root it in natural causes. Thus, he 
argued that, “whatever may be the nature of the monopoly of land, whether necessary 
or artificial, it will be observed that the power of paying a rent…on the land, is 
completely limited by its fertility.”16 Unlike Jones, he did not believe that the rent, all 
over the world, was determined by a configuration of property and political power. 
That is why, despite describing the circumstances of India and China as different, he 
quickly absolved the difference by arguing that rent, all over the world, is caused by 
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the same factor, namely, variations in the fertility of soil. In the letters he wrote to 
William Whewell, he noted that he valued Jones’s work, and was happy to know that 
his differences with Ricardo are also shared by Jones. But even then, he insisted that 
Jones, in criticizing Ricardo, was drawing incorrect conclusions. Malthus pointed out 
that, “[i]n his zeal to show that Mr. Ricardo is quite wrong…in dwelling upon the 
diminished returns of agricultural capital as the sole cause of increasing rents, he 
seems inclined to deny the undoubted truth of the natural tendency to such diminished 
returns in a limited space, unless prevented by improvements…”17 He emphasized 
that this tendency of diminishing returns is the general principle of the emergence and 
increase of rents.  
Such were the epistemological limits to what Malthus presented as a 
“concrete/practical” political economy. The theoretical foundation of this political 
economy was a faith in land, as the fundamental provider of life. This was Malthus’s 
own principle of abstraction. It reflected his belief in the power of nature as 
determining of political-economic categories. Even in the study of particular 
situations where he admitted that rent was produced by the imposition of a particular 
form of political power on land, he ultimately upheld differential natural capacities of 
the soil as the point of its origin. It is the same naturalist conviction which made him 
argue that improvements would be the source of increase of rents in the future 
everywhere in the world. He noted that, “for the very great increase of rents which has 
taken place in this country during nearly the last hundred years, we are mainly 
indebted to improvements in agriculture, as profits have rather risen than fallen, and 
little or nothing has been taken from the wages of families…”18 This view was also 
part of a crucial difference with Ricardo. Through an advocacy of improvements, 
Malthus also presented the landlord as a figure capable of stimulating agricultural 
production. The landlord was not against improvements, as they ensured him 
increased rental returns without a correspondent fall in the total produce. Malthus 
believed that as the custodian of the most important producer, land, his interests had 
to be united with the rest of the society. He did not argue that the landlord was 
necessarily an active improver. But at the same time, unlike the common explanation 
of his pro-landlord position, he did not only characterize landlords as “unproductive 
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consumers”, whose primary economic role was to stimulate demand by excessive 
spending. He wanted the landlords, as David Cannadine points out, to spend on the 
improvement of agriculture. Malthus wrote that the landlords should make 
“substantial repairs of all the cottages on their estates”, and be interested “to build, to 
improve and beautify their grounds, and to employ workmen and menial 
servants…”19 In fact, he noted that often, as was the case in Ireland, the landlords, in 
the greed of obtaining higher rents, let their lands to inefficient tenants. But all 
landlords were not as imprudent as the Irish ones. Being aware of the distinction 
between short and long term benefits, they had the potential of acting wisely in 
choosing substantial tenants, who would, with the aid of improvements, increase 
rents. Thomas Malthus, thus, differed from the dominant, Ricardian framing of 
political economy. In differing, however, he did not produce a more concretized 
political economy, despite claims to do so. As I have shown, his definition of the 
concrete, or his practical explanation of rent, was rooted in other forms of abstraction.   
 
“Theory” vs “practice”: an opposition? 
 
This section intends to develop what the previous one hinted at, namely, the area of 
methodological contention in political economy between the “theoretical” and the 
“practical”. By dissecting both categories involved in the opposition, this section will 
suggest that beyond the visibility of the opposition there were invisible lines of 
consensus. In a certain sense, therefore, the opposition was a false one. It was 
significant nevertheless, as it acted as an analytical pointer to a redefinition of core 
political-economic categories. These points will be established through an 
examination of both the critique of Ricardian political economy, and its rebuttal.  
In reviewing Richard Jones’s book, “An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth 
and the Sources of Taxation”, William Whewell noted that, “Political 
economy…must be concerned with the laws of the production and distribution of 
wealth as they actually operate in different countries and different forms of society. It 
must be a science concerned with actual facts and daily observations…”20 Whewell 
was an old friend of Jones. Their friendship developed in Cambridge, where they met 
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as students. In Cambridge, along with Charles Babbage and John Herschel, they had 
formed a group which thought similarly, in their respective individual areas of study, 
about methodological questions involved in the formation of scientific knowledge. 
Other than Jones, the rest were all students of, and subsequently, scholars in, the 
natural sciences. Whewell was the intellectual nerve centre of this group, who 
articulated, in an organized fashion, those interests which had built strong intellectual 
and personal ties between these men since their days as students.
21
 Over successive 
and systematic treatises, Whewell developed the philosophy of “Inductivism”, which, 
he argued, was the only proper method of gaining true knowledge in any branch of 
science—natural, moral, or political. As it befitted the role of a pioneer, he wrote on 
diverse subjects, including mechanics, astronomy, geology, mineralogy, political 
economy, education, architecture, and moral philosophy. 
Jones’s book, Whewell believed, was a fine example of the adoption of an inductivist 
approach to political economy. Moreover, he argued that it was particularly important 
to rebuild political economy as an inductive science, because most of its leading 
doctrines, claiming to explain complex issues affecting the lives and livelihoods of the 
masses, were nothing but a bunch of false conclusions; yet at the same time they were 
influential enough to become part of popular commonsense. He spelt out these 
worries clearly in the review. “Political economy…must be a science of induction and 
not of deduction. It must obtain its principles by reasoning upwards from facts, before 
it can apply them by reasoning downwards from axioms…these maxims...have been 
strangely lost sight of, and indeed have of late been absolutely denied. In recent times, 
and especially since the publication of Mr. Ricardo’s treatise, the science has been put 
altogether in a deductive form…”22 
Jones shared Whewell’s critique. In his book, as well as in other scattered 
pieces of writing, he made Ricardian political economy the central object of his 
criticism. Almost echoing Whewell’s words, Jones wrote in his book: “Mr. Ricardo 
was a man of talent, and he produced a system very ingeniously combined, of purely 
hypothetical truths; which, however, a single comprehensive glance at the world as it 
actually exists, is sufficient to show to be utterly inconsistent with the past and present 
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condition of mankind.”23 As it is evident, observation of facts seemed to be the 
epistemological basis of the kind of political economy Richard Jones attempted to 
develop. William Whewell wanted to develop a general method of inquiry for all 
branches of knowledge out of the same principle. He noted that, as opposed to this, a 
deductivist approach to knowledge explained each and every element of the field 
under study by reasoning logically from a very small number of fundamental axioms. 
Ricardian political economy was a classic example of such a methodology. In it, 
Whewell pointed out, everything related to production and distribution was explained 
by the application of various combinations of three fundamental principles—the 
theory of population, the doctrine of rent, and the measure of exchange value. None of 
these principles was obtained on the basis of a systematic collection of facts. As a 
result, when they were made occasion for sweeping generalizations, they naturally 
produced nothing but absolutely false conclusions. 
A deductive approach was not inherently flawed. Whewell argued that there 
were parts of physical science where it could be successfully exercised. But they were 
those rare areas of science where a completeness of knowledge had been reached. Not 
more than two or three branches of physics, namely physical astronomy and 
mechanics, and partially optics, could claim such a status. But these were ancient 
disciplines, which had taken the time and labour of generations to attain this state. 
Compared to them, Whewell noted, “[I]t will…be a most strange and singular 
circumstance in the history of sciences, if political economy, the youngest of them, 
the most complex, mixed and vast in its subjects, depending on the most subtle, 
obscure and unmeasurable elements, should have sprung at once to this ultimate 
condition, this goal and limit of its possible intellectual progress.”24 
These were the oppositions—theory-practice, hypothesis-observation, 
deductive-inductive. But these were not only the creation of the self-styled inductivist 
position. The theory-practice opposition featured in the writings of all leading 
political economists of this period, irrespective of their allegiances to a deductive or 
an inductive method. Even Malthus, in criticizing Ricardo, claimed to put forward 
opinions more attentive to “practical” conditions. But, as I have argued, these 
differences remained theoretical ones. They emerged from different assumptions 
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undergirding different conceptualizations of the relation between land and production. 
Similarly, both Whewell and Jones, and their opponents, to whom I turn later, 
frequently flagged this opposition, despite being rooted, I will argue, in positions of 
universality. Whewell expressed surprise at the “…project of converting a study 
concerned with the endless variety of facts and relations which belong to political 
economy, into a result of definitions and axioms.”25 I will argue, in the rest of this 
section, that despite their diatribe against a priori generalizations in political economy, 
all of them, Ricardians or otherwise, operated with such generalities which organized 
every bit of their statements in this field of study. In my opinion, everyone, contrary 
to what Whewell might want us to believe, worked very much within different frames 
of a priori reasoning. In this sense, nothing in political economy was out of what was 
identified in this methodological debate as the domain of “theory”.  
But the theory-practice opposition was maintained as the focal point of this 
debate. J. R. McCulloch used the opposition to answer the criticism aimed at 
Ricardian political economy. As a committed Ricardian, he came up with an 
extremely harsh and dismissive review of Jones’s book in the Edinburgh Review. 
Referring to the theory-practice divide, McCulloch exclaimed that Jones had confused 
elements as different as weight and colour in his work. Accepting the critique that was 
directed at Ricardo from the perspective of a “practical” political economy, 
McCulloch declared, “…Mr. Ricardo’s book is one of principle only, and that it is not 
to be judged by a merely practical standard…”26 McCulloch’s support for “theory” is 
worth probing in a greater detail, keeping in mind the way the category had been 
defined by Whewell and Jones. After claiming Ricardo for “theory”, McCulloch 
immediately pointed out that the former restricted his researches, and conclusions to 
rents that were paid by farmers cultivating for profit under a system of free 
competition. In other words, McCulloch noted, Ricardo’s work referred to “…rents as 
they actually exist in England, Holland, the United States, and a few other 
countries…”27 Ricardo did not intend, McCulloch continued, to define, “taxes on the 
land imposed by the sovereign, and the sums wrung by taskmasters from the reluctant 
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labour of slaves, [as] rent…”28, just as he did not wish to call allowances to slaves in 
the West Indies, “wages”.  
These statements clearly bring out the conceptual investments in McCulloch’s 
use of the category of “theory”. I will sort out what seems to be a contradiction in this 
use. McCulloch initially seemed to argue that “theory” is a mode of explanation 
which does not represent actual conditions of life. But later he noted that Ricardo’s 
“theory” does represent actual conditions of life, but not all of them. So the argument 
for “theory” did not necessarily exclude the condition of representability. McCulloch 
did not drive an absolute wedge between “theory” and actual life. Rather, he 
segregated certain kinds of practical conditions which, according to him, legitimately 
belonged to the domain of representability, from others which did not. Political-
economic principles, and, by extension, the practical field they adequately resembled, 
his vivisection suggested, were only for populations which lived and produced under 
free markets. The rest, like slave-labour in West Indies, or Asian cultivators, were 
banished from both the “theoretical” and the “practical” in political economy. This is 
how the contradiction in McCulloch’s statements got resolved. He did retain both 
arguments: a) “theory” and “practice” were in opposition, and Ricardo’s work did not 
cover practical situations; here ‘theory’ stood for free-markets, and “practice” for 
slavery; b) “theory” and “practice” were unified, one neatly representing the other, in 
this case Ricardo’s work explaining rents in England, Holland, and the United States. 
Thus, “theory” in political economy did not exclude the “practical”. On the contrary, 
it was rooted in “practical” conditions only. Despite this, for McCulloch, there were 
some forms of the “practical” which did not feature in this debate. Amongst them, 
were the slaves and the ryots. They were pre-epistemological, unworthy of being 
considered as part of the enlightened orbits of political economy, or knowledge. 
The participants in the theory-practice debate soon pointed out, as they 
explicated the conflictual terrain in greater detail, that the opposition was between 
good and bad theories. Ultimately, all of them defined “theory” as a form of 
explanation in which was included all practical phenomena. Apparently, Whewell and 
Jones, from a supposedly “practical” perspective, argued that Ricardo’s “theory” did 
not represent factual conditions of life. But by the same token, they also implied that, 
it was not a “theory” at all. Rather, their own exposition of political economy, since it 
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successfully explained all practical conditions of life, was “theory”, in the true sense 
of the category. The debate, therefore, I will argue, was not between “theory” and 
“practice”; rather it was a conflict over the legitimate domain of the 
“practical/theoretical”. Everyone agreed that true “theory”, should be able to explain 
“practice”; but everyone disagreed on what ground the “practical” should include, in 
order to be a legitimate object of the “theoretical”. These disagreements, I will argue, 
emerged from the different sets of a priori generalities with which each contestant in 
the field began their respective journeys towards the writing of political economy.  
For example, in Ricardian political economy, as I have shown earlier, the 
definition of rent was based on the assumption of an economy, where production was 
carried out by capitalist farmers and agricultural labourers on land leased from 
landlords. It is these “practical” conditions that the “theory” of rent sought to 
represent. Wherever production was carried out under differently, those “practical” 
conditions remained out of the scope of Ricardian political economy. It was a 
particular conceptualization of production and distribution that determined what 
“theory”, unified with “practice” would look like.  
Whewell and Jones pointed out that such a “theory” was useless, because it 
failed to explain the greater part of the practical conditions of the world. What they 
implied was that it can hardly be called “theory”. Their attack was double-edged. On 
the one hand, Whewell argued that even if he accepted McCulloch’s retort that 
Ricardo’s definition of rent did not intend to cover all those payments which are 
commonly called rent, “the reader might be left to decide for himself which subject of 
inquiry may be the better worth his notice,—the rents that are actually paid in every 
country, or the Ricardian rents, which are not those actually paid in any country.”29 
On the other hand, he also emphasized that, contrary to what McCulloch represented, 
Ricardo did not confine his researches to a small section of the world. His conclusions 
did have a claim of universality. Even Jones, in one of his letters to Whewell, 
maintained this position.
30
 Keeping in mind this claim, Ricardo’s “theory” seemed all 
the more baseless. Jones was amused by such universal claims which did not even 
remotely correspond to the facts of life. He asked his readers to imagine a situation 
where different kinds of landholders were being taught the fundamental doctrines of 
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Ricardian political economy. The teacher was telling these landholders, that their 
interest was opposed to the rest of the society, that rent depended on the fertility of 
soil only, that no improvements of their income might emerge from an increase of 
rents, or an increased fertility of the soil, and many more of such Ricardian precepts. 
Jones remarked that the audience “…would be apt to believe, that the philosopher 
they were listening to must have fallen from some other planet: that the scene of his 
experience must have differed widely from the scenes of theirs...”31 
For Jones and Whewell, all along, it was a battle to prove greater universality. Thus, 
incorporating the ‘practical’, or, as I will document later, the ‘local/indigenous’, into 
their explanatory framework, was an analytical move to achieve total universality. 
They believed that the power of ‘theory’ stemmed from its capacity to explain each 
and every bit of the practical conditions of the world. In that sense, Ricardo was 
powerless, as his ‘theory’ was fragile. Whewell was pretty candid about his 
realization that a profound sense of power could be felt from being able to explain the 
world as it is. In a letter to Jones, he wrote, “You know as well as I do that those who 
theorize rightly are in the end the lords of the earth.”32 The program of induction, as 
Whewell argued, aimed at moving from observed facts to generalization, and, further, 
in a spiralling manner, to higher and higher generalizations.
33
 In its political-economic 
articulation, it had the ambition of a super-synoptic gaze, which wished to wrap up, at 
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a single glance, the infinite diversity of lives and livelihoods in the world, into a 
single frame of explanation.   
 
  
A new land for “theory”: James Mill and a reinterpreted Ricardian universalism 
 
McCulloch was not the only interpreter of the problematic of representability in 
Ricardian political economy. James Mill, an equally ardent devotee of Ricardo’s 
system had a very different take on the matter. Like Whewell and Jones, he believed 
that a true “theory” should be able to account for all “practical” conditions of the 
world; unlike McCulloch, he did not think that Ricardian categories only explained 
the ‘practical’ conditions of countries where production and distribution of wealth 
took place under conditions of high population, free market, and a capitalist economy. 
I am tempted to call him a truer follower of Ricardo. His systematic demonstration of 
the universality of Ricardo’s system evinced his unwavering faith in it. His efforts can 
be seen as a fitting response to the critique of Ricardo that was raised by Whewell and 
Jones. But despite his astute defence of Ricardo’s system, I argue, the epistemological 
assumption of this defence was the same as that of Ricardo’s arch-enemies, namely, 
Jones and Whewell. These were the invisible lines of consensus between apparently 
conflicting perspectives.  
James Mill did not think, like McCulloch, that what Ricardo defined as “rent” 
was categorically different from other kinds of payments, like, “…taxes on the land 
imposed by the sovereign…”34 in an Eastern country. It is important here to highlight 
the presuppositions of this notion of difference. McCulloch argued that, “From the 
remotest era down to the present moment, the land of almost every Eastern country 
has been regarded as the exclusive property of the sovereign, who was thus enabled to 
fix the terms on which it should be occupied…”,35 whereas in England, land belonged 
to individuals, and cultivators were not enslaved.  For McCulloch, a difference in the 
structures of property ownership between England and the “Eastern countries”, made 
the Ricardian category of “rent” inapplicable to the latter. Evidently, this was a view 
based on the perception of a fundamental linkage between property and political 
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power. It is this linkage which defined “despotism” as an absolute and arbitrary form 
of power rooted in the total ownership of property by the sovereign. In McCulloch’s 
scheme, such was the basis of the polity of all “Eastern countries”, as different from 
the free and individual forms of property-ownership in England, which laid the 
foundation of its polity. I will contend that in this conceptual constellation, property-
ownership was imagined to be constitutive of political power, and this property-power 
complex was supposed to demarcate the epistemological field of political economy. 
Based on these assumptions, McCulloch reasoned that “despotic” polities cannot be 
legitimate domains of political-economic inquiry. For him, they harbored those 
“practical” conditions that the “theory” of political economy did not need to address. 
James Mill, however, did not envision these “despotic” polities as lying 
beyond the scope of Ricardian political economy. While admitting that political-
economic analysis is embedded in the relation between property and political power, 
he defined this relation differently. Mill argued that not only the form of property 
ownership, but the category of “property” itself in India was different from its 
European counterpart. He noted that “In a state of society resembling our own, in 
which property is secure, and involves very extensive rights or privileges…in minds 
of little range…the particulars combined together under the idea of property appear to 
be connected by nature…”36 It would be presumptuous, Mill emphasized, to infer 
from this perception of “property”, that the category expressed the same kinds of 
rights at all times and in all places. On the contrary, by the gradual association of 
different kinds of rights, the category of “property” came into shape differently in 
different places. It is only with a considerable civilizational progress, Mill suggested, 
that “property” can be found to convey all those rights which characterized its 
European form. 
But in India, Mill argued, although the sovereign was the lord of the soil, there 
were important restrictions to his right of property. The ryot, or peasant cultivator, 
who held land, could not be removed from possession by the sovereign, if he 
continued to pay the amount of assessment demanded from him. His right of 
possession was saleable during his life, and inheritable after his death. Describing the 
proprietary status of the ryot, Mill remarked: “…I should think it might be more 
                                                 
36
James Mill, History of British India, Volume I, Book II, Fifth Edition with notes and continuation by 
H.H. Wilson, London, 1997, (1858), 208. 
  
 57 
properly expressed by saying that he has a property in the land, than that he has the 
property of the land. There is no doubt that he has a property in it, because he has a 
right of perpetual occupancy, and the right of cultivation, subject to the demands of 
government.”37 Although Mill admitted that landed “property” in India was different 
from that in Europe by including the right of the ryot within the semantic fold of 
“property”, he did not take this redefinition too far. His explanation ultimately took a 
Ricardian turn, when he chose to take two connected analytical moves. Firstly, he 
marked the right to receive rent as the defining feature of “property”, thereby, 
acknowledging the sovereign’s right in the land as superior than the ryot’s.38 In the 
same breath, he also contended that the ryot’s right, instead of being “proprietary”, 
was, effectively, merely a right to cultivate the same field.
39 
Secondly, he categorized 
the government demand on the ryot as “rent”, in the Ricardian sense of the term, by 
describing it as “the surplus, after the capital and labour bestowed upon the produce 
has been replaced and paid.”40 He argued that “according to the practice and law of 
India, the full rent is due of Government…”.41 This practice, he emphasized, “has no 
inconsiderable recommendation from science itself. Previous to allotment, the 
productive powers of the soil are the joint property of the community; and hence are a 
fund peculiarly adapted to the joint or common purposes and demands…”42 By 
representing the state in India as the sovereign proprietor of land or the universal 
landlord, he established the contemporary political-economic category of “rent” as 
something consistent with age-old “Indian” practice.  
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As an administrative prescription, therefore, which had already been 
established by him as a practice continuous with the past, Mill noted that the 
legitimate limit of the government demand was the full ‘rent’. He admitted that this 
limit had not been always followed in the past, when arbitrary exactions took over the 
political-economic or “scientific” principle of taxation. But even then he did not 
believe “…that such is a necessary consequence of the system by any means.”43 Not 
only did Mill graft the Ricardian category of rent into the government dues from land 
in India, he also used Ricardo’s critical attitude towards the rent-receivers, or 
landlords, in a significantly reinterpreted manner. By defining the government dues as 
“rent”, and not as a tax on either capital or revenue, he exorcized what Ricardian 
political economy had called “the great evil of taxation”.44 Rent, as an income of 
private landlords in Europe, had already been identified in political economy as 
devoid of productive value. Mill’s construal of the state in India as the paramount 
landlord was, therefore, fundamentally, a critique of the institution of private property 
arising from the reception of rent. Mill suggested that it is only a particular form of 
property ownership, where the state was the universal landlord, which allowed the full 
“rent” to be the basis of the fund derived from taxation, as this was to be spent by the 
state towards the improvement of the community. At this point Mill’s analysis took a 
turnaround, as he hierarchized difference in the reverse direction. The kind of linkage 
between property and political power he favoured was present in India, and absent in 
Europe. 
This difference was crucial to the field of inquiry of political economy itself. I 
have already argued that the linkage between property and political power was 
perceived to be the constitutive ground of political economy. This assumption was, in 
a sense, hidden in McCulloch, but was brought out in his review of Jones’s work. For 
James Mill, as the discussion shows, it was the central problematic of political 
economy—clearly recognized, discussed in detail, and analyzed ultimately in a 
Ricardian light, notwithstanding the major reinterpretations. Other than his 
administrative works, where he treated the problematic in a more systematic manner, 
he also highlighted it in his book, The Elements of Political Economy, where he 
clearly pointed out his preferences. After defining “rent” in the same manner as 
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Ricardo, Mill argued that, “It is sufficiently obvious, that the share of the rent of land, 
which may be taken to defray the expenses of the government, does not affect the 
industry of the country.”45 He further noted that while in the major polities of Asia 
“almost the whole expenses of the state have in all ages been defrayed from the rent 
of land”, in Europe it took place only in the remote past when the sovereign was the 
proprietor of land, and the greater part of the expenses of the country was defrayed 
from the rent of the land. Interestingly, this equivalence between the European past 
and the Asian present was not cast into the mould of a progressivist hierarchy. 
Europe’s present did not feature as the final teleological destination in James Mill’s 
analysis of the linkage between property and political power. Rather, Mill seemed to 
lament over Europe’s present. His anguish was blurted out in The History of British 
India:  
“…The benefits of the soil have…over the greater part of the globe, been 
employed, first, to supply in whole, or for the greater part, the necessities of 
government, next to enrich the individual occupant. The most remarkable exception to 
this rule is in modern Europe. After the conquests of the Gothic nations, the land was 
thrown in great portions into the hands of the leading men; and they had power to 
make the taxes fall where they chose; they took care accordingly that they should fall 
any where rather than upon the land; that is, upon any body rather than 
themselves…they not only threw the burden off their own shoulders, but taxed, as 
they have continued to do, and sometimes on a progressive ration, to the present hour, 
the rest of the community for their benefit.”46 
 
This is how James Mill established the relation between property and political 
power as the structuring principle of the field of political-economic knowledge. His 
elaboration of differences, between the modes of property ownership, and their 
attendant forms of political power, in India and Europe, was a necessary 
epistemological building-block for his subsequent political-economic analysis, which, 
as I have shown, was unambiguously Ricardian. But his vision, I will argue, expanded 
the theoretical scope of Ricardian political economy, by using it to explain conditions 
which were based on a linkage between property and political power radically 
different from that of England. Mill’s reinterpretation of Ricardian political economy 
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was indeed remarkable. In a certain sense, this reinterpretation suggested that it was 
suited equally well to the relationship of property and power that it claimed to be 
based upon, and to conditions that were radically different. Thus, for Mill, Ricardian 
theory seemed to be valid for both “free” and “despotic” forms of property-
ownership, and the polities based on them.  Mill unhesitatingly declared his 
appreciation for what he construed as the Indian forms of landed property, political 
power, and mode of taxation. His only problem was with the corrupt, uncertain, and 
unequal manner in which this system operated, which, he believed, would be 
remedied by the able governance of the British.  
It is here that my reading of James Mill deviates significantly from that of 
Stokes. Stokes understood that Ricardian ideas were radicalized by Mill, when he 
used the Ricardian definition of rent to put forward an absolute critique of private 
property. As he noted about Mill’s programme, “…to advocate state ownership or 
nationalization of the soil was to strike at the whole Liberal tradition for which the 
institution of private property was the tap-root of progress and individual liberty.”47 
But this was not a simple radicalization of Ricardian categories. Mill’s 
reinterpretation of Ricardo needs to be located within the epistemological turn in 
contemporary political economy. As I have demonstrated, Mill’s political-economic 
articulations were constituted by careful examinations of indigenous forms of 
interrelations between property and political power. In other words, Mill’s political 
economy had already started speaking in the vocabulary of the “political”, without 
being entirely able to exorcize itself of its Ricardian commitments. That is why, for 
Mill, the argument about state ownership of land did not signify a particularity of 
“Eastern/despotic” polities. On the contrary, it stood for the past condition of all 
nations of the world, and the ideal route for progress. In this scheme, it was England’s 
polity which was exceptional, since at its foundation was a regressive form of linkage 
between property and political power.       
Thus, James Mill invested Ricardian political economy with a new 
universality. The “practical” conditions identified by McCulloch as external to 
political-economic explanation were explained by Mill in the light of a redefined 
Ricardianism. His construal of rent, property, and taxation in the context of British 
India, I argue, were linked to, and consistent with, his methodological position on the 
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theory-practice problematic. Unlike McCulloch, Mill believed that true “theory” 
should be consonant with all “practical” conditions of the world. His elaboration of 
Ricardian political economy in the context of Indian landed property and political 
power demonstrated that despite difference, “theory” and “practice” were unified. A 
return to the “theory-practice” opposition at this point is imperative, as James Mill 
was a seminal contributor to this methodological debate. In an imaginary dialogue 
entitled “Theory and Practice”, written for the London and Westminster Review, Mill 
analyzed the problem. The essay presented a conversation between two men, marked 
“X” and “Y”, where the former began by positing a total inconsistency between 
“theory” and “practice”, while the latter gradually and successfully persuaded the 
former about the necessary unity between the two.       
Unarguably, Mill imagined himself to be in the position of “Y”. In discussing 
this essay, accordingly, I will refer to “Y” as James Mill.  The dialogue began with 
“X” arguing that he is a follower of “practice”, because it is based on experience, and, 
therefore, in absolute opposition with “theory”, which is based on speculation. Mill, in 
response, stated that in order to achieve clarity in the discussion, a comparison must 
be made not between the mere terms “theory” and “practice”, but between the 
meanings they are associated with. As the conversation developed, “X” came to 
define “practice” as “the cases which may be regarded as constant”,48 which Mill 
rephrased, with the former’s consent, as “cases in which like antecedents have been 
followed by like consequents in many times.”49 Further, Mill pointed out that the 
knowledge of constancy in any area is dependent upon careful observation of a 
number of instances, and the remembrance of them. But then, Mill asked, “…this 
knowledge is only of the past; all practice regards the future…How is it that your 
knowledge of the past becomes a guide of the future?”50 In reply, “X” argued that 
since these are observed sequences, of similar actions producing similar results, they 
can be safely expected to get repeated in the future.  
Mill intervened at this point, claiming that this is exactly what “theory” stands 
for, namely “…drawing up a theorem for the guidance of the future from the 
observation of the past.”51 “X” retorted, arguing that what he understood by “theory”, 
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like the vortices of Descartes, has no bearing to such observation. Mill’s reply was, 
“As you began…by expressing a preference of experience to theory as a guide to 
practice, I concluded that we had in view only that class of theories which have a 
reference to future practice; not those attempts sometimes called theories, to account 
for certain phenomenon, that is, bring them under some law which is already 
ascertained.”52 As examples of the former category of “theory”, Mill mentioned 
political economy and medicine. At this point “X” agreed that all such “theory” is 
based on some observation of the past. But he still maintained his refusal to accept 
Mill’s argument, by pointing out that “…very few theories are correctly founded.”53 
By this time, Mill had successfully persuaded his opponent to share the analytical 
presuppositions framing his argument, that “theory” and “practice” were unified. He 
pointed out that both “theory” and “practice” can be in error, because the source of 
such error in either case has to be incorrect observation. His campaign was over, as 
“Y” assented to his judgment: “When a man says that he follows practice, he says by 
the same words that he follows theory. All men, therefore, in every rational action of 
their lives are followers of theory; and they may be divided…into the two following 
classes—those who follow good and those who follow bad theory; the first sort acting 
always right…”54   
For James Mill, the value of “theory” emerged entirely from its ability to 
explain the greatest possible range of “practice”. He believed that a philosopher, 
whose task is to make “theory” as expansive as possible, was also the best 
practitioner.
55
 I will argue that several of his analytical conclusions were shared by his 
arch-opponents, the “inductivist” political economists. Mill’s emphasis on 
observation, his attempt to make all “practice” consistent with “theory”, and also his 
argument that ultimately all “practice” is reducible to a small number of fundamental 
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philosophical principles
56—all these commonalities, in my opinion, call in question 
the methodological distance Whewell and Jones posited between themselves and the 
Ricardians. In the next section, I will try to analytically disaggregate the 
entanglements—both convergences and divergences—between these apparently 
opposed methodological positions.  
 
Framing the “political”, redefining (Ricardian) political economy 
Richard Jones wrote An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth and on the Sources of 
Taxation in 1831, following which, in 1833, he was appointed as professor of political 
economy at King’s College, London.57 The Essay was a treatise on rent, and also the 
first part of a projected work on other major categories of political economy. Jones, 
however, was not a prolific writer. The other parts never got written. Jones became 
significant, to his contemporaries, primarily as a critic of Ricardo,
58
 which obviously 
reflects the enormous influence Ricardo’s theory of rent—with which Jones directly 
engaged—had in intellectual circles in Britain at that time. In 1835, Jones was 
appointed by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to the chair of political 
economy and history at the East India College at Haileybury.
59
 This appointment 
indicated that Richard Jones’s political economy had acquired a different kind of 
significance in contemporary Britain. Jones called his work a political economy of 
nations, which, I believe, made Jones important for an institution like the East India 
College at Haileybury. As it is well-known, the East India College was that 
pedagogical site where future administrators of British-India were educated in all 
those branches of knowledge which were considered as the intellectual backbone of 
governance. Political economy, as is evident, was one of the most important subjects 
in this curriculum of governance. Interestingly, this subject was taught at the East 
India College, as “political economy and history”, which shows that within the 
scheme of imperial governance, these two branches of knowledge were considered as 
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necessarily interdependent. Also, such a mode of classification was almost naturally 
suited to Jones’s work where, ‘history’ had a constitutive role to play in 
reconceptualizing political economy. For Jones, such intimate connections between 
his work, the East India College, and its way of classifying knowledge, remained life-
long. He died in the college on 20 January 1855, and was buried in the neighbouring 
churchyard of Amwell. 
On being appointed as the professor of political economy at King’s College, 
London, Richard Jones gave a public lecture on what he considered to be the 
fundamental problem of this domain of knowledge. He argued, not surprisingly, that 
the main task of political economy was the analysis of “…differences in the 
productive power and operations of different nations.”60 Political economy, as was 
commonly understood, produced knowledge of the laws governing production and 
distribution of wealth. Jones emphasized that although, temporally speaking, 
production preceded distribution, analytically considered the latter should be the core 
area of inquiry in political economy. The mode of distribution—of the surplus 
produce of the soil—was embedded in the different forms of property ownership in 
different nations. These proprietary relations, in turn, expressed the organizing 
principle of political power in every society. Jones declared these linkages in 
unequivocal terms. The distribution of produce, in the form of property, he noted, 
“…has served, in the great majority of instances, to establish the first rude framework 
of political society. We see wealth, and the mode of its distribution, assuming an 
active influence, in creating the ties which bind the body politic together, and 
determine, by their form and complication, its character, and often its resources.”61   
This exposition, I argue, signalled the first coherent reinterpretation of 
political economy in the light of the “political” in nineteenth century Britain. By the 
“political”, I mean the constitutive linkage between property and political power that 
gradually came out as the epistemological point of departure for political-economic 
analysis. Its universality was a hidden assumption in Ricardo. In Malthus, it came out 
as difference, between England and “Eastern nations”, only to be flattened out in an 
unexplained manner by the Ricardian universality of “rent”. The analytical 
significance of the “political” was teased out in the debates over “theory” and 
“practice”, which took place between political-economists who claimed to be 
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methodological enemies of each other. It is this debate, I will contend, that sharpened 
the articulations of the “political”, by forcing Ricardians like McCulloch, to admit it 
as the basis of political-economic knowledge. McCulloch’s admission was, however, 
also a moment of contraction in the universal potential of political economy; the 
moment of its expansion came soon with James Mill’s rewriting of Ricardianism in 
the light of the relationship between landed property and political power in British 
India.  
Richard Jones’s work, I argue, broke away from the available epistemological 
casting of political economy. Jones located the “political” at its heart. He gave the 
“political” a theoretical status, by acknowledging its fundamentally constitutive 
function with regard to political-economic categories. James Mill had also taken into 
account the “political” quite extensively when commenting on the conditions of 
British India. But Mill’s works did not contain an explicit conceptual foregrounding 
of the “political”. They remained wedded to Ricardo’s formulations, in which the 
“political” was invisible. Thus the way Richard Jones articulated the “political” was 
unprecedented.   
This linkage between a mode of property ownership and the framework of 
political power which sustained it, argued Jones, structured the sphere of 
“distribution” in political economy. He insisted that that it should be considered as 
analytically prior to the sphere of “production”. Here was his crucial critique of 
contemporary political-economic frameworks, especially the dominant Ricardian one. 
Ricardo understood the sphere of “distribution” as consisting of a tripartite division of 
the produce into “rent”, “wage”, and “profit”, between landlords, capitalist farmers, 
and agricultural labourers respectively. The temporal assumption here was that 
distribution of the produce could take place only after its production. The universality 
of this temporal sequence was, however, dependent upon a crucial analytical excision 
of “distribution” from the temporality of a narrative where production is located as an 
absolute, pristine point of beginning. The problem with the narrative’s internal logic 
of temporality is that its imagined autonomy of “production” as a transcendental point 
of origin sat awkwardly with its general characterization of the relation between 
“production” and “distribution”.  
It was assumed in Ricardo’s work, that this relation between production and 
distribution was universal. The variation was only that “…in different stages of 
society, the proportions of the whole produce of the earth which will be allotted to 
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each of these classes, under the name of rent, profit and wages, will be essentially 
different…”62 But at the same time, Ricardo’s theory of rent stated that “rent” as a 
proportion of the produce distinct from “profits” and “wages” can arise only at an 
advanced state of cultivation, with the gradual extension of cultivation beyond the 
most fertile lands. It is only when cultivation was pushed to inferior soils that “rent” 
as a measure of differential natural fertility of soil emerged as a separately identifiable 
proportion of the produce. At an early stage of cultivation, when fertile land was 
abundant, Ricardo noted, “there will be no rent; for no one would pay for the use of 
land, when there was an abundant quantity not yet appropriated, and, therefore, at the 
disposal of whosoever might choose to cultivate it.”63 If the division of the sphere of 
distribution into “rent”, “profit”, and “wage” was an universal one, as argued by 
Ricardo, then what did the sphere of “distribution” consist of when there was no 
“rent”? The framework of property itself—within which ‘distribution’ took place as 
‘rent’, ‘profit’, and ‘wage’—disappeared at this point in Ricardo’s analysis. Ricardo 
seemed to suggest that this was a temporality of pure “production”, uncontained by 
the shackles of “distribution”, which his general framework, where “production” and 
“distribution” were necessarily interrelated, did not allow. 
In fact, Ricardo’s entire analytical framework collapsed as it was embedded in 
such an inconsistent and self-destructive temporality. Rahul Govind in a recent essay 
has brilliantly argued this point. According to Ricardo, the price of produce of the 
marginal land, which did not pay rent, determined the rate of “profit”, which, in turn, 
determined “rent”. But for the rate of profit to get determined from the marginal land, 
Govind notes, there had to be a market, which also meant that since this was the last 
land, produce from earlier lands must have reached the market. But how is that 
possible, Govind asks, given that only the last land’s produce can determine the rate 
of profit, and rent? Let us see what Govind has to say about the contradiction this 
leads to.  
 
“…1) other lands yielding rent having acquired a surplus from/over the market 
price/rate of profit (before their determination) when their produce is brought to the 
market/sold; 2) other lands are not yielding rent since they are awaiting such a 
determination, hence they cannot bring their produce to the market and therefore 
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neither can the “last land” do so. How is the rate of profit of the marginal land itself 
determined and what is the temporal/logical medium through which it can be 
determined?...This requires a miracle and thus we have the immaculate conception of 
the market.”64  
 
Without such immaculate conceptions, Ricardian political economy, I argue, could 
not sustain itself in terms of the narrative temporality it was inscribed in. The pure 
temporality of “production”, as I have shown, was yet another example of this.  
For Jones, however, the temporality of “production” and “distribution” 
remained unified, at all times and in all places. Production, Jones argued, was already-
always imbricated in distribution. In fact, in the Jonesian scheme of things, it was the 
mode of distribution which organized production, and, therefore, made the category of 
production itself contingent—differently shaped according to different modes of 
distribution. As I have argued earlier, the sphere of “distribution”, according to Jones, 
was the framing of property forms by political power. Instead of calling this 
ensemble, “distribution”, in a typically political-economic vein, I have chosen to call 
it the “political”, because it brought back the category of “power” to political 
economy in a way which transformed this field of inquiry. The “political” in Jones 
was also that principle which produced, arranged, and distributed relations between 
different groups of the society. It was the container of the “social”. In his king’s 
College lecture, he traced the operations of the “political” in the following manner. 
“Labour, continuously bestowed upon the soil”, Jones noted, “supposes 
property in the soil to be established.”65 Further, he pointed out that “property in the 
soil almost universally rests, at one time of a people’s career, either in the general 
government, or in persons deriving their interest from it.”66 It is this primary relation 
of property—between owners and cultivators of the soil—which, Jones noted, 
“practically bind together different ranks in all the regions of the world.”67 From this 
point, Jones started outlining the emergence of different relations over time in 
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different nations, out of these primary ones. As he had pointed out earlier, they 
determined the conditions and capacities of production in these nations. This was 
certainly a hierarchical scheme, although Jones remained cautious about extolling the 
virtues of advancement.
68
 He began with “Asiatic nations”, where the primary 
division of the surplus was between the sovereign, his officers, and the cultivators. 
The non-agricultural populations in these nations, he argued, were paid by the 
sovereign from this surplus. Coming to eastern European nations, he noted that 
similar relations persisted between the bondsmen, the nobility, and the non-
agricultural classes. As he came to countries of Western Europe, particularly England, 
he argued that there was a notable difference in the structure of these relations. This 
change in the “political”, or the assemblage of proprietary relations and political 
power, strikingly affected, and improved the conditions under which production took 
place, or, in Jones’s words, “the management and productiveness of labour”69. 
The change was primarily signified by the arrival of the capitalists, as an 
intermediate class between proprietors and labourers, both agricultural and non-
agricultural. He brings in his wake, “capital”, which Jones defined as “accumulated 
wealth with a view to profit”.70 This distinct portion of wealth constitutes the fund 
from which labourers of all kinds receive their wages. This is how Jones explained the 
emergence of the specifically Ricardian sphere of distribution, marked by its tripartite 
division of wealth as “rent”, “wages”, and “profits”. In Jones’s political economy, 
therefore, the distribution of wealth amongst landlords, capitalists, and labourers—in 
one form of the “political” did not exclude its distribution in other forms also. Rather, 
he regarded this as conditional upon the “political”, explaining it differently under 
different articulations. Thus, Jones explained “rent”, “profits”, and “wages” in all 
those countries where the capitalists had not yet appeared in a different way, as 
produced by the particular relations between proprietors, labourers, and non-
agricultural classes, i.e., by the varying formations of the “political”. The structuring 
logic of the “political”, however, as Jones emphasized, remained strong even after the 
significant change introduced by “capital”. Within the same logic, old forms gave way 
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to new ones. In Jones’s opinion, “The ties which formerly bound the community 
together are worn out and fall to pieces; other bonds, other principles of cohesion 
connect its different classes.”71  
Jones’s “inductive” political economy, and its hierarchy of nations, was 
undoubtedly rooted in historical determinism. But he was less interested in its grand 
teleological implications. Political economy’s task, he believed, did not consist in 
predicting the future on the basis of a common temporality of progress for all nations. 
Jones clearly pointed out that, “The future of all other people will, however, at some 
time, be like our present. Be it so…but still the interest we have in the future, however 
great, can but be a subordinate interest after all.”72 Contemporary political-
economists, Jones believed, suffered from the assumption of a single future for the 
entire world. This prevented them from looking at the world around them in its own 
terms, in the light of different histories and different presents. By focusing solely on 
their own conditions, these people believed, that “…if we do not get a knowledge of 
the phenomena which the rest of the people of the earth present to the philosopher as 
his materials, we shall at least get a knowledge of a state of things, which will one day 
be theirs and is destined to be universal.”73 Such blinkered futurism, Jones argued, 
doomed political economy to false generalizations based on gross ignorance. The 
world, Jones argued, was not going to erase its differences and become one in any 
conceivable future. Change would be slow and extremely imperceptible. This 
approach, therefore, would provide political economy with no analytical means to 
look at the world as it was, and explain the various conditions of livelihood existing in 
it.  
History primarily inspired Jones as an explanatory principle of political 
economy. It explained the present of all nations. Political economy, Jones argued, 
could establish general principles only on the basis of a rigorous observation of 
“facts”. For this, he noted, “…there are open to us two sources of knowledge,—
history and statistics, the story of the past, and a detail of the present condition of the 
nations of the earth.”74 These two modes of knowledge constituted the analytical 
“eye” of “inductivism” in political economy. While “history”, during Jones’s time, 
had become accepted as a legitimate mode of knowledge, “statistics” had not. Jones 
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remained emphatic about its use in political economy. He argued for its 
systematization, and urged for the formation of statistical societies in England.
75
 In 
one of his letters to Whewell, he also mentioned his plan of proposing the formation 
of a statistical society to the British Association for the Advancement of Science. The 
society, he noted, should deal with various kinds of statistics. He enlisted them as: 
“Economical statistics…Political Statistics…Legal Statistics…Finance…Medical 
Statistics…Moral & Intellectual statistics…Ecclesiastical statistics…”76 
Such was Richard Jones’s political-economic vision. I will argue that he 
effected a major re-writing of the contemporary articulations of this field of 
knowledge. His political economy was historical, statistical, and even ethnographic. 
He was not beyond the evolutionist universalism of his times. But, from within that, 
he engendered a framework which hooked the epistemological foundations of 
political economy to what I have called the “political”. He made political economy 
look more like a comparative political sociology of nations. What Jones and Whewell 
posited in this rewriting as “inductivism”, or the championing of “facts” over abstract 
“theory”, I will argue, can be more productively interpreted as a theoretical 
reconfiguration and a methodological diversification of political economy. As I intend 
to demonstrate gradually, such changes in the object and texture of knowledge in this 
area, need to be examined simultaneously with the field of agrarian governance in 
early-nineteenth century British India.   
 
Where the “political” began: rent 
 
It has been shown in the previous sections that rent was one of the central categorial 
markers of this radical redefinition of political economy. This section will closely 
document the manner in which the category of rent carved out the field of the 
“political” in Jones’s political economy. Richard Jones pointed out that it is the 
conditions within which human labour operated that determined the precise nature of 
rents, wages, and profits and, thereby, the laws of production and distribution of 
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wealth.
77
 These conditions, he argued, were structured by an assemblage of property 
and political power, and were different throughout the world. He argued that the 
different forms of distribution of wealth equate with different shares of incomes 
generated from land. Thus, he noted, that “If that soil belongs to others, this 
circumstance alone makes the peasants at once tributary to the proprietors, and a 
portion of the produce is distributed as Rent. If besides the soil other things are 
needful to facilitate their exertions, to the owner of these things another part of the 
produce must be resigned, and hence the origin of Profits. The share of the labourer, 
the reward of mere personal exertion, in whatever shape, or manner, or time, it may 
be received, constitute the Wages of labour…”78   
Jones went on to document a variety of rents existing in different parts of the 
world. He described them as labour, metayer, cottier, ryot, and farmer’s rents. He 
traced the origin of each of these to the different histories of the nations in which they 
existed. Jones argued that not only rents, but also wages and profits were expressions 
of relations of power around land. These relations conditioned the efficiency of 
labour, thereby dictating production of wealth, in general. In the case of labour rents, 
for example, Jones stated that landed proprietors allotted a portion of their estate to 
cultivators, from which the latter were supposed to draw their subsistence. In 
exchange, as rent for that land, they were to provide their labour to the proprietors. 
Jones argued that such a relationship between the proprietor and cultivator of land had 
ruinous consequences on the conditions of labour: “The industry of serfs, then, is 
found to be neither continuous, skilful, nor powerfully aided;…The peasant who 
depends for his food upon his labour in his own allotment of ground, and is yet liable 
to be called away at the discretion and convenience of another person to work upon 
other lands, in the produce of which he is not to share, is naturally a reluctant 
labourer.”79 In this way, Jones explained “rent”, in each case, as an articulation of a 
particular calculus of power between proprietors and cultivators of land. As he 
developed his explanation of “rent”, he candidly dismissed Ricardo’s. He remarked: 
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“The necessity then, which compels them to pay a rent, it need hardly be observed, is 
wholly independent of any difference in the quality of the ground they occupy, and 
would not be removed were the soils all equalized.”80  
Ryot rents, Jones argued, were peculiar to Asia.  Jones described “ryots” as 
“hereditary occupiers”, having attributes of both tenants and proprietors. He pointed 
out that, “They are proprietors, inasmuch as they are unquestionably and 
incontestably entitled to possess, and to transmit to their children, the soil which they 
cultivate. They are tenants, inasmuch as they have rarely a beneficial interest in the 
soil; or inasmuch as they have to pay rent.”81 Jones traced the origin of these rents to 
an Asiatic mode of governance, and their present condition to administrative 
arrangements of the British government. Like James Mill, Jones also argued that 
Asiatic sovereigns used to be supreme landlords. But he drew a different sketch of 
India’s “political”. Unlike Mill, he did not view the ancient Asiatic state as the 
exclusive site of the “political”. In other words, while analyzing ryot rents, he did not 
think that the Asiatic state could be perceived as the unambiguous embodiment of the 
particular complex of proprietary relations and political power these rents were 
embedded in. In Jones’s understanding, India’s “political” was less centralized than 
what Mill thought it to be. Jones depicted it as a much more diffused and dispersed 
arena of power. In his scheme, the “political” in India looked like a mélange of 
various kinds of landholders and landholding bodies. Rent was a transaction which 
defined this complex, and determined the overlapping yet separate jurisdictions of 
power. I will discuss this power-complex in greater detail in the chapter on property 
and agrarian governance in British India. This is because the way administrative 
practice defined, maintained, and governed landed-property in India had remarkable 
similarities with Jones’s definition of the ‘political’. But such linkages can be 
explored only in the upcoming chapters within a more contextualized discussion of 
agrarian governance.        
Jones himself argued that within his political economy the chief expression of 
this “political” is rent. He emphasized that, “We may be prepared…to see without 
surprise, the different systems of rents which…have arisen out of the peculiar 
circumstances of different people, forming the main ties which hold society together, 
determining the nature of the connection between the governing part of the 
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community and the governed, and stamping on a very large portion of the population 
of the whole globe their most striking features, social, political, and moral…”82 In a 
certain sense, therefore, for Jones, “rent” determined all aspects of a society, of the 
character of a nation; it was an organic expression of the “political”.  
 
Conclusion 
This was the world of political economy in early-nineteenth century Britain in which 
a critical epistemological reorientation took place with the ascendancy of the 
“political”. As I have argued in chapter one, this opened up a novel horizon for the 
meaning of labour, as production, which was, according to Foucault, the constitutive 
category of the discourse of political economy during this period. As the Modern 
episteme replaced the Classical one, Foucault notes, production replaced exchange as 
the object of knowledge. At the level of the structure of discourse, the equivalence of 
representation was substituted by the organicity of the unrepresentable. Labour stood 
as that elemental, irreducible, origin from where political economy began.
83
    
It is here, at the very moment of the foundation of this political economy, that 
labour, as production, was redefined, in the light of the “political”, as local/indigenous 
power. This was a profound transformation at the level of the object of knowledge of 
political economy. It meant that labour, as production, will be henceforth defined as 
conditioned by the different interlocking arrangements of property and political power 
in different nations. This chapter argues that Ricardo and Ricardians like Malthus and 
McCulloch tried to render this question invisible, by putting forward a universal 
political-economic framework, defined by immaculate conceptions, like the pure 
temporality of production, or naturalist determinants of production, like land as divine 
monopoly. Questions of power were posited as outside the legitimate analytical 
domain of political economy, as McCulloch emphasized that slave-labour in the West 
Indies, or peasant tributes in Eastern nations could not be classified as wages or rents. 
But with Mill, Jones, Whewell, and, as I will show in a later chapter, J.S. Mill, 
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local/indigenous forms of power were perceived as key constituents of a more 
universalized political economy. 
In a sense, this was to make political economy sociological. To grasp its 
significance at another level, I argue, it will be necessary to see how similar processes 
were at work in the governance of quotidian agrarian affairs in British India during 
this period. The upcoming chapters will bring out the rationalities immanent in a 
range of governmental practices across a variety of localities in British India. I will 
argue that the “political”, as an assemblage of property and political power, also 
underpinned agrarian governance in British India, but in a transformed manner. This 
transformation, which I call the “local”, stood for an analytical framework which 
classified localities on the basis of complex spatio-temporal interconstitutivities, 
rallying around an original, indigenous form of the “political”. The next chapter will 
begin where this one ended. It will take a plunge into the agrarian affairs of early-
nineteenth century British India by tracking the career of rent—one of its chief 
governmental categories, which was also the gateway of the “political”. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The regulator of agrarian power: rent 
 
Cuttack was the nineteenth division of Bengal Presidency. In 1837, East India 
Company’s government began the first land survey and settlement of Cuttack. The 
land revenue assessment of the division had been done earlier also. But things were 
markedly different this time. The government seemed to be occupying every nook and 
corner of the agrarian landscape of Cuttack. In every village, on every plot of land, 
there were men of the government. They came with questions. They also came with 
machines. They measured land, decided disputes between villagers over boundaries of 
fields, asked about the rates of different types of land, the crops, the cows, looked for 
deeds of ownership, and held assemblies with the headmen of villages, zemindars, 
talookdars, and cultivators of various kinds. The proceedings of the Collectorates in 
Cuttack, of the Bengal government, and of the India Office records, suggest 
unequivocally that there was quite a crowd in the villages of Cuttack in these years. 
This chapter marks the beginning of a search in the bye-lanes of these crowded 
places. It tries to find out what governance was looking for in the agrarian territory of 
Cuttack during this period. Instead of looking at quotidian practices of governance as 
an infinite range of contingent, on-the-spot, pragmatic, reactive, and arbitrary 
decisions
1
, the chapter assembles a firm epistemological matrix as the structuring 
logic of the diversity. In developing this matrix, I walk along the trail set up in the 
previous chapter by reorientations in political economy in early-nineteenth century 
Britain. I interpret agrarian governance in British India during this period as a 
particular articulation of political economy—one that I have described in the former 
chapter as the “political”. I demonstrate how the “political”—a bundle of property and 
political power—got fashioned as the primary object of agrarian governance in British 
India. In this chapter the demonstration begins with the category of rent.  
Over six sections, the chapter argues that rent was one of the pivotal markers 
of the “political” in British India in the first half of the nineteenth century. In 
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following the political-economic/governmental career of rent, I travel in and out of 
Cuttack, through times before and after the settlement. Cuttack was an anomalous 
zone in the world of British Indian agrarian governance. It was one of those areas 
which, despite being a part of the Bengal Presidency, never got governed by what has 
been typically and hastily identified in the historiography as the shorthand for agrarian 
governance in Bengal, namely, the policy of Permanent Settlement. In terms of 
agrarian governance, Cuttack, I argue, stood forth as a complex site where 
governmental practices of other regions jostled as overlapping, contradictory, and 
interconstitutive forces. As an agrarian locality, therefore, its history has to be 
envisioned as a necessarily intertwined one, connected and disjointed at the same 
time, written simultaneously with histories of other regions. The nature of these 
connections will be studied in greater detail in the next chapter. This chapter focuses 
on myriad articulations of rent across a range of administrative sites. It argues that the 
category of rent, in all these sites, instead of being perceived as a sign of the 
productive capacity of soil, was deployed as a marker of the domain of the “political”. 
It was debated and developed as the most important historical trace of the different 
kinds of proprietary power in British India. Rent was used to understand the particular 
forms of interrelations between property and political power operative in different 
localities. It was defined as that crucial transaction which held these relationships 
together. It was viewed as one of the most important regulators of agrarian power.
2
 
Accordingly, over the first half of nineteenth century, the regulation of rent was set up 
as one of the major tasks of agrarian governance. This chapter shows how various 
strategies were devised to carefully map, supervise, and control rent. The following 
chapters will demonstrate how the “political”, in a transformed manner, as the “local” 
emerged as the general object of agrarian governance in British India. In this chapter, 
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on better soils, and argued for political intervention to fix levels which would secure a sufficiency of 
income to the tenants. For their theory, they preferred Jones to Malthus or Ricardo. Rent was regarded 
not as the necessary expression of economic factors creating a “net product”, but as a variable 
originally traced to power.” But Robb does not take Jones’s general reconceptualization of political 
economy as a possible interpretive entry-point to the foundations of agrarian governance, which, as I 
argue in this dissertation, were laid much earlier in the nineteenth century. Peter Robb, Ancient Rights 
and Future Comfort: Bihar, the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 and British Rule in India, London, 1997, 
197.    
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therefore, I show how rent was conceived as both the entry-point into, and the 
defining element of, the “political”.  
   
           
A topography of the “political”: Bengal, “local” and the 5th Report 
 
The earliest presentation to the British Parliament of a comprehensive discussion on 
revenue-administration in British-India was made in the 5
th
 Report from the Select 
Committee of East India Affairs in 1812. The report discussed matters of revenue-
administration as part of a general critique of the Bengal Code, namely, the 
Cornwallis-inspired model of administration, which was established in Bengal in 
1793. The policy of a permanent zemindary settlement constituted the land-revenue 
policy, and, therefore, the core of the “Bengal Code”.  
Through a detailed discussion of the operation of the Bengal Code in different 
parts of the country, the report argued that it was ill-suited to several “local” 
conditions. Next, the report discussed a number of alternative administrative 
arrangements which were considered to be more sensitive to the “local” 
characteristics of different areas. I argue that the conceptual grid within which the 
critique of the Bengal Code was organized in the 5
th
 Report was the category of the 
“local”. The “local”, which explained changes in revenue-administration, was an 
expression of difference in tenures, or proprietary rights in land. It established an 
entire spectrum of hierarchized difference over which the problematic
3
 of land-tenures 
was distributed. I will argue that the epistemological basis of this hierarchized 
difference was political-economic. The “local” signified difference in the 
arrangements of property and political power, distributed over a range of geographical 
localities. It represented varying configurations of the “political”. It established the 
“political” as the object of agrarian governance. Practices of governance adopted the 
“local” as a spatio-temporal frame within which the particulars of the “political” got 
distributed as a range of landholders and landholding bodies, fashioning an entire 
matrix of power flowing out of proprietary relations. This is how, I argue, agrarian 
                                                 
3
I use the term problematic in an Althusserian sense throughout the chapter. Althusser defines 
“problematic” as that which brings out within a given ideological formation, “…the system of 
questions commanding the answers given by the ideology”. Althusser argues that it is through the 
problematic that every ideological formation structures its unity.  Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. 
Ben Brewster, London, 1977 (1969), 67.  
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governance remained grounded within the assumptions of a particular form of 
political-economy—one that was rewritten by the “political” in early-nineteenth 
century Britain.   
In exploring the “local”, the 5th Report used rent to demarcate the domain of 
proprietary power. The proprietary-forms it ended up excavating will be taken up in 
the next chapter. In this chapter, I will discuss how rent was used to open up 
interrelations between property and political power. The 5
th
 Report was perhaps the 
earliest and most systematic example of this analytical operation. It pointed out that in 
India, the ryots, or the peasant cultivators, held the most authentic form of proprietary 
right in land. This property-right existed in the most ancient times, when the country 
was ruled by a Hindu sovereign. Since then, through the oppressive period of Muslim 
rule, a successively corrupt gradation of property rights emerged in India. The 
property rights of “village headmen”, and “chief cultivators”, evident in Benares, and 
that of the “zemindars”, found in the permanently-settled areas of Bengal were 
instances of those corrupt forms.  
The report tried to prove the existence of property rights during ancient times 
in India from a discussion of land-tenures in the Presidency of Fort St. George. For 
example, it noted about Malabar and Canara that, “The lands in general appear to 
have constituted a clear private property, more ancient, and probably more perfect, 
than that of England. The tenure, as well as the transfer, of this property, by descent, 
sale, gift, and mortgage, is fortified by a series of regular deeds…”4 The Report 
emphasized that along with alienable rights, it was a landlord’s rent which proved the 
existence of private property in land. It pointed out that the government assessment 
under Hindu rule was moderate enough to leave this rent with the owner of the land. 
But, “…the increase which that assessment underwent at different times, during the 
Mahommedan government at Mysore, was so great…The landlords had so little rent 
left to them, after rendering their public dues, as to be mostly unable to subsist upon 
it…”5 Evidently, the Report suggested that without the existence of rent there ceased 
to be a property in land. 
Existence of private property in land was defined in similar terms with regard 
to the Meerassadars, or the main tenure-holders of Jaghire. The Report mentioned 
                                                 
4“The Fifth Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company”, P.P,, 1812, 
130. 
5
Ibid, 132. 
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that, “…they possess a real property in the land, having the right of mortgaging, 
selling, and otherwise disposing of it…”6 In discussing the oppressions of Muslim 
rule in the region, the Report stated, “Where the demand of government was so high 
as to have absorbed nearly the whole of the landlord’s rent…the land naturally ceased 
to be either a mortgageable or saleable commodity; but even in that case, if the 
meerassadar did not cultivate the land himself…he was entitled to receive from the 
cultivator a russoom, or quit rent, in acknowledgment of his proprietary right…”7 
The 5
th
 Report articulated, quite forcefully, the question of tenures or 
proprietary right as the chief concern of revenue-administration in British-India. Like 
James Mill, the 5
th
 Report also deployed rent as a historical clue to the “political” in 
India. That is, both used rent to posit a particular enmesh of property and political 
power as the authentic form of the “political” in India. But there was a crucial 
difference between the two articulations. Mill, through a reinterpreted Ricardianism, 
argued that the state in India was ultimately the universal landlord, irrespective of the 
ryots’ quasi-proprietary rights over the soil. Thus, it could legitimately extract the full 
rent as revenue, or land-tax. As I have shown in the previous chapter, Mill 
emphasized that this was consistent with a scientific, productive, political-economic 
form of taxation. But the report noted that rent-property was retained in designing 
revenue-administration in this Presidency. “At an early period of British 
administration, it appears that the share of the produce received by the landlords as 
rent, was about fifteen per cent, and that which belonged to the tenant, 57 or 58 per 
cent, leaving the remainder, about twenty-four per cent, as the land tax or public 
demand…”8 As it is evident, the report implied that the field of the “political” in India 
was forged by several landholders, or landholding bodies. The Company’s 
government, therefore, allowed the rent to be distributed in different portions over this 
dispersed field. In the representations of the 5
th
 Report, therefore, rent was considered 
something more than and different from a value emerging solely from differential 
fertility of land. It was seen as that part of the produce, that income from land which, 
in being distributed amongst different landholders, defined, and held together the 
dispersed domain of the “political”. In this manner, the “political” was inaugurated in 
the 5
th
 Report as a decisive threshold of difference with respect to a certain variant of 
                                                 
6
Ibid, 136. 
7
Ibid. 
8
Ibid, 132. 
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political economy, namely the Ricardian one. It set in motion a dynamic field of 
interpretive possibilities, centred on the issue of proprietary power.  
 
Rent and the Permanent Settlement: a new analytic of power 
 
John Herbert Harington came to British-India as a writer in 1780, during the 
Governor-Generalship of Warren Hastings. His official career lasted for nearly half a 
century. Over this period he occupied several important judicial positions of the 
Company’s government. He served variously as the Magistrate of Dinagepore, as the 
Register of Sudder Dewanny and Nizamat Adawlut, as a member of the Board of 
Revenue, and as the Judge of the Sudder Dewanny and Nizamat Adawlut.
9
 His 
influential two-volume analysis of the Bengal Regulations used to function as a 
manual for all district officers in Bengal. Just before retirement, in 1827, Harington 
wrote a treatise on the question of tenures in Bengal. It was titled, “Minute and Draft 
of Regulation, of the Rights of Ryots in Bengal”. It must be remembered that 
Harington’s text was produced in an administrative milieu which was critical of the 
way the category of landed property had been treated during the Permanent 
Settlement of Bengal. The critique of Permanent Settlement was on the rise right from 
the first decade of the nineteenth century.
10
 This critique was primarily invested in 
redefining the field of landed property, not only in Bengal, but also in other parts of 
British India, which were gradually coming under the Company’s government.  
It was being argued that the Permanent Settlement of Bengal had mistakenly 
established the zemindars, or big landlords, as the exclusive proprietors of the soil. In 
doing this it had swept away a great variety of proprietary rights possessed by 
different kinds of landholders.
11
 Harington’s essay, in the spirit of this critique, aimed 
                                                 
9
Extracts from Harington’s Analysis of the Bengal Regulations, Calcutta, 1866, V. 
10Right Honorable John Sullivan’s note in the collection of evidence presented to the House of 
Commons Select Committee on the affairs of East India Company contained a systematic review of the 
several positions against Permanent Settlement. Written in 1832, the note mentioned that, “The 
preceding Administration at home had, in the years, 1801, 1802, 1804, and 1809 evinced a disposition 
more and more adverse to any early extension of the Bengal Permanent Settlement in the Madras 
possessions. A similar course had been pursued in the years 1810 and 1811, and the early part of 1812, 
as relating to the modern acquisitions of the Bengal side of India.” “Observations on the Revenue 
Systems of India”, by the Right Honorable John Sullivan, Appendix 8, Revenue, 51, Report from the 
Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company; with minutes of evidence in six parts, and 
an appendix and index to each, P.P., 1831-32.  
11
Lamenting the pernicious effects of this measure, Lord Moira, the Governor-General in 1815, noted 
that, “If it was the intention of our Regulations to deprive every class but the large proprietors who 
engaged with Government, of any share in the profits of the land, that effect has been accomplished in 
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at a redefinition of the category of landed property in the context of Bengal. His chief 
analytical tool in this exercise was rent. In this section I interpret this administrative 
articulation of property as a political-economic one. I suggest that the epistemological 
basis of rent in Harington’s essay was what I have called in the previous chapter the 
“political” in political economy. Richard Jones perceived the fundamental 
constituents of political economy as conditioned by particular configurations of 
property and political power. The problematic of Jonesian political economy was, 
therefore, an assemblage of property and political power, which adopted different 
forms in different nations of the world. Even James Mill, as I demonstrated in the 
former chapter, upheld the “political”, namely, a similar matrix of property and 
political power, as the problematic of political economy in applying a reinterpreted 
Ricardianism to British India. Most importantly, in both cases the category of rent 
was construed as one of the primary components of the architecture of the “political”. 
Harington also, I argue, deployed rent as a political-economic category. He used it to 
explore the formations of the “political” in Bengal. 
Harington’s essay was a reinterpretation of the Permanent Settlement in the 
light of the category of rent. It reflected on the relationship between the zemindars 
and other landholders—primarily the ryots, but also others like dependent 
talookdars—in Bengal. Harington perceived all these landholders as possessing 
varying degrees of proprietary rights. More importantly, he pointed out that there 
were provisions in the regulations of the Permanent Settlement itself for the protection 
of these rights. But they were not clearly defined and enforced by the government. 
Harington argued that only a careful regulation of rent can ensure these rights. In this 
matrix of proprietary rights, the inferior ones were always under the threat of being 
destroyed by the superior ones. Harington saw rent as that political transaction, or 
vehicle of power, which defined proprietary rights by marking their boundaries, and 
therefore prescribing the limit at which they ceased to exist.
12
 
                                                                                                                                            
Bengal. No compensation can now be made for the injustice done to those who used to enjoy a share of 
those profits under the law of the Empire, and under institutions anterior to all records, for the transfer 
of their property to the Rajahs.” “Minute by the Right hon. the Governor-General, on the Revenue 
Administration of the Presidency of Fort William, dated the 21
st
 September 1815”, Report from the 
Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company, Appendix 9, Revenue, 84.  
12He noted that, “The causes, which have principally operated in producing insecurity and oppression 
to the peasants of Bengal…” were principally “…The omission of clear and definite rules in the 
Regulations of 1793, and subsequent years, for the declaring the rights and tenures of the ryots, whose 
rents were, in many instances, left to be adjusted by Pergunnah or other supposed local rates, no longer 
in existence, or ascertainable…” and “A want of due enforcement of rules, which were enacted on 
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Harington claimed that the systematic administration of rent had been one of 
the major concerns of the Permanent Settlement. By presenting extracts from the 
results of John Shore’s investigation into the tenures of Bengal, which were supposed 
to be the basis of the Permanent Settlement, Harington suggested that rent, as the 
primary marker of property, was present at the heart of this measure of governance. 
According to Harington, John Shore insisted that a Permanent Settlement should be 
based on a precise and transparent regulation of rent payable by the ryots and other 
under-tenants to the zemindars. Shore wrote that, “…the Rents to be paid by the 
Ryots, by whatever rule or custom they may be demanded, shall be specific as to their 
amount. If by a Pottah, containing the Assul and Abwab, the amount of both shall be 
inserted in it…In every Mofussil Cutcherry, the Nirkbundy, or rates of land, shall be 
publicly recorded, and the Zemindar is answerable for enforcing this Regulation, 
under a penalty or fine for neglect, at the discretion of Government.”13 In this manner, 
Shore went on to recommend an entire infrastructure of regulation, distributed over 
the village, the Pergunnah and the headquarters of the Collectorate, which was 
supposed to record fixed rates of rents and govern justly their transactions between 
the landholders.  
Harington regretted that this regulatory mechanism was not instituted during 
the Permanent Settlement. However, he pointed out, quoting the statement of another 
senior official, Mr. Colebrooke, that, “The power of making laws for the protection 
and welfare of the tenants, in the several classes of dependant Talookdars, Ryots, and 
other cultivators of the soil, was expressly reserved to Government, by an Article of a 
Proclamation enacted into Regulation I. of 1793; and Rules, with correspondent rates, 
may be sanctioned by Government…”14 After concluding his minute, Harington put 
forward the various clauses of the Regulation he proposed for the protection of the 
rights of Ryots. The Regulation put together, in a summarized form, his opinions 
expressed in the minute. Its central focus was the matter of ascertainment of 
legitimate rents and modes of governing their fair operation. This was considered as 
the essential mechanism for protecting and maintaining all proprietary rights in land. 
The way it envisioned property in land—as a matrix of dispersed, overlapping, and 
                                                                                                                                            
concluding a Permanent Settlement with the Zemindars and other landholders, requiring them, within a 
fixed period, to adjust the rent of their tenants, and furnish them with Pottahs; the forms of which were 
to be approved by the Collectors.” Harington, Minute and Draft of Regulation, 1. 
13
Ibid, 3.  
14
Harington, Minute and Draft of Regulation, 15. 
 83 
conflicting rights between zemindars, and talookdars and ryots of different kinds—
resounded the principles of Regulation VII of 1822.  
This regulation, to which I turn in the next section, was a crucial legislative 
moment in early nineteenth-century agrarian governance. Harington openly 
appreciated its vision of property in land. He quoted in detail from the 9
th
 Section of 
the Regulation, which laid bare this vision by prescribing rules for the governance of 
property. The section noted that the proceedings of the government officers involved 
in settling the land-revenue, “…shall embrace the formation of as accurate a record as 
possible, of all local usages connected with landed tenures, as full as practicable a 
specification of all persons enjoying the possession and property of the soil, or vested 
with any heritable or transferable interest in the land, or the rents of it; care being 
taken to distinguish the different modes of possession and property; and the real 
nature and extent of the interests held, more specially where several persons may hold 
interests in the same subject, matter of different kinds or degrees…”15  
Harington’s perception of rent was not completely severed from the Ricardian 
explanation of the category. He did argue that even the “pergunnah rates” or other 
“local rates” had some basis in the varying fertility of soil. However, in the complete 
constitution of the payment called “rent”, various other customary tributes, in the 
name of Abwab and Khurcheh, came into play. But for Harington, the relations of 
property and political power in which rent was embedded were of far greater 
analytical significance than the differential fertility of soil, which was merely a 
marginal empirical aspect of the category. In Harington’s text, rent functioned as a 
political-economic category only in so far as it signified the “political” or, the core of 
power relations between different proprietors of the land. For Harington, rent was not 
only an entry-point into the matrix of property and political power; it was that 
political-economic threshold beyond which the category of property vanished. In 
other words, as long as superior landholders took a legitimate rent from subordinate 
landholders, the field of property, defined by varying degrees of rights over land, 
remained in existence. Accordingly, he argued that the aim of agrarian governance 
should be the maintenance of this field of proprietary power, and protection of all 
kinds of rights residing in it. A careful mapping and regulation of rent was thought to 
be the key strategy towards this end.   
                                                 
15
Ibid, 29. 
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The early legislative career of rent 
 
Regulation VII of 1822 comprised of a new plan for the land-revenue settlement of 
the Ceded and Conquered Provinces and the temporarily-settled areas of the Bengal 
Presidency, including Cuttack. Harington had indicated that the principles of this 
regulation shared his formulation of the relation between rent and proprietary rights. 
Ascertainment of proprietary-rights was, undoubtedly, the central focus of this 
regulation. Its opening lines were: “…in revising the existing settlement, the efforts of 
the Revenue-officers should be chiefly directed not to any general and extensive 
enhancement of the jama, but to the objects equalizing the public burthens, and of 
ascertaining, settling and recording the rights, interests, privileges and properties of all 
persons and classes owning, occupying, managing or cultivating the land, or gathering 
or disposing of its produce, or collecting or appropriating the rent or revenue payable 
on account of land…”16 Determination of an entire gamut of proprietary rights in land 
had, by now, become the unequivocal objective of agrarian governance in British-
India. In the achievement of this objective, however, rent remained a crucial 
analytical tool. It continued to function as the principal reflector of the “political”.   
Holt Mackenzie, the chief architect of this regulation, held opinions similar to 
James Mill on the relationship between rent and the assemblage of property and 
political power. He adhered to the contemporary political-economic definition of rent, 
and also to Mill’s interpretation of the state as the general landlord in India, entitled to 
the full rent. In a letter to the Select Committee of the House of Commons, he noted 
that in India “the existence of private rights, limiting the right of government, so as to 
leave to the owners of the fields a portion of the rent, that is, a share of the surplus 
which remains, after paying wages and replacing stock, seems to have been rarely 
established…”17 Mackenzie further pointed out that, “few instances are to be found of 
individuals enjoying rent separately from the profits of tillage, excepting under some 
                                                 
16
F.G. Wigley (ed.), The Eastern Bengal and Assam Code, In Three Volumes Containing the 
Regulations and Local Acts in Force in the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, Vol. 1, Calcutta, 
1907, 177. 
17“Letter from the Right Honorable Holt McKenzie”, Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs 
of the East India Company, 300. 
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express grant or contract with Government. The Government, in short, was the great 
rent-owner…”18  
But unlike James Mill, Mackenzie did not believe that this government did, or 
should, assume the same principle in fixing the assessment. He emphasized that, “It 
was not indeed the intention of our Government to enforce its full rights. It was 
generally allowed that the interest of the country must suffer if it were attempted to 
draw the entire rent into the exchequer…still more with reference to the risk of taxing, 
and restricting production by an excessive assessment on the part of Government, as 
the general landlord, it was expedient to leave to individuals a valuable property in 
this land, whether permanent rights of property were admitted or not.”19 
It is to be noted that Mackenzie argued in favour of keeping a property, 
distinguishing this from “permanent rights of property”. He envisioned this 
proprietary right as a restricted kind, dependent on the payment of a certain portion of 
the rent. As a witness to the Select Committee, Mackenzie was asked how such 
proprietary rights in favour of ryots could be recovered in Bengal, the land of the 
ruinous policy of the Permanent Settlement. In reply, Mackenzie stated that,  
 
“In cases in which it may appear that the legal demand of the zemindar is such 
as to leave a valuable property to the ryot, the object will be accomplished by the full 
ascertainment and due record of the fact; but in other, probably in the majority of 
cases, I am afraid it may be found that in strictness the legal demand of the zemindar 
is such as, if actually enforced, would leave the ryots’ right of occupancy of no value; 
for the rates nominally existing will often be found excessive if applied to the land 
accurately measured; and in the absence of established money rates, the ordinary 
measure of the government revenue is stated at one half of the gross produce, which I 
apprehend would generally swallow up all rent."
20
 
  
Mackenzie argued, like Harington, that the regulation of rent was absent in 
Bengal, which resulted in a destruction of proprietary rights in land. This allowed the 
superior landholders, or the zemindars, to usurp that restricted proprietary right which 
the government intended to maintain amongst the inferior landholders, or 
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Ibid, 301. 
19
Ibid. 
20“Examination of Witnesses, Holt McKenzie, April 18, 1832”, Report from the Select Committee on 
the Affairs of the East India Company, 226. 
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cultivators.
21
 He pointed out that the zemindars destroyed that proprietary right by 
extracting the full rent.
22
 Thus, Mackenzie pointed out that a settlement, “…embraced 
two great branches of inquiry; first, the relation of the people to each other and to the 
government; and, secondly the extent of productiveness of the land, …The first 
branch of inquiry has been almost wholly neglected…It was yet the branch of inquiry 
that most demanded attention, both because, to maintain the rights of the people is the 
main object of all government, and because, in it, inaccuracy is fatal to utility...”23 
It can be seen clearly that although Mackenzie adhered to the Ricardian 
definition of rent, as the surplus over profits of cultivation and wages of labour, he 
located its political-economic function in the realm of the “political”. That is why he 
viewed the settlement of rent as an exercise in exploring, disaggregating, and 
governing a web of relations between the state and various kinds of landholders—
relations constituting a complex of property and political power, or the “political”. 
Like Harington, once again, he did not neglect the link between rent and 
productiveness of soil. But he insisted that the task of settling the domain of power-
relations embodied by rent was much-neglected and needed urgent attention. Unlike 
Mill, McKenzie did not abhor all property arising from rent. He believed that the 
maintenance of property in land, albeit of a limited kind, was consistent to the 
principles of utility. He wished to retain a property in land for the cultivators, which 
did not merely consist of a right to occupy and cultivate the same land for a long 
period. This is how James Mill had described the “proprietary” rights of ryots in 
India. McKenzie, on the contrary, was willing to reserve a more valuable property in 
the land for the ryots, which would allow the ryot to become a proprietor by owning a 
certain portion of the rent.  
Eric Stokes’s work identifies Holt Mackenzie as an unequivocal follower of 
the Ricardian doctrine of rent. Stokes argues that Mackenzie’s proposals for the 
                                                 
21He noted that “…the rule authorizing the exchequer to take as revenue one half of the produce, which 
in the hands of government is in a great manner nominal…becomes in the hands of its assignees, the 
zemindars or revenue contractors, a real measure of demand: and those persons, in a great part of the 
permanently settled districts, have therefore the power of destroying the property of the inferior, just as 
in the unsettled districts government may, and sometimes does, destroy the property of the cultivating 
zemindars by an excessive demand. For I conceive that, taking the general average of the country, if 
more than a third be taken by government, there can be no private property in the land; that is to say, no 
rent…” Ibid, 227. 
22McKenzie noted that this was because the zemindars were, “…without any such obligation as 
attaches to the government of considering the general good, and as makes it our duty to restrict our 
demand within the legal limit, so as to be consistent with the existence of private property and the 
improved comfort of the people.” Ibid, 226. 
23
Ibid, 298, emphasis mine. 
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assessment of the land revenue demand of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces were 
rooted in the net produce criterion declared by James Mill. But Stokes notes that in 
practice Mackenzie applied this principle very cautiously. Mackenzie, he argues, 
knew that it would be impossible to extract information on soil fertility from the 
multiplicity of local practices which determined payments between cultivators and 
revenue engagers.
24
 My reading of this moment in the governance of rent differs from 
this analysis. I argue that Mackenzie’s move away from Mill’s Ricardianism can be 
better understood as a position grounded in a different political economy. It was not 
inspired by contingencies of “practice”, which the “theory” could not address. 
Mackenzie’s primary aim, as this section shows, was to excavate, and govern the 
“political”. He was more interested in finding out the networks of proprietary power 
than a measure of soil fertility. Rent, for him, was not an index of varying 
productivity; it was a transaction which defined the relationships constituting the 
“political”. Accordingly, Mackenzie believed that it is only by preserving some rent in 
the hands of the cultivators that a balance of power in agrarian relations could be 
maintained.    
As the settlement was conducted on the basis of the principles of Regulation 
VII of 1822 in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, officials observed that it 
progressed very slowly.
25
 Such circumstances necessitated a modification of this 
regulation. William Bentinck, then governor-general, organized a conference of 
revenue-officers on this matter at Allahabad on 21 January 1833. Recommendations 
from this discussion led to a new plan of settlement, which got legislated as 
Regulation IX of 1833.
26
 The settlement in Cuttack, which began in 1836, was 
executed according to the principles of this regulation. As expected, a particular 
relationship between rent and property framed this regulation. I now examine a 
minute by Bentinck which discussed this relation in detail. This minute formed a part 
of the guidelines of the settlement in Cuttack, and was sent to the Commissioner of 
Cuttack, as an enclosure to one of the circular orders of the Sudder Board of Revenue. 
It was one of those documents which, by virtue of its physical cohabitation in both the 
district record-room of Cuttack and in the India Office record-room in London, staged 
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Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India, Delhi, 1989, 94-99.  
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a materially embodied effect of demonstrating the discursive cohabitation of the 
“imperial” and the “local”.  
Bentinck argued that “…As far as the rights of the Government are concerned, 
I think I am at liberty to assume that a minute inquisition into the capacity of each 
field or each village of the country is unnecessary.”27 He further pointed out that, 
“…As observed by the Governor of Madras…‘In fixing the assessment of the lands of 
any village, the safest guide is the actual produce and collections of former 
years.’…”28 Like McKenzie, Bentinck also believed that, as revenue, the government 
is not entitled to the full rent. For him revenue meant the government share, of the 
rent, or the proprietary profit of each landholding class.
29
 It is evident that Bentinck’s 
articulation of rent differed significantly from the Ricardian rendition of the category. 
That is why he thought a minute examination into the productive capacities of land, 
by disaggregating the constituent elements of agricultural production, like cost of 
production, soil quality, or wages of labour, was not necessary in the process of fixing 
rent. Rather, he believed that the settlement of rent would bring forth a far more 
useful exercise—the mapping of the “political”, or the determination of the various 
degrees of proprietary rights distributed between the state and a variety of 
landholders. His discussion of rent, therefore, was entirely an analytical foray in the 
category of property in land.  
Bentinck wrote extensively on tenures in this minute. I will not go into an 
analysis of his formulation, as the various modes in which the entire problematic of 
tenures were expressed would be the object of examination in the next chapter. Here, 
it will be sufficient to note that in this minute he came up with a particular 
formulation of the domain of legitimate proprietary rights, which proved to be 
influential in the context of the upcoming settlement in Cuttack. He proposed the 
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maintenance of only those proprietary rights in land which he considered authentic.
30
 
He identified three kinds of proprietary rights as authentic. These included a 
Putteedaree tenure, where the proprietary right rested in a land-sharing unit, called by 
Bentinck a ‘village community’, zemindars and talookdars of a certain kind, and only 
those ryots who were original hereditary occupants of the soil. He warned against 
confounding old, permanent, original tenures with new, temporary, false ones. 
Bentinck remarked, “that it should always be borne in mind, that though there may be 
cultivators who have proprietary rights or rights of occupancy, it does not follow that 
all cultivators have such rights; and that, on the other hand, though there may be 
Zemindars who are merely contractors for the revenue, there may be other zemindars 
who are entitled to be considered as proprietors also. The greatest care should be 
taken to discriminate between the different classes as well of Zemindar as cultivator, 
and to avoid confounding the Malgoozar of later years with the hereditary Zemindar; 
and the mere agricultural labourer…with the hereditary ryot whose ancestors perhaps 
first broke up the soil and paid the revenue, or rent of the lands, direct to the servants 
of the State…”31  
In this manner, rent was used as a heuristic device in defining and establishing 
an entire matrix of proprietary rights as the central object of agrarian governance in 
early nineteenth-century British India. Mackenzie and Bentinck’s formulation of the 
“political”, woven into the regulations of 1822 and 1833 were crucial moments in this 
particular political-economic articulation of rent. The way they defined the “political”, 
as a dispersed assemblage of proprietary rights and political power, will be taken up 
in the next chapter. For the time being, I will bring attention to the fact that this was 
also the time when settlement operations began in Cuttack. 
 
Settling the “political”: the crowd in Cuttack 
 
Fixing rates of rent was an immensely complex affair in the settlement of Cuttack. 
The process of settling rent unearthed the various relations of power embedded in 
contending proprietary claims. The category of rent, therefore, could never be 
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fashioned out of an assessment of variations in soil fertility. In Talooka Bishnupur, 
Pergunnah Bakrabad, Mr. Hunter, the Collector, tried to derive rent solely from the 
productive potential of lands of various kinds. F.J. Halliday, secretary to the Board of 
Revenue noted the terrible incomprehension resulting from such a method. Halliday 
pointed out that, “These sorts he found to amount to three hundred! And he reduced 
them by a process not explained to the less alarming but still unintelligible number of 
twenty nine.”32 Such a method faced immediate rejection. The Commissioner, Mr. 
Mills, called such estimates “conjectural”. Everywhere rent rates were determined 
with reference to the specific proprietary status of different kinds of landholders. 
Thus, Mill pointed out that “the assignment of a trifle more than the moiety 
of…produce to the cultivator in which are included risks, outlay, labour, maintenance 
is a very insufficient provision. I would have rather allowed him half of what remains 
from the gross produce of the land after deducting all expenses balancing such 
calculations with the rents actually found to have been paid…”33  
But protecting the cultivator as a policy was not always appreciated. In settling 
Talooka Koorkoora, Pergunnah Kowakund, Mr. Taylor stated that, “I have based all 
my calculations on the principle of leaving to the cultivators after payment of the tax 
on his land, & defraying the necessary expenses of culture half at least of the 
produce.”34 Halliday, deputed as a supervisor of settlement, objected to such a 
decision. On the basis of a hypothesized calculation, he pointed out that such a 
method leaves only 1/5
th
 of the produce as “rent” to the landlord, which is a dismally 
low share. Halliday argued that, “…the proportion of rent to produce always 
decreases with the progress of civilization & improvement & is now in England on an 
average about one fifth having been formerly one fourth, one third or even two fifths. 
If then in an unimproved & semi-civilized country like Cuttack Mr. Taylor has really 
assigned as rent to the landlord only one fifth he has assuredly committed a great 
mistake on the side of moderation & probably underassessed the lands very 
considerably…”35 Halliday was generally against the notion that the rent of ryots 
needed to be fixed in order to prevent limitless exaction by the zemindar. During the 
settlement of Putna Buheepore, Pergunnah Kowulkund, he commented elabourately 
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on the role of rent in determining the relation between zemindars and ryots. He 
maintained that,  
 
“I have been as far as my opportunities went, a careful observer of the 
relations between Zemindar and tenant and the result of my observations has weaned 
me in a very great degree from the prejudice adopted by most persons from the earlier 
writings on Indian statistics respecting the universal oppressions and exactions of 
Zemindars and the universal miseries of the Ryots. I am certain that the zemindars are 
much bellied on this point and that their treatment of their tenants, little understood by 
us, is forbearing & sympathising in a far greater degree than we usually give credit 
for. In short I do not believe that the Zemindars as a body do oppose their Ryots as 
has been supposed…”36 
  
More importantly, he did not consider the hereditary occupant cultivator or the 
thanee ryot of Cuttack to be a proprietor. He described them as “resident farmers”, 
and noted that by fixing their rents, the government is making proprietors out of 
farmers. Halliday observed that,  
 
“…in the case of the Thanee…they are not said to be proprietors but farmers 
who have we are told a right to a fixed money rent and to permanent occupation of 
their tenures as long as they pay that rent. To the latter portion of their supposed 
rights, I have no objection, but the former appears to me to involve a contradiction in 
terms. For in order to avoid trenching upon profits and wages which we are of course 
utterly unable to define and which after all may often be infringed we are obliged to 
exceed the other way and trench upon rent. But a farmer who receives in addition to 
wages and profits, a share of the rent is pro tanto a proprietor, which the Thanees do 
not claim to be.”37  
 
Halliday was in favor of fixing rents at “market rates”, and reserving 
proprietary profits only for the zemindars, identified by him as landlords.  
It is evident from Halliday’s characterization of rent that he was speaking in 
the language of Malthusian rent theory. His notion of a fair rate of rent was premised 
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on a universal relation between rate of rent and capital investment in agriculture. 
More importantly, adhering strictly to Ricardian theory, Halliday divided the domain 
of agricultural production into “landlords”, “farmers” and “labourers”, making only 
the zemindar, or the landlord, deserving of property from rent. In tune with this 
classificatory scheme, he described thanee ryots as “farmers”. Thus, it is but natural 
that he believed “that the true protection of the ryot is to be found not in violating for 
his sake the laws of political economy but in giving him ready access to Courts of 
justice and teaching him to depend upon written agreements.”38 He did not perceive 
rent as that payment which reflected different proprietary relations of power in 
different nations. This is how Richard Jones construed rent. Jones’s political economy 
was rooted in such an assemblage of property and political power, or the “political”. 
He argued that in India, these relations of power could not be divided readily into 
landlords, farmers, and labourers. They were dispersed over a range of landholding 
bodies. Rent, in the Jonesian scheme, therefore, was primarily a pointer to this field of 
power. But for Halliday, rent remained more conventionally Ricardian—a measure of 
the differential fertility of soil, payable to the sole proprietor, the landlord.  
But Halliday’s assertions went in vain. His political-economic faith 
notwithstanding, the rent of thanee ryots was fixed in Cuttack. Interestingly, in 
Cuttack, only zemindars and village proprietors of different descriptions, like 
Surburakars, Mokuddums, Pudhans, were recognized officially as receiving a 
proprietary allowance.
39
 The thanee ryots were not officially registered as proprietors, 
receiving proprietary allowances. But despite that, their rents were fixed. It might 
appear that the settlement policy in Cuttack concurred with Halliday’s representations 
in not identifying the thanee ryot as proprietor. But, by that same standard, the fixing 
of rent of the thanee ryot appears contradictory. The contradiction gets resolved if one 
looks at the difference within contemporary political economy in the framing of the 
relation between rent and property. Within the settlement policy of Cuttack, rent was 
fundamentally deployed as the sign of the “political”, or as the expression of relations 
of power between superior and inferior landholders. Rent was conceived primarily as 
that instrument which regulated this equation, and since the thanee ryot, or the 
hereditary cultivator, had already been identified as a vulnerable actor in this matrix 
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of power, it was important to adjust the relation somewhat in his favor by fixing rent. 
I will argue that this kind of political economy continued to inform the use of rent 
throughout the settlement. Ricardian uses of the category jostled to find space, but 
were, almost always, pushed to the margins. 
For official proprietors as well, rent was pitched as that transaction which 
stabilized a field of power. Regarding the settlement of Talooka Chunderbanpoor, 
Pergunnah Sosa, the Commissioner differed with the settling officer on the usefulness 
of Surburakars. He emphasized that, “Many of these Surburakars have possessed their 
villages for centuries & have successfully resisted in the Courts, all attempts of the 
zemindars to raise their rents.”40 So, not only were the Surburakars considered ancient 
proprietors of Cuttack, their significance was also understood in terms of their role in 
maintaining rent as an equitable transaction of power between zemindars and other 
inferior holders. They were considered as important contributors to the diffusion of 
power in the domain of proprietary relations. There were several instances where 
fixing of rent meant balancing power-equations between zemindars and ryots. Even 
when settling officers thought that such a balancing act might go against the prospect 
of “improvement”, by curbing the powers of the zemindar to encourage agriculture, 
the “political” pre-configuration of rent dictated their actions.  
In Pergunnah Saibeer tobacco was cultivated extensively. It was one of those 
rare estates in Cuttack which produced in abundance a commercially valuable crop. 
Owing to the vulnerability of the tobacco lands to encroachment of the river, rent on 
those lands used to be settled by the Zemindar at the close of the rains every year. But 
during the settlement, the Commissioner noted, that the “The Thanee ryots insisted on 
their tobacco lands being secured to them…at a particular rate, and in order to indulge 
them and prevent their being ruined by their own perverseness the rates were lowered 
some forty five per cent, and to those holding lands the situation of which is very 
precarious a small portion of waste of a good quality has been given…”41 The 
Commissioner thought that the earlier arrangement was more suited to the conditions 
of agriculture and situation of ryots. He pointed out that, “…every order which tends 
to the division of the profits of cultivation amongst greater numbers is injurious to 
every interest connected with the land, these “independent” ryots themselves not 
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excepted for not withstanding the reductions made they will be ruined the first year in 
which the deposit necessary for the growth of the plant shall be wanting, the zemindar 
will afford them no assistance, and exercise no forbearance, he will be the person 
ultimately to benefit by the sacrifice…”42 But, in spite of the Commissioner’s 
judgment, which reflected a typically Malthusian belief in the potential of the landlord 
to act as an “improver”, settlement was made by fixing rates of each ryots and 
providing a culturable waste of good quality to all those ryots owning lands exposed 
to risks of flood. Once again, it can be seen that a preference emerging from dominant 
Ricardian and Malthusian political-economic notions—of centralized, landlord-
induced, capital-dependent agriculture—was not able to determine the function of 
rent, on the face of its “political” deployment. 
Fixing the rates low was the unequivocal objective of the settlement. Such a 
generalized policy certainly emerged out of the notion that rent was the key reflector 
of relations of power in the agrarian landscape. The strictly natural basis of rent did 
not, however, escape its use in the settlement. Naturalism is especially significant in 
Ricardo’s definition of the category. He painstakingly separated several constituent 
elements of agricultural production from that quintessential factor giving rise to rent, 
namely the productive capacity of soil. It is because of this exclusively natural origin 
of rent, that he claimed it to be an income without “value”. Mackenzie perhaps came 
closest to suggesting a method of settlement which would have embraced a minute 
inquiry into the productive capacity of each field. As I have shown, this method was 
rejected by Bentinck as unnecessarily laborious, because rent was assembled in the 
practices of agrarian governance as a different kind of political-economic category. 
Accordingly the naturalism inscribed in the Ricardian constitution of rent, was 
redefined by the “political”. In almost all instances at Cuttack, this naturalism got 
emplotted within frames of the “political”. 
So, in Talooka Patamoondee, a host of reasons were cited by the officials for 
fixing low rent rates. It was noted that the sea broke through the embankments in 
1831, impregnating the lands of the pergunnah with saline matter, which led to a 
severe deterioration of the produce. The lands were still exposed to such risks of 
inundation. Moreover, there was no market nearby for disposal of the produce. But 
when the measuring aumeens prepared the jummabundee the Collector found that the 
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returns were full of exaggerated and erroneous estimates. Moreover, the Collector 
stated that, “…no confidence could be placed on the surburakars records few Rhyots 
had Pottahs” and finally, “…the only means left were to take the zemindars papers as 
the guide and to assess the lands according to their quality and advantages of 
situation…”43 It can be seen that although the natural circumstances and capacities of 
land were recorded specifically in describing the process of fixing rent, following the 
official directives of settlement, past payments were taken as the ultimate guide in 
ascertaining rents.  
But the records of past payments could only be taken from superior 
landholders like zemindars and village proprietors, who were represented as more 
powerful actors than cultivators in official discourse. So, their accounts were accepted 
only after assemblies in the villages admitted them. In Patamoondee too, the 
zemindar’s papers were accepted only through such an assembly. As the Collector 
noted in his report: “I also visited every village in the Pergunnah, reviewed the 
mouzawarree estimates prepared by the Deputy Collector on the spot and heard the 
objection of the people to the demand which it was proposed to fix on the village, so 
that I can with confidence state that no little pains has been taken to make an equitable 
and fair settlement…The surburakars are satisfied, the Thanee ryots have willingly 
engaged…and the demand is on the whole moderate.”44 Such village assemblies 
further reinforced the particular political-economic placement of rent which was 
rooted to perceptions of a dispersal of power in the sphere of the “political” in India. 
Reflecting the same spirit, in settling Talook Rughoonathpore, the Collector noted: 
“After checking the measurement and classification and making notes where it was 
necessary, I took up the case of each Thanee Ryot separately examined the papers of 
the zemindar and canoongoe as to the quantity and quality of his land enquired into 
his condition viz., whether he had risen or fallen in the world and why, heard any 
thing he had to say for himself and then fixed his Jummah.”45  
Settlement reports in Cuttack went on representing such compulsory and 
unmediated intercourse of the officials with the organic constituents of the domain of 
the “political” as the decisive factor in determining rent. This had significant 
                                                 
43Letter from A.J.M. Mills, Collector’s Office, Cuttack, Bengal Sudder Board of Revenue, 20 th April, 
1838, No. 4, IOL. 
44
Ibid. 
45‘Letter to Assistant Commissioner of Revenue, Cuttack, from J. Grant, Collector, Balasore, 25th 
December, 1835’, Old No. 506, Acc. No. 95C, August 1835 to November 1835, CDR, Revenue, OSA. 
 96 
implications in delineating the figures of the “political”, laying down its boundaries, 
differentiating between its authentic and false members, and finally, establishing an 
entire calculus of relationships as the object of agrarian governance in British India. I 
do not suggest that the measures taken to fix rent in Cuttack reflected a governmental 
intention to remove inequalities of power, by granting protection to cultivators against 
landlords. That will amount to an uncritical reproduction of the official narrative, 
without any interrogation of the meanings of its categories. Rather, I argue that the 
critique of big landlords during this period was simultaneously a celebration of new 
wielders of power in agrarian localities. This foregrounding of new power holders, 
like the surburakars, the thanee ryots, or even the “village” was based on further 
exclusions, and other hierarchies. It will be shown in the next chapter that despite 
being presented as “ryots”, or “peasant cultivators”, these figures were far removed 
from the tillers of the soil. Moreover, the same governmental strategies which 
awarded greater privileges, than what they used to enjoy earlier, to them, also 
denounced and devaluated the rights of other tillers of the soil.  Rent played a critical 
role in determining the contours of this landscape of agrarian power. But these matters 
will be analyzed in greater detail in the coming chapters.  
 
A theory of practice 
 
In the 1860’s Henry Ricketts wrote a series of essays from London on the question of 
rent in Bengal. Ricketts was an experienced administrator, who had climbed the 
ladders of the British Indian bureaucracy between the 1820’s and 1840’s. Beginning 
as a Collector, he ended his administrative career as an influential and respected 
member of the Board of Revenue. For my purpose, Ricketts is particularly relevant as 
a large part of his lower-level administrative career was spent in the Cuttack Division. 
He began as the Magistrate and Collector of Cuttack in 1827 and eventually left the 
Division in the 1840’s as its Commissioner. Other than Cuttack, Ricketts also served 
at Chittagong and parts of the Central Provinces. Later, as a member of the Board of 
Revenue, to which he was appointed in 1849, he regularly expressed strong opinions 
on various matters of agrarian policy. He took an active role in the debates preceding 
the formulation of the “Rent Act”, or Act X of 1859. 46  
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In the context of several legal disputes around questions of land rent in 
Bengal, Ricketts wrote a number of essays from England. The disputes were mostly 
between Indigo planters and ryots over the issue of enhancement of rent. As such 
cases flooded the district courts accompanied by a number of incidents of violent 
conflicts between ryots and planters, a range of opinions were generated at different 
levels of the administration on more general questions regarding the category of rent. 
Administrators started critically reviewing the history of agrarian governance in 
Bengal since the establishment of the Permanent Settlement. As I have shown earlier, 
even in this context rent was framed within the “political”, as that transaction which 
would give shape to all proprietary relations of power in the agrarian economy of 
Bengal.
47
  
Ricketts pointed out confidently in his essays that the foundational problems 
of agrarian governance in Bengal were a handiwork of the policy of Permanent 
Settlement, which left undefined a large area of relationships between the landlord 
and the peasant cultivator in the countryside. Once interpreted in this way, Ricketts 
was also quick to suggest that the only solution resided in a detailed settlement of 
agrarian relations in the discontented areas of Bengal. Such a settlement, he further 
noted, should take its inspiration from the model of land survey and settlement that 
was carried out in the Cuttack Division between 1836 and 1843. According to 
Ricketts, it was Cuttack, a marginal area of Bengal, from which the rest of Bengal 
should draw its model for an efficient, productive and peaceful resolution of the 
problems experienced in the domain of land relations. At the heart of his plea for a 
detailed settlement, the category of rent loomed large. Like other administrators of 
Bengal, Ricketts also shared the assumption that rent was the constitutive thread of 
the relations of power between landholders. So it was necessary to devise means to 
formulate it correctly.   
The first of the four essays that Ricketts wrote on this matter was entitled “The 
Real Difficulties in Bengal and How to Settle Them”. Commenting on the Indigo 
disputes, Ricketts noted that, “The real struggle is, which party is entitled to the 
advantages accruing to the different classes engaged in agriculture, from the increased 
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value of all agricultural produce.”48 The problem, in Ricketts’ opinion, originated 
from the range of administrative mistakes committed during the policy of Permanent 
Settlement. Ricketts lamented that “We have ever since continued to write and speak 
of the rights of the ryots, but they were never ascertained; of the Pergunnah rates, 
which were never adjusted; of the settlement, at which nothing was settled, but the 
revenue to be paid by each superior holder to the state.”49 All this litigation, Ricketts 
observed, displayed that rent was the battleground of interests between superior and 
inferior landholders. While the superior landholders tried to enhance the rent, the 
peasant cultivators tried hard to resist such an increase. Thus, Ricketts noted that in 
resolving these disputes, “There is but one complete remedy, and that is to do now 
what ought to have been done in 1793, to make forthwith a field survey, and a 
complete registry of all rights and interests in the lands…”50 
With this confident declaration, Ricketts brought Cuttack into the discussion. 
He pointed out that there should not be any apprehension, on the part of the state, in 
proceeding with such a plan of settlement. On the contrary, he suggested that, there 
are examples within Bengal only, which displayed excellent results in the 
administration of land relations, produced out of such a settlement. “Previously to the 
settlement of Cuttack, the province deteriorated each year, the people were 
discontented, and embarrassments and difficulties increased. Since the settlement, the 
province has flourished, the inhabitants have been among the most peaceful and well-
disposed of our subjects, there has been less litigation than in any other part of the 
empire…Let Bengal be treated precisely in the same manner, and there is no reason 
why there should not be the same result.”51  
Ricketts followed this essay with a second one, titled, “The Rent Difficulties 
in Bengal and How to Remedy Them; The Rent Facilities in Cuttack and How to 
Preserve Them”. Here Ricketts developed his critique of the official interpretation of 
the disturbed agrarian conditions in Bengal. He raised the example of the “Great Rent 
Case”, between Hills and Ishwur Ghose and began systematically recording his points 
of difference with the opinion of the Judge. The Chief Justice, in his judgment, had 
proclaimed that a “fair and equitable” rate of rent could be reached only by applying 
the Malthusian definition of rent. In laying a guideline for the Special Commissioner 
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deputed in the Indigo districts to settle the rent disputes, the Judge said, “We cannot 
lay down any better rule for his guidance than that we have quoted from Mr. Malthus 
in his Principles of Political Economy”52. The judgment further observed, that “He 
there defines rent to be ‘that portion of the value of the whole produce which remains 
to the owner of the land after all the outgoings belonging to its cultivation, of 
whatever kind, have been paid, including the profits of the capital employed, 
estimated according to the usual and ordinary rate of agricultural capital at the time 
being.’”53 
In arguing against the official opinion, Ricketts pointed out that such political-
economic prescriptions cannot be followed in fixing rent. He had his own 
propositions to offer in the matter. In another essay, titled, “A Few Last Words on the 
Rent Difficulties in Bengal,” he continued with these propositions. In both these 
essays, one of the primary objections he raised against the implementation of the 
Malthusian definition was the impossibility of calculation of the “outgoings of 
cultivation”. Indicating the infinite variety of costs related to cultivation, Ricketts 
pointed out that it is practically impossible to make an accurate calculation of all of 
them. He noted that the plan of basing the assessment on a comparison between costs 
of production and value of produce was proposed through Regulation VII, 1822, but 
later rescinded in Regulation XI, 1833. Ricketts had his own explanation of how a 
settlement could overcome such practical difficulties. Throughout the three essays, he 
maintained that questions of practice can only be sensitively tackled in the field, but 
not by adhering to rigid political-economic guidelines. He argued that as long as 
contentions around rent, and consequently, questions of power relations between 
agrarian groups, remained trapped in law and in the court-room, they would always 
lead to confusion.  
Ricketts represented the law, and its performative arena, the courtroom, both 
metaphorically and literally, the prisons of false analytical abstractions, in 
contradistinction to which stood the space of the open field, symbolizing truth and 
pure transparency. “The same point would be ruled in many different ways by the 
different courts. Good lands would be assessed at a low rate, and bad land at a high 
rate, the courts having been misled by clever representations, which they were unable 
                                                 
52
Henry Ricketts, The Rent Difficulties in Bengal and How to Remedy Them, The Rent Facilities in 
Cuttack and How to Preserve Them, London, 1863, 7.  
53
Ibid. 
 100 
to test by the only efficient test, investigation conducted over a considerable tract of 
country.”54 The field was also represented as that authentic, embodied, organic space 
of those relations of power which determined rent. Ricketts went on saying that the 
same people, who, in the court-room, stood as agents of corruption and deceit, 
became the torch-bearers of truth and objectivity in the open country. “He who might 
for a very small douceur be brought into the court to substantiate any story, however 
improbable, when taken into the field with all his neighbours among whom he has 
lived from his youth, and among whom he must live till his dying day, will, in a few 
hours, class a thousand acres of land, varying in every imaginable way, without 
making a mistake or causing a single remonstrance or murmur from all the eager 
listeners around him.”55 I argue that in Ricketts’s statements the field was represented 
as beyond, and opposed to, political-economic doctrines. But his perception of rent, as 
an articulation of the true nature of relations of power, remained tied to a different 
kind of political economy, which had reoriented itself in the light of the “political”. 
His notion of the practical, therefore, was already-always inscribed by a theoretical 
framing of the category of rent, just like most of the political economists of his time.   
It is easy to see how Ricketts garnered faith in the practical. As a settlement 
officer in Cuttack, he was bewildered by the inexplicable variety of rates of the lands 
in Talook Noanud. He noted that, “land of the same description and in every respect 
equal advantages not only pays at various rates in different villages, but in the same 
village and on the same Chuck. In one village, I found as many as 34 rates for rice 
lands alone.”56 Guided by a Ricardian commonsense, I will argue, he made an attempt 
to correspond rent to the productive capacity of the land. He tried to introduce a 
consistent scale of classification for different soils. The effort was futile, as he 
remarked: “In the hope of establishing something approaching uniformity for future 
guidance I appointed a Punchayet consisting of 5 Zemindars 9 Serberakars and 18 
Ryots who met for several day and endeavoured to adjust 3 or 4 rates for each sort of 
land but they completely failed…”57 So he left the variety in the way it existed, in a 
form which was incomprehensible to him. But the rates reached at in this way were 
satisfactory to the different landholders in the Pergunnah. As I have argued earlier, 
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such “village assemblies” were considered as one of those authentic markers of the 
“political” which constituted “rent”. In Ricketts’ vision of settlement, people of the 
“field” stood for similar organic truths, expressing existing relations around land, to 
which political-economic doctrines appeared as external and incompatible. That is 
why when he tried to refigure the existing variety in the rates, which reflected 
contested relations of power over the land, into a uniform standard, he failed. The 
“field” in this case was a specific configuration of a conflictual arena of interests, 
which could not be reshaped into a new configuration by a group of landholders 
representing a unity of interest alien to the existing arrangement of power.  
Ricketts noted some of the specificities of the power-relations around rent in 
another instance of settlement: “…in a small village 100 Beegahs is held Lakhiraj, 
and not included in the Jummabundee, but…a considerable revenue is derived by the 
village zemindar from such lands. The Lakhirajdar’s land is capable of growing a 
second crop but not without irrigation. The village proprietor has command of the 
water, and he allows the Lakhirajdars so much water as will bring the second 
crop…receiving half the rent realized from the land.”58  
Such were the contours of the “political”, revealed by the administration of 
rent. Practices of agrarian governance in early nineteenth-century British India 
worked within a framework of political economy which was undergirded by a matrix 
of property and political power. In settling rent, therefore, administrators followed the 
variety in the relations of power which constituted the domain of the “political” in 
British India. These relations emerged out of varying degrees of proprietary rights. 
They were distributed over a range of landholders, and landholding bodies. As Jones 
had noted, this domain of proprietary power was of an essentially dispersed character. 
I argue that the practices of agrarian governance were embedded in a similar political-
economic matrix, which is why such a diffused domain of proprietary power—opened 
up by the administrative excursions around rent—was constituted as the object of 
agrarian governance. I do not interpret this process, of endorsing a variety of power-
relations in settling rent, as a pragmatic move, inspired by the search for local 
collaborators. It was not a case of governance being arm-twisted by local powers to 
merely confirm the existing power-arrangements, or to ratify the “facts on the 
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ground”. On the contrary, by fixing rent, landholders of different kinds were instituted 
as power-brokers of localities through specific mechanisms of exclusions and 
inclusions, the logic of which was political-economic. 
As it has been evident from this chapter, village proprietors, and ryots of 
certain kinds were being empowered by these practices of governance against big 
landlords. The following chapters will show how particular relations of power were 
carved out of an infinite variety of agrarian relations in different localities, and 
established as the legitimate form of the “political” in British India. The rationality 
immanent in this process of governance was a transformed political-economic one. 
Specific configurations of local power were inscribed by this rationality. Ultimately, 
governance aimed at creating conditions of production. The “local” was made internal 
to, and constitutive of, production. The next section will demonstrate, and argue, that 
during this period within the sphere of governance itself, the category of rent was 
being perceived as the key indicator of proprietary power, which determined the 
conditions of production.          
 
Rent and production 
 
James Alexander wrote an essay on the relation between “rent” and land tenures in the 
“Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal” in 1845. In this section, I will show how 
Alexander developed a political-economic explanation of rent, grounded in the 
“political”, namely, an interconstitutive linkage between property and political power. 
Reflecting an evident epistemological kinship with Richard Jones’s political 
economy, James Alexander’s essay forged crucial analytical relations between rent, 
property, political power and production.  
Right at the beginning, Alexander declared that rent is an expression of 
proprietary relations, which is also a field of political power. In fact, he argued that 
the different kinds of ‘nerikh’, or rates of rent, reveal the specific contours of a 
relation of property and power between the zemindar and the ryot. That is why, he 
noted, “in the ryuttee as in the zemindaree tenure, the rent which it will yield is the 
distinguishing mark of each sort of tenure…”59 Alexander went on to argue that since 
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different kinds of rent articulate different kinds of relationships between landlords and 
tenants, they also shape the conditions of production differently. In a sense, like 
Jones, Alexander was suggesting that the context, and therefore, the nature of 
production get determined by these relations of power. Thus, he noted, “the landlord 
must constantly observe his tenant to ensure his honesty, and the tenant is discouraged 
by the reflection that one-half of his labour must be bestowed for the benefit of 
another.”60 It must be remembered that Richard Jones had made the same connection 
between rent and the productive efficiency of labour, demonstrating how different 
kinds of rents led to varying productivity of labour.
61
 For Jones, productivity was 
rooted in the “political”. As he noted that, “it will be found that the motives to 
industry, which operate in different communities, depend upon the relations which 
connect the classes of those communities.”62 
Rent, Alexander argued in a manner similar to Harington, marked the contours 
of the field of power existing between the zemindar and the ryot. In this field, he 
observed, “there is a constant struggle between himself and his tenantry regarding the 
share which they are respectively to enjoy of the surplus profits of cultivation.”63 
Various factors determined the scope of this proprietary relation. Alexander argued 
that customary laws of different kinds constituted the “political”, restricting the 
landlord’s capacity of extraction. In a certain sense, as Andrew Sartori has shown in a 
recent article, custom here acted as a political-economic category.
64
 It was not viewed 
as necessarily antithetical to political-economic formulations. However, I argue that 
the political-economic underpinnings of custom here were not entirely similar to those 
identified by Sartori in his examination of the category in the context of debates on 
rent laws in Bengal. There were, of course, certain clearly identifiable similarities. But 
there were crucial differences as well, which, I will argue, did not allow the political 
economy of custom in this case to be interpreted, as Sartori does, in terms of either 
Lockean or Ricardian/Malthusian frameworks. Custom here was a political-economic 
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category only in so far as it was determined by the “political”, i.e., by a political 
economy which opposed and reconfigured the Ricardian framework.     
Alexander enlisted a number of rents paid in Bengal. In describing each of 
them, he elaborated upon the nature of the matrix of proprietary power in which they 
were located. He noted that the “Nerick Mocurrreree” was a fixed rate of payment 
granted to cultivators validated by a written document. Its basis was that the cultivator 
had held the land at fixed rates for twelve years prior to the Decennial Settlement, 
during which period he paid his dues regularly. “Nerick Mowrossee”, on the other 
hand was a rate established by inheritance. A prescriptive right to hold certain lands at 
fixed rates was allowed to cultivators because they were considered the first to 
cultivate those lands. These rents were called “Nerick-i-kudeem”. Alexander noted 
that the “village”, as a customary body, was also invested with the power to grant 
prescriptive proprietary rights. These were fixed rates of rent, “…established for each 
peculiar class of soil…”65 in the village. “The Nerick-i-Mukuddum”, Alexander 
continued, “is a rate established in favour of particular individuals, who claim to hold 
land at rates below those of the village, as a privilege of caste or office; where there is 
sufficient evidence to prove that this title has been previously recognized, it acquires a 
force from prescription which is not easily set aside…”66 The “Jungle-booree Nerick” 
was another class of rents which were rates at which cultivators entered into 
engagements to bring forested lands under cultivation. They depended upon various 
factors—the density of the jungle, the markets, rivers, and roads nearby, the quality of 
the soil, the means of irrigation, the demand for land in the neighbourhood, and also 
the climate.  
All these factors taken together, in Alexander’s analysis, accounted for the 
nature of proprietary power, and, consequently, the category of rent. In his description 
of the relation between custom and rent, there was a vision of the ryot as the capitalist 
farmer, similar to the one Sartori identifies in the George Campbell’s invocation of 
custom in the course of debates over rent in Bengal in the 1850s. Like Campbell, 
Alexander also argued that custom guaranteed this political-economic capacity to the 
ryots—of being more like a farmer, and less like an agricultural labourer. He stated 
that “…if confidence in the stability of the rates is not so strong, and tenures held 
under prescriptive titles have not the same value as marketable commodities, neither 
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will the cultivator himself incur the risk of any extensive outlay in the formation of 
gardens, the excavation of tanks, and the building of houses…”67 But Campbell and 
others in that context had argued that “customary” rents were low because they 
assumed the ryot to have a right to the soil. He was imagined as the original improver, 
thereby possessing a right to a portion of the rent fund. There was a Lockeanism at 
work here, Sartori argues, through the reworking of the category of custom.  
In my opinion, however, Alexander’s argument for a political economy of 
custom was rooted in a different perspective. Here, custom served to demarcate the 
domain of the “political”, or the assemblage of property and political power, which 
conditioned production. The strength of custom, to condition the productive efficiency 
of labour, derived from uninterrupted residence, inheritance, prescriptive rights of 
holding on to a land by virtue of being its original cultivator, and the capacities of the 
village to regulate proprietary power. All these elements together defined what can be 
called in political-economic terms the tightly woven relation between property and 
political power, or the “political”. Alexander’s political-economy of custom, 
therefore, did not emerge from any variety of the Ricardian, Malthusian, or Lockean 
analytical frames. On the contrary, it was steeped in one of their most powerful 
critiques—an internal one, a different kind of political economy.                    
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that in the practices of agrarian governance rent served as a 
point of entry into the complex architecture of the “political” in British India. I 
contend that the category of rent did not operate in its Ricardian form. It was not 
understood as a measure of differential soil fertility, and, accordingly, it did not 
function to divide the domain of agrarian relations into landlords, farmers, and 
labourers. Rather, it was used to open up a more complex field of power-relations 
between agrarian actors of myriad descriptions. It was fundamentally understood as 
the defining transaction of power in an agrarian society which was constituted of 
dispersed and divided linkages between property and political power. Consequently, 
administrators deployed rent to balance several conflicting equations of power. These 
                                                 
67Ibid, 537, emphasis mine, the equivalence between “prescriptive titles” and “marketable 
commodities”, once again, underscored that custom, as a category, was internal to the political-
economic articulation of production and exchange. 
 106 
were equations between the state, the big landlords, the village proprietors, and 
cultivators of various kinds. The Ricardian framing of rent saw it as a portion of the 
produce which belonged legitimately to the landlord, as he was the proprietor of the 
soil. In this case, however, since the proprietary field itself was understood as diffused 
and restricted, the landlord’s legitimacy was also questioned, as property was not 
considered as an unequivocal right possessed exclusively by one individual. James 
Mill’s interpretation of the state as the paramount landlord was challenged, as 
different kinds of partial, but strong proprietary rights were identified amongst other 
landholders, ranging from village proprietors to ryots. Even when the state was 
admitted as the supreme landlord, it was considered important to leave some rent in 
the hands of the cultivators, and grant them some privilege of property, by preventing 
the predatory impulses of superior landholders exercised through excessive collection 
of rent. All of this, as the upcoming chapters will show in greater detail, was linked to 
a redefinition of the political economic framing of production. The move away from 
Ricardianism did not mean an abandonment of its organizing category, production. It 
meant the recasting of production in the light of varying agrarian power-relations in 
different localities. Rent was a gateway to this domain. Its administration, thus, 
signified strategies directed at refashioning production as local power. This is how the 
meaning of production changed, and the “local”, as the transformed “political”, 
defined this process. Settling the rent question was one of its vital nodes. 
It must be evident that the chapter has, in the process of tracking this particular 
political-economic deployment of rent in the field of agrarian governance, opened up 
a lot of questions about property in land. I have argued that rent was used as the most 
significant tool in demarcating the domain of property and political power. But at all 
such sites, where rent got administered, an array of proprietary relations sprung up. 
These relations will be examined carefully in the upcoming chapter. In the next 
chapter, I will show how a range of proprietary figures, taken together in their varying 
relations to each other, constituted the domain of power on land. This was the 
“political”—a field of power which got instituted as the object of agrarian governance 
in British India during the first half of the nineteenth century. The upcoming chapter 
will argue that specific arrangements of the “political”, different in different regions, 
were organized and distributed by practices of governance in terms of the category of 
“local”. In that chapter, the “political” will be analyzed as a complex spatial and 
temporal concatenation. It will be understood as a political economy, which 
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underwent dynamic reconfigurations in the hydra-headed networks of agrarian 
governance. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Locating localities: political economy, agrarian governance, “Cuttack” and 
“India” 
 
 
This chapter is about temporal geographies generated by complex interconnections 
between political economy and agrarian governance. It argues that specificities of 
agrarian power in the different localities of British India took shape out of changing 
articulations of a governmental category, the “local”. The “local” was a classificatory 
framework which explained these specificities as varying degrees of resemblances 
with, or differences from, a general spatio-temporal imagination of an authentic, 
ancient, Hindu/Indian relation between property and political power. In this chapter, I 
pursue shifting deployments of the “local” over multifarious sites of governance. I 
argue that the formulation of this authentic relation between property and political 
power was continuously reinterpreted. Accordingly, the “local” emerged as the object 
of agrarian governance out of a dynamic process of negotiation between changing 
meanings of generality and specificity. The chapter, however, also reclaims the 
“local” for political economy. I argue that the structuring principle of the “local”—a 
search for the authentic national property-power complex—was also the reconfigured 
epistemological object of contemporary political economy in Britain, namely, the 
“political”. As I have shown in the second chapter, Richard Jones made the political 
economic category of production contingent upon different interrelations between 
property and political power existing in different nations of the world. This chapter 
explores in detail the manner in which Jones analyzed the specificities of the 
property-power complex in India, relating them to categories like rent, wage, profit, 
and, production. From Jones, I move on to introduce John Stuart Mill’s political 
economy as another articulation of the “political”. I argue that Mill, in a way different 
from Jones, forged constitutive conceptual linkages between property, power and 
production. It is in this light that Mill interpreted agrarian conditions in Britain, India, 
Ireland, and other nations of the world. This is how the chapter brings together the 
“political” and the “local” as categories fashioned by similar, yet different meanings. I 
try to read them as part of the same analytical field.  
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 This chapter shows that in the years after the permanent zemindary settlement 
of Bengal, the ryotwari mode of property-organization was envisioned in practices of 
governance as the ancient and authentic form of the “political” in India. It was argued, 
at different sites of governance, that the original proprietary relation on land was 
between the state and the peasant-cultivator, which existed in an erstwhile, Hindu 
India. This chapter argues that this vision was marked by a discursive elasticity which 
enabled administrators to reinterpret this relation differently in different localities, 
without moving away from its founding principle. That is, the proprietary peasant of 
the ryotwari, was refashioned variously, as a hereditary cultivator, or khoodkasht ryot, 
as a village-proprietor, or putteedar/mokuddum, and even as particular kinds of 
zamindars and talukdars, whose roots were in the “village community”. I argue that 
this represented a governmental strategy of positing one landholding figure in each 
locality as its dominant one, based on arguments about its greater proximity to the 
original proprietary ryot than others. These arguments were formed by the category of 
the “local”. The “local” allowed administrators to rank different landholders in 
different localities in terms of their difference/distance from the authentic time of the 
ancient, and the original space of a Hindu India, which was viewed as the abode of the 
true “political”. But the choice of this figure, I argue, also emerged out of a preference 
for the productive potential of peasant-proprietors over big landlords. This preference 
was evident in John Stuart Mill’s political economy as well. But the productivist 
emphasis marking this choice, both in Mill, and in the practices of British Indian 
agrarian governance, was articulated in and through a complex interpretation of the 
interrelationship between property and political power in nations. In other words, it 
was a discourse of political economy, the constitutive categories of which were the 
“political” and the “local”. The question of production here was internal to that of 
local power. 
 There was another deployment of the “political” which played an equally 
important role in fashioning constellations of agrarian power in the localities. This 
was an interpretation of the property-power complex in India as diffused and 
dispersed. Within this framework, although the landlord-state was considered as an 
absolute/despotic source of power its despotism was seen as qualified, limited and 
arrested by a range of landholders and landholding bodies. The latter, along with the 
state, therefore, was perceived as forming a distributed matrix of agrarian power. In 
this understanding, property in India was seen to be a conjunction of proprietary rights 
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vested in both the soil and offices of revenue collection. The “political” was construed 
as a diffused field, constituted by zamindars, talukdars, village-proprietors, like 
mukaddams, serberakars, and pudhans, and cultivators, like the thanee or khoodkasht 
ryots, each having their share of rights, along with the state. Once again, this 
articulation of the “political” was shared between governance and political economy. 
It was deployed by administrators, and by Richard Jones, in explaining the specific 
nature of the relationship between property and political power in India. 
 I argue that the “local” and the “political”, over their different interconstitutive 
articulations, shaped agrarian relations in different localities of British India. This 
chapter traces these articulations through the 5th Report, an insurrection in Cuttack, 
an authoritative text on tenures in Cuttack, debates over settlement in the North-
Western Provinces, the Governor-General William Bentinck’s intervention in these 
debates, settlement practices in the different districts of Cuttack, and finally, the 
political-economic writings of Richard Jones and John Stuart Mill. In this dissertation 
they serve as routes of both entry and exit to Cuttack. More generally, however, I 
suggest that this mode of analysis indicates the entangled character of all localities. It 
shows that specific configurations of agrarian power in localities were not outcomes 
of contingent, on-the-spot, pragmatic administrative measures. On the contrary, 
specificities were implicated in, and constituted by complex but coherent networks of 
knowledge and governance.     
            
                
Early connections: a report, a rebellion, and the ordering of difference 
      
To begin with, I take another look at the 5th Report. The 5th Report, as I noted in the 
previous chapter, represented the first systematic attempt to put together an 
assemblage of property relations and political power which would remain, over 
shifting arrangements, the object of agrarian governance in British India throughout 
the first half of the nineteenth century. I documented earlier how rent operated in this 
report as an indicator of these relations. But the report, as I had suggested, was 
primarily organized around the category of the “local”. This chapter brings forth the 
importance of this category in the assembling of the proprietary matrix. It argues that 
the “local” signified a spatio-temporal frame within which the “political”, as an 
ensemble of property and power, assumed a national form, and got distributed over 
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various geographical sites, or localities, as a hierarchized range of difference. In other 
words, the “political” of each locality was always interpreted by practices of 
governance as specific manifestations of a general, national, Hindu/Indian complex of 
property and political power. Moreover, this ordering of difference was framed by a 
hierarchy. A Hindu/Indian form of the “political” was construed as the authentic one, 
and proprietary power relations specific to each locality was assessed in terms of its 
distance/difference from the former. Within this interpretive grid, time and space were 
the twin markers of distance/difference. The “local” performed this analytical 
function. It was both a point and a range. It acted as both specificity and generality. In 
the “local”, time and space defined each other. Every locality, as a space different 
from the original, was also explained by practices of governance as a time distant 
from the ancient. The logic of the “local” was all-pervasive. This section argues that, 
from the 5th Report to an insurgency in Cuttack, the “local” reigned supreme in 
assembling the “political”.  
The 5th Report criticized the Bengal Code of administration by pointing out its 
inapplicability in other localities. The report presented administrative experience from 
various regions of British India, as evidence of “local” differences in the forms of 
land tenures. This body of evidence emerged from experiences in governance in the 
old and new areas of the Bengal Presidency and also in the Presidency of Fort St. 
George. By demonstrating the unsuitability of the Bengal Code to some of both the 
old and newly-acquired territories of the Company, the Report pointed out that 
significant alterations were made in the revenue administration of these areas. These 
new arrangements were considered to be more sensitive to “local” conditions, and 
consequently, highly successful in effecting improvement in the material conditions 
of these places.  
The model of permanent settlement of revenue with zemindars established by 
the Bengal Code faced severe opposition from a number of localities. In all these 
areas, government officers pointed out, “local” circumstances did not warrant the 
settlement of revenue with zemindars. Amongst the old territories of the Company, 
such a contradiction of the revenue policy of the code was first experienced in 
Benares in 1795. The principal landholders of Benares seemed to differ substantially 
from the figure of the zemindar enshrined in the Code. Proprietary rights in land in 
Benares were vested in groups described in the Report as “village zemindars”. “The 
village zemindar of Benares appears to be the mokuddum found in certain parts of 
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Bahar, and the Potail of the Carnatic, both of whom are headmen of villages, who are 
responsible to the government, for maintaining and promoting the cultivation of the 
land, and who in the first-mentioned portions of territory possessed the right of 
disposing of their situations by sale or gift to others…”1 
 The greatest challenge to the Bengal Code came from the new presidency of 
Fort St. George. The Report noted that in many parts of this presidency, “local” 
conditions did not allow an unmodified application of the Code. A number of 
representations from Collectors in different divisions, spearheaded by Thomas 
Munro’s vision of a new revenue arrangement produced significant changes in the 
revenue policy of the Bengal Code. In some parts of this presidency the revenue 
arrangement was made with individual cultivators or ryots, while in some other areas 
a “village settlement” was adopted by which the “chief cultivators” of villages 
engaged for the revenue.  
Generally, the Report argued vigorously in favour of the mode of revenue 
settlement with the ryots. It stated that the ryotwar system of revenue management 
had contributed much to the improvement of the province. “It 
appears…that…operation of the ryot-war principle of collection, duly conducted and 
superintended; having for its leading objects, the confining every man to the 
cultivation of his own land, and defining the specific amount to be paid by each; and 
thus, securing to him the need of his own industry had, in the…two years, during 
which the country continued under this system of management, effected an 
improvement in its internal condition…”2 The Report further pointed out that the 
exactions of the village headmen or the superior ryots had been disallowed by this 
mode of revenue settlement. “…pottahs signed by the collector and his assistants, 
were granted to each individual cultivator, specifying the rent he was to pay; the 
grammatans were prohibited from collecting any thing more from the ryots, than the 
pottah demand; while the latter became encouraged to resist the exactions of the 
native servants, from a confidence in the protecting power of the government…” 3  
Thus, the 5th Report presented the category of “local” as an explanatory 
framework of difference. The “local” forms of land-tenures were identified as corrupt 
versions of an originary and authentic form of proprietary-relation, between the 
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government and the cultivator, which existed in the ancient times, when India was 
under Hindu rule. The report pointed out, that apart from the sovereign, only the ryots, 
or peasant cultivators held proprietary-rights in land. Other groups on land, like the 
“village headmen”, “chief cultivators” or the zemindars, emerged as usurpers of those 
rights during the subsequent period of a tyrannical Muslim rule. The report 
recognized certain areas of the presidency of Fort St. George as containing, in its form 
of land-tenures, traces of the original proprietary-relation. In this manner, it 
inaugurated the analytical mode by which a particular combination of property and 
political power got repeatedly represented as the “political” of the nation, and by 
extension, of each and every locality. Cuttack was soon harnessed into this analytical 
space, whereby the initial inexplicability of an insurgent moment in this new division 
of Bengal Presidency was quickly tamed by the calm assurance of the calculus of the 
“local”.  
In the spirit of the 5th Report, an oppositional stance to a permanent settlement 
was displayed with regard to revenue-administration in Cuttack as well. The 
Company acquired Cuttack in 1803. Since then, a number of short-term settlements of 
the land-revenue were carried out in the province. As I had mentioned earlier, in spite 
of the introduction of the Bengal code of regulations, the policy of permanent 
settlement was not extended to Cuttack. In 1817, an insurrection spread rapidly over 
parts of Cuttack.  The insurrection was led by a group of Paiks, who were the landed 
military servants of the Rajah of Khoordah. After the conquest of Cuttack, in making 
revenue engagements with landholders of different kinds in the area, the new 
Government introduced changes in the mode of settlement of the estate of Khoordah. 
Prior to the British, when the area was ruled by the Marathas, the Raja of Khoordah 
paid only a nominal tribute to the rulers for the estate. But when the British occupied 
Cuttack, the Raja tried to resist them. The British defeated and deposed the Raja, and 
resumed his estate. Later, when the Raja was released, he was asked to engage for the 
estate, but only against a regular revenue payment. The Raja refused to consent to 
such an offer, due to which the government leased out his estate to revenue farmers. 
The estate consisted of several rent-free lands gifted to the paiks. These lands were 
resumed by the government as well. One of the Raja’s principal servants, high in 
rank, and commander of his paiks, was Bakshi Jagabandhu. The Bakshi owned 
several rent-free lands, which were resumed by the Company’s government.  
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These matters appear to be a necessary background to the acts of agitation in 
Khoordah, as these acts were led by Jagabandhu Bakshi, and committed in the Raja’s 
name. At least, the Cuttack-based government officials were quite emphatic in 
claiming that the Raja was centrally implicated in these acts, as soon as the rebellion 
broke out. Thus, the Magistrate reported to authorities in Calcutta that, “I have no 
doubt of the proceedings of the Insurgents being countenanced and secretly 
encouraged by the Rajah Makoond Dea, they repeatedly call upon his name in their 
violent acts, and the Buxee Jugbundoo issues all orders in the Raja’s name, whilst 
their intention is declared to be, to proceed to Poory, and convey, the Raja into his 
own territory…”4 
Authorities in Fort William, the headquarters of Bengal Presidency, however, 
perceived the event in a very different way. From the very beginning, they saw the 
insurrection as symptomatic of a general failure of governance in the province.
5
 Due 
to this perception a number of investigations were carried out in different branches of 
the administration in Cuttack. Questions of land-revenue occupied a substantial space 
in these enquiries. The Revenue Department at Fort William noted that, “…We see 
reason to apprehend both that the Bengal system of Revenue Law has in some 
respects, been ill-adapted to the District of Cuttack, and that the executive 
management of the Revenue affairs has been defective…”6  
I argue that the authenticity of the “political” got posed as the central object of 
contention in the aftermath of the insurrection in Cuttack in the same way it was 
framed in the 5th Report. In fact, the structure of reasoning within which the act of 
insurrection got explained in Cuttack emerged entirely from the prevailing discourse 
on the “political”, articulations of which, as I have shown in the previous chapter, 
                                                 
4“Magistrate of Cuttack (Secret) to Secretary to Government, Judicial Department, Fort William”, 4 
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Authorities at Fort William in Calcutta, however, understood the chain of events at Cuttack in a 
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could be found at every level of the imperial bureaucracy.
7
 In order to decide upon a 
policy of revenue-administration in Cuttack, the Court of Directors in London urged 
the Bengal Government to gather, “…more complete information…regarding the 
system of Village Policy prevalent in Cuttack, particularly the nature of the rights and 
privileges enjoyed by the different class of persons who have an interest in the soil 
from the zemindar down to the actual cultivator of the land…”8 The question of a 
permanent settlement, and the question of the authentic proprietor of land with whom 
the settlement was to be made were considered as interrelated ones; they could only 
be decided through a minute investigation into tenures.  
Following these orders, the Collector and the Commissioner in Cuttack 
reported on the forms of land tenures in Cuttack. Both of them pointed out that in 
Cuttack, previous to the British occupation, the agents of Government in revenue 
affairs were not zemindars. They were mostly village headmen, with different names 
in different parts of the district. The Commissioner, Walter Ewer, pointed out in a part 
of his report, that “…by the ancient original institutions of the country the ryots of 
every Mouzah under the immediate direction and management of their Pudhon 
                                                 
7
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Paik rebellion, I argue, replicate the official framing of the “local”, by pointing out that the rebellion 
forced the government to implement reforms. As I have shown, these reforms, and their limits were 
pre-figured by those imperatives of the “local” which had nothing to do with the event of the rebellion 
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8“Secretary to Government, Territorial Department”, 24 October, 1817 in S. C. De (ed.) Guide to 
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Mundel or Moquddum were the only class besides the sovereign who could claim a 
proprietary right in the soil…they once enjoyed the privilege of paying their revenue 
direct to the state, and…no middleman had anciently a right to intervene between 
them and the Government…”9 But the Commissioner also argued that it was difficult 
to trace historically at what point of time the system changed. During the British 
occupation, it was found that in both Khoordah and other parts of the district, the 
mokuddums were preponderantly in charge of revenue affairs. Ewer further noted that 
historically Cuttack was divided into two administrative units, one known as 
Rajwareh, and the other, as Mughalbundee. Khoordah was the principal unit of the 
Rajwareh, the seat of the ancient Raja of Orissa. Ewer argued that, “…the Political 
state of Khoorda…previous to the conquest…by the British arms exhibited an exact 
picture in miniature of the condition of Orissa under its ancient native sovereigns 
antecedent to the Mogul invasion and…that condition much resembled what I am 
informed is still observable in some of the Hindoo states of Hindostan and the 
Deccan.”10 The Collector and the Commissioner then inferred that since in the ancient 
times, the entire province of Cuttack was the territory of the Raja of Khoordah, the 
forms of land tenures in Khoordah would indicate the original system of revenue 
management prevailing throughout the division. In this manner, they came to the 
conclusion that the “…the pudhan in Khoordah appears to be precisely what the 
mokuddums are in the Moghulbundee…”11 The Commissioners report finally 
recommended future settlements to be made with mokuddums or pudhans, as the 
supposedly original, ancient revenue-managers of the country.  
The 5th Report’s preference for the ryotwaree and classification of different 
forms of property rights were echoed in discussions at Cuttack. I argue that the 
ryotwaree principle was reworked in establishing the pudhans/mokuddums as the 
legitimate revenue officers. Since the original peasant cultivator who shared a 
proprietary-right with the state could not be recovered in Cuttack, the 
pudhans/mokuddums were considered nearest to, and the zemindar furthest from, the 
original proprietary figure. They were perceived to have a proprietary right in the 
office of revenue-collection, unlike the ancient ryot, who had a proprietary right in the 
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soil. But, as the chapter will demonstrate gradually, the “political”, as an assemblage 
of property and political power, was considered to include proprietary rights both in 
the soil and in the offices of revenue-collection. Within that scheme, therefore, the 
pudhans/mokuddums could be incorporated as legitimate “proprietors”. It is evident 
that the figure of the pudhan was re-discovered with a corresponding reconstruction of 
a putative ancient Hindoo form of administration in Orissa, the present territorial 
remnant of which was taken as Khoordah, the seat of the Raja. It is by re-imagining 
the forms of land tenures in Khoordah as the symbols of an ancient Hindu 
administration, and projecting this imagination onto the rest of Cuttack, that the 
authenticity of the pudhan was consolidated. This is how the “local” of Cuttack was 
reintegrated to the “political” of the nation. This principle of ordering difference was 
inaugurated in the 5th Report, and re-enacted in Cuttack. Figures and relations, 
existing at that time on the lands of Cuttack were visualized as living embodiments of 
an authentic spatio-temporal point—the Hindu/Indian “political”. The next section 
will show how this spatio-temporal architecture was developed in terms of its 
generality as well as its specificity. It will show how “Cuttack” and “India” got 
related, and secured their respective seats in the classificatory topography of the 
“political”. 
 
Conceiving the “political”: property, “Cuttack” and “India” 
 
Immediately after the rebellion, in 1821, Andrew Stirling, one of the leading 
administrators of Cuttack, wrote the “Minute on Tenures in Orissa”. The minute was 
subsequently published, in 1822, in the form of a book, entitled, “An Account, 
Geographical, Statistical and Historical of Orissa Proper, Or Cuttack”. I regard 
Stirling’s work as both the first systematic treatise on the land tenures of Cuttack, and 
also as one of those expositions which, forged a definitive link between the “political” 
of “Cuttack” and “India”. Quite naturally, this work also acted as an authoritative 
reference for administrators in Cuttack, throughout the first half of the nineteenth 
century, as and when land tenures and governance met each other. In a sense, 
Stirling’s propositions rearticulated the representations of the “political” that informed 
the official reaction to the rebellion. But his work, by developing the assumptions 
inherent in those discussions, outlined the horizon of their potential. Stirling’s text 
described the lands of Cuttack as inhabited by an immense variety of figures, only in 
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order to invest each one of them with the traces of the “political” that encapsulated 
lands all over “India”. Here, the staging of diversity was constitutive of a centralizing 
operation, which eventually harnessed, and reintegrated all its elements to a single 
analytical trope.   
Stirling began with a natural division of the lands. He noted that the country 
may be divided into three regions which were, “The marshy woodland tract which 
extends along the sea shore…The plain and open country between this and the 
hills…and…The hill country.”12 He immediately re-described these three divisions as 
two, in terms of the land-tenures that populated them. He noted that, “The first and 
third are known to the natives as the Eastern and Western Rajwara or Zemindara, that 
is, the country occupied by the ancient feudal Chieftains, Khandaits, Zemindars or 
Poligars of Orissa; and the second, as the Mogulbundi or Khaliseh, being that from 
which the indigenous sovereigns and the Mogul conquerors of the country, derived 
the chief part of their land revenue…”13 I have shown in the previous section that a 
similar division of the lands of Cuttack was made in the report on tenures following 
the rebellion, and the “Rajwara” was identified as the authentic form of the 
“political”; its tenures consisting of the remnants of the ancient Hindu form of 
administration. But Stirling’s scheme had greater ambitions. It conjured up a gigantic 
spatio-temporal canvas on which the “political” of Cuttack was joined to not only an 
ancient Hindu India, but to lands and times far beyond it.  
In his first move, he took the “political” to a different part of the world. He 
remarked that, “In surveying attentively the ancient Political Institutions of Orissa as 
connected with the tenure of land, it is impossible not to be struck with the marked 
resemblance which many of their features exhibit to the system of European policy 
called the feudal, at certain stages of its progress.”14 In the very next line he increased 
the scope of this comparison. He noted that, “I am strongly inclined to think that the 
comparison might be extended to India generally, and that a careful enquirer would 
not fail to discern in every quarter of the country, obvious traces of the former 
existence of such a system, however irregularly defined, and liable to variation in the 
details, from local peculiarities.”15 Thus, he established that interpretive frame which 
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explained the “local” of land-tenures, as variations of an original “political” form, 
which existed under a Hindu form of administration, and, thereby, represented the 
authentic “Indian” form of property in land. In support of his representations, Stirling 
referred to similar opinions of other experienced administrators, working in different 
parts of British India.  
He argued that Sir J. Malcolm, in his report on Malwa, noted that land-
administration in the Rajpoot principalities differed little from the feudal system that 
existed in Europe. Stirling further observed that “every one knows that the Rajput, is 
only one branch or epithet of the great Regal and Military Caste amongst the Hindus, 
called the Cshetriya (Khetri), and anciently all principalities and kingdoms might in 
one sense be designated as Rajput.”16 Similar views, Stirling argued, were held by 
Captain MacMurdo in a paper on the province of Cutch. Like the feudal form of 
administration in Europe, where power rested entirely on the possession of land, 
Stirling noted that, there existed a giant kingdom in India in the ancient times, 
“…ruled by a sovereign residing at Hastinapura and Delhi…”, under whom the lands 
of the country were divided amongst a “vast number of great Military Chiefs and 
Feudatory Rajas, of the Khetri Caste, who were dependent on and owed service to the 
Lord Paramount.”17 Stirling went on describing the administrative form of this 
kingdom, or empire as he put it, in the mirror of an archetypal European feudal 
system. He pointed out that the kings subordinate to the emperor, “…the great officers 
of state called the Gajapati, Aswapati, Chatrapati, and Narapati…” were initially 
“…dependent fiefs subject to the condition of Military service…”18, but later 
established themselves as independent overlords of their territories. This was the scale 
of the “local”. It encompassed a spatio-temporal range, which could simultaneously 
incorporate Cuttack, an ancient Hindu (Rajput) India, and a feudal Europe.
19
 From 
here, Stirling proceeded to a meticulous grounding of the “political” in the lands of 
Cuttack.  
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Orissa was under one of those regional sovereigns, Stirling observed, who 
became independent of the mighty emperor. He argued that the land-tenures presently 
existing in the area denominated Rajwareh showed that this region was the abode of a 
number of military chieftains, among whom lands were distributed by the Gajapati, 
the great sovereign of Orissa. Stirling noted that the principle of administrative 
independence existing between the emperor and the regional sovereigns was 
reproduced in the relation between the Gajapati and his subordinate chiefs as well. 
Thus, he pointed out, that, “These Chiefs may be safely considered as de facto 
proprietors of their possessions…that is to say they held them hereditarily, exercised 
uncontrollable territorial jurisdiction within their limits, and appropriated the entire 
revenues, subject to the condition of performing Military service, or other offices and 
duties, at the court of their superior Raja, the Gajapati…”20 However, in Stirling’s 
opinion, the other part of Cuttack, the Mughalbandi, was under the direct authority of 
the Gajapati, and consequently, of his successors, like the Moguls, Marathas and 
English.  
Property and political power was viewed as an interconstitutive complex by 
Stirling. The various proprietary relations characterizing the lands of the Rajwareh 
and the Mughalbandi were seen as deeply imbricated in different forms of political 
power. The chiefs inhabiting the Rajwareh, whom Stirling called the “feudal lords”, 
all belonged to the Cshetriya caste. In his opinion, they were variously known as 
Khandait, Bhuyan, Poligar, Sawant, Sirdar and finally, zemindar. Under the Mogul 
government, Raja Man Singh, conferred on the two sons of Telinga Mukund Deo, the 
last independent monarch of Orissa, the title of the reigning prince. He noted that 
these chiefs “held their situations hereditarily, and were in the habits of mortgaging or 
even selling the whole or shares of them, with the sanction of the ruling power…”21 
But, he further pointed out that this never implied a right of property in the soil itself. 
That right, he argued, can be imagined to have belonged only to the actual cultivators 
of the soil under the ancient Hindu government, but he did not find any traces of it in 
Cuttack. Further, almost echoing the discussion in the 5th Report, he noted that such a 
right is existent in Canara and Malabar, pointing out that, “I have never yet been able 
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to discover any well authenticated instance of the sale or mortgage of land by a 
Malguzari ryot of the province.”22  
Stirling now turned to the Mughalbandi, and its proprietary forms. The 
Mughalbandi, under the Mughal administration, ceased to be the territory of the 
Gajapati, and came under the direct management of the Mughals. Stirling remarked 
that the ministers of Akbar, however, did not change the system of revenue 
management in that area; they only translated the Oriya names into Persian ones. The 
revenue officers of the state here were known by the names of Chowdris, Talukdars, 
Vilaity Canoongoes, Mokuddums and others. Describing the nature of their 
attachment to the land, Stirling noted, that, “Amongst the chief of their duties were 
the collection of the Government Revenue assessed on their several divisions, the 
control of Police, the adjustment of disputes relating to the Pergunnah generally, and 
the enforcement of all the government orders and instructions relative to the 
assignment and proportion of lands.”23 Against the performance of such tasks, they 
received certain perquisites on the natural resources, and a certain percentage on the 
revenue, of that area.  
Such a neat differentiation between chiefs of petty principalities, and revenue-
officers of the state collapsed totally with the introduction of the British government, 
and its principles of land-administration. Henceforth, Stirling argued, that, “all parties 
whose names appeared in the public accounts of the preceding administration as 
answerable for or entrusted with the collection of the public dues, were forthwith 
acknowledged not only as Zemindars, but as proprietors of the land comprised in their 
Zemindaris.”24 Actually, till the times of Aurangzebe, this separation was in place. 
After that, revenue-managers were often falsely designated as zemindars. Thus, 
Stirling observed, that “…we must unhesitatingly class the Zemindari so created, as 
nothing higher than a Talukdari, or a mere official trust…”25 As such a practice 
became regular, the erstwhile Chowdris and Canungo Talukdars styled themselves as 
zemindars, while the “proper Zemindars”, according to Stirling, adopted the title of 
“Rajahs”. This process of contamination reached its culmination under the British 
government, when every description of persons engaging for the payment of revenue, 
were marked in the official accounts as zemindars. Thus, Stirling noted that, “We may 
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distinguish no less than seven different grades of persons holding offices and tenures 
connected with land, who appear in the Collector’s accounts as Zemindars, and 
absolute proprietors of the soil…”26 These were the “ancient Zemindars (now 
Rajahs)…Zemindars of Mogul or Mahratta creation…Chowdhri and Canungo 
Talukdars…(Mazkuri) Mokuddums…Village accountants, called Serberakars, and 
Karjis…head-men (Poorsettis) of Patnas…holders of lands…called Kheridah…”27  
Stirling argued that the British government misconstrued each of these 
revenue-officers of the state, existing in the Mughalbandi, as the absolute proprietors 
of lands. The confusion, he noted, existed at two levels. Firstly, as I have already 
pointed out, Stirling argued that the zemindars in the accounts of the British 
administrators were actually revenue-managers employed by the state. The true 
zemindars, Stirling further emphasized, by presenting excerpts from authoritative 
works in the history of “India”, such as the “Ayin Acberi” and Ferishteh’s text, were 
“feudal” chiefs, possessing “…a title of property, and accountable to their sovereign 
only for the performance of such services, military or otherwise, as the condition of 
their tenure imposed…”28 Secondly, he noted that as revenue-managers, the tenure-
holders in the Mughalbandi, held “…offices connected with the land, of different 
degrees of authority and importance, each having its distinct duties and 
perquisites…”29 These offices were hereditary, and deeds of sale which made the 
British believe that they reflected sales of lands, were actually sales of positions of 
management. When these offices fell into arrears, the Mughal government transferred 
them, by sale, to other managers. But the authority of such management was always 
partial, and distributed amongst a collectivity of various other managers. That is why, 
Stirling argued, such deeds of sale were addressed to the entire body of proprietary 
interest-holders, “…the Amils, Mutsuddis, Chowdris, Canoongos, Mokuddams, ryots, 
and cultivators…”30 Such addresses, Stirling also noted, were never issued to the 
authentic zemindars. 
As it is evident, Stirling’s text was an operation in disentangling the different 
lineages of the “political”. Stirling separated the Rajwareh from the Mughalbandi on 
the basis of the different relations between property and political power that marked 
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these lands. Proprietary rights in the soil itself, according to Stirling’s representations, 
could never be located in the varied repertoire of tenures in Cuttack. That kind of 
proprietary-right, if existent at all, could only be found in those lands where the 
tenures reflected the mode of administration of an ancient Hindu kingdom. A 
proprietary right in the soil, belonging only to the peasant cultivators, however, did 
not exhaust the domain of property in “India”. For Stirling landed-property in India 
existed both in the soil, and in the offices of revenue-management. Most importantly, 
these two forms of proprietary rights reflected the different ways in which property 
and political power were related. In the form of tenure imprinted with ancient Hindu 
administrative principles, the sovereign and the peasant cultivators were co-
proprietors of the land, whereas in the other forms, it was a collective of various 
revenue-managers whose proprietary-rights were vested in their offices. Taken 
together, they constituted the “political”, and, consequently, the object of agrarian 
governance.  
But the varying respectability of their lineages implied that they were framed 
within a hierarchy. Although Stirling emphasized that the British government 
confused the two, his efforts to clear this confusion by digging up their pasts meant 
that the hierarchy was retained. The upcoming sections will show how this hierarchy 
was creatively reinterpreted during the settlement of Cuttack to infuse the various 
proprietary figures with new lineages and new identities.  The “local” was invoked, 
time and again, as a spatio-temporal grid distributing the “political” of “India”, in and 
beyond Cuttack, as embodied complexes of multiple relations of power—between 
various landholding groups, and also between the former and the state. 
 
Cultivators and proprietors: new connections in the landscape of difference 
 
As I noted earlier, right from the beginning of the nineteenth century, express 
instructions were communicated to authorities in British India from the Court of 
Directors in London, of knowing in detail the various interests connected with land in 
the newly-acquired territories of the Company. Orders from London emphasized that 
any decision on a long-lasting settlement could be taken only on the basis of such 
knowledge. I have already demonstrated that similar opinions on the issue were 
articulated in Cuttack, after the rebellion. But the hot seat of contention involving all 
questions of settlement, during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, was 
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located elsewhere. The biggest territorial acquisition of the Company at the turn of the 
century was a region administratively classified as the “Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces”. Situated in the north-west of India, this area was conquered between 1801 
and 1803. It consisted of the districts of Bareli, Moradabad, Farrakkhabad, Etawah, 
Kanpur, Allahabad, Gorakhpur, Saharanpur, Aligarh, Agra, and Bundelkhand.
31
  
The history of settlements in this region was similar to that of Cuttack. From 
the time of its conquest, a series of short-term settlements were carried out under the 
promise of a permanent settlement in the near future. However, the promise was never 
fulfilled. As Imtiaz Husain notes, “The Bengal Government under Lord Wellesley had 
promised a permanent settlement for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. But 
between 1807 and 1813 the applicability of that policy to those regions was earnestly 
discussed, and a radical departure from the Bengal system of land settlement 
emerged.”32 Subsequently, a new mode of settlement for this region was gradually 
assembled under the administrative leadership of Holt Mackenzie, secretary to the 
Territorial Department of the Government of Bengal. In this section, I will closely 
examine the vision of the “political” which informed this new model of settlement. 
Once again a variety of power-relations between landholders of different descriptions 
and the state were established as the object of agrarian governance. Out of an 
entangled condition, these relations were classified into varying degrees of 
authenticity, by drawing up connections within their spatio-temporal lineages. In the 
process, the “political” emerged as similar to, yet different from its previous 
articulations.  
On the one hand, the complex of property and political power was conceived 
as diffused and dispersed. It was considered to be distributed, in varying capacities 
amongst the state, and various kinds of landholders. It was seen as a shared domain of 
power where the state, the big landholders like zemindars and talukdars, and the small 
landholders like village-headmen and cultivating peasants of various kinds all enjoyed 
varying degrees of proprietary rights. These proprietary rights were seen to be vested 
in both offices of revenue-collection and the soil itself. On the other hand, there was 
an urge to fashion this welter of rights along the lines of a perfect ryotwari condition, 
by extracting the figure of the cultivating peasant, and investing him with superior 
                                                 
31
Imtiaz Husain, Land Revenue Policy in North India: The Ceded and Conquered Provinces, 1801-33, 
Calcutta & New Delhi, 1967, 3.  
32
Ibid, 60. 
 125 
proprietary rights. His superiority over others in this matrix was argued for on the 
basis of the respectability of his lineage. He was viewed as the surviving form of that 
proprietor, who, in ancient times, shared the right of property in the soil with the state. 
However, even in the North-Western Provinces, like Cuttack, the cultivating peasant-
proprietor could rarely be found in its pristine, ancient, original form. In most cases he 
was seen as both continuity and change, embodying a history of loss. He was 
characterized by an absent presence. His full presence, therefore, could be only be 
recovered by the operation of the “local”, which made visible the loss through traces 
left in time and space.
33
 
In 1819, Holt Mackenzie wrote a memorandum on the land and people of the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces, reflecting on the past settlements in the region, and 
putting forward a detailed plan for a future one. Mackenzie noted that the 
memorandum was written in response to the concerns expressed by the Court of 
Directors. The Court wanted to obtain, he pointed out, “not merely…more ample 
information…respecting the general nature and the resources of the districts…and the 
quality and value of the produce; but…a full and particular detail of all local tenures 
and usages…”34 In presenting his vision of a settlement, Mackenzie noted that the 
most important part of settlement accounts was that relating to land-tenures. He 
seemed to be following a perception similar to Stirling that since proprietary rights in 
land are plural and partial, it is imperative to protect each, because superior holders 
have the tendency of usurping the rights of inferior ones. Thus, he emphasized the, 
“…importance of…ascertaining the nature and extent of the rights, interests, and 
privileges of the various classes of persons connected with the land, and…if such a 
course be not followed, all will be sacrificed to the Sudder Malgoozar, whose interest 
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in the land, or the revenue of the land, if left undefined, is not naturally conceived to 
be that of absolute and exclusive property, and whose means of destroying or evading 
the rights of his inferior tenants are so powerful…”35 This shows that even 
Mackenzie, echoing Stirling and the representations of the 5th Report, posited 
proprietary-rights in lands, or land-tenures, as contingent on myriad power-relations 
between inferior and superior landholders.  
Difference, however, had its own role to play in the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces. The discussion on proprietary-rights here grafted itself on new figures and 
new relationships. Mackenzie noted that, in spite of the presence of big landholders, 
such as the talukdars, the proprietary-rights of a particular form of subordinate holder, 
described as the village zemindars were recognized by the administrators in this 
region. He pointed out that, “…the rights of the village Zemindars, as the chief 
cultivators and sole owners of the land…were fully recognized, even where the 
revenue of Government were received from Talukdars or other superior holders…”36 
Henceforth, Mackenzie directed all his energies in disentangling the figure of the 
village Zemindar from a complex web of relations on land. He represented most of 
these relations as spurious, deceitful, or subordinate, in relation to that true relation of 
property in land, which he claimed to be the privilege of the village zemindar. In 
claiming greater authenticity for him, Mackenzie simultaneously defined many more 
figures, who were construed as related to land in other, less authentic, proprietary 
capacities.  
The talukdar, he argued, “…appears seldom to have pretended to be more than 
the Collector of the revenue of Government, claiming, indeed, sometimes a hereditary 
interest in the advantages of the office, but urging no pretension to a property in the 
soil…”37 These tenures, he pointed out, were created in the recent past. The village 
zemindars, on the other hand, “…were the immemorial occupants of the soil; they 
cultivated generation from generation. They gave, sold and mortgaged their lands at 
will…”38 But the true proprietary rights of these village zemindars, were often 
appropriated by the encroaching tendencies of superior holders like talukdars. 
Mackenzie argued that district administrators made no effort in knowing the real 
nature of these tenures. Originally, the proprietary right of these village Zemindars 
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was an absolute one, that is, they had both a right to the soil as well as a right to their 
share of the income from it. But in certain situations, they had to give up this right to 
superior holders. These superior holders came into existence at times, by the gradual 
purchase of individual villages from their owners. Also, whenever any one amongst 
the leading men of the “village Zemindars” was appointed by the government to 
collect the revenue from a number of villages, “…he appears to have engaged in a 
constant struggle for the extension of his Zemindari property, and as he generally had 
the hand of power and a preponderating influence with the Amil, the various villages 
composing the Talooks or farm were too frequently converted by force or fraud into 
one Zemindari estate…”39 In this way, Mackenzie noted, wherever the talukdari 
tenure prevailed, the talukdar asserted the superiority of his proprietary-rights, by 
presenting evidence of a variety of transactions, like sales, gifts or mortgages, with the 
original village zemindars. But in spite of such superior claims, Mackenzie 
emphasized, since the latter had an inviolable right to the soil, even when they have 
been forced to dispose of their property, they “…would still continue to cultivate their 
paternal fields, and the leading men among them, preserving their influence in the 
village, might naturally be employed to manage it on behalf of the purchaser, in the 
character of a Ryot Mocuddum.”40 
There were other instances, however, where the village zemindars were found 
existing as undisturbed, sole proprietors of their lands. Mackenzie described them as 
putteedari tenures, where lands of the villages were held by a multitude of sharers 
called putteedars. In Bundlecund, for example, he noted that, “…all the persons from 
whom the Government revenue was collected, appear to have been Village 
Zemindars, themselves the cultivators of the soil…”41 Mackenzie also observed that 
this did not necessarily mean that these village zemindars were the only cultivators of 
the soil. They often hired cultivators, and slaves, depending on their caste, and the 
extent of their possessions. The cultivators of the field, Mackenzie noted were 
primarily of two kinds. The khoodkasht ryot were firmly attached to their cultivating 
fields, possessing a prescriptive right of occupancy, dependent on the payment of a 
rent, based on fixed rates. The pykasht ryots, on the contrary, were travelling 
cultivators, without a fixed residence in those villages, the lands of which they 
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cultivated. Mackenzie described the form of tenures these cultivators held primarily 
with reference to the way they were related to the village zemindars. Thus, where the 
village Zemindars were cultivating proprietors, he considered “…the only real 
description of Khoodkasht Ryots to be of the family of the Zemindar…”42  He further 
emphasized that although the khoodkhast ryots in Bengal did not presently enjoy such 
proprietary privileges, the way this tenure was imbricated in the authentic proprietary-
form of the village Zemindar in the North-Western provinces, it clearly makes ground 
for the assumption that, “…the resident Ryots of Bengal were originally of the same 
class with the Village Zemindars…vested with an equal right of property in the soil 
they occupied…”43 
Mackenzie’s representations, I argue, created an opening for imagining a new 
form of proprietary-body on land, by retaining, yet reinterpreting the older inventory 
of the “political”. With the arrival of the figure of the village Zemindar, the 
longstanding administrative imagination of the ryot, or the cultivating proprietor as 
the authentic proprietor, reflective of the ancient Hindu/Indian mode of 
administration, was significantly redefined. Here the logic of the “local” was again 
instrumental. Invoking it, Mackenzie could establish the village Zemindar as the 
genuine proprietor, by locating his origin in the ryot or the peasant cultivator. 
Wherever he was not found as a cultivating proprietor, Mackenzie could argue that his 
proprietary capacities got lost over time. This time was seen as one of corruption and 
invasion, when the predatory habits of big landlord spoilt the pristine status of the 
proprietor-ryot. As I have shown, Mackenzie attributed such predatory habits to the 
leading figures of the collectives of cultivating proprietors as well. He noted that these 
“headmen” often usurped the proprietary status of the individual cultivators by falsely 
posing as the exclusive proprietor amongst them. Once again, the “local” defined time 
and space in terms of each other. The present time was seen as embodying corruptions 
of past time, just as the present space/land of the North-Western Provinces, and even 
Bengal, was viewed as the degenerated form of an ancient Hindu India.      
But Mackenzie’s deliberations, while remaining grounded within the earlier 
tradition of representations of the “political”, also indicated certain new political-
economic assumptions. These political-economic bearings were quite forceful. They 
often exploded out of his descriptions as his preferences. Mackenzie noted, while 
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discussing the village Zemindars, that it is greatly beneficial to have such a class of 
“cultivating yeomanry” as the engagers of Government revenue. He argued that it is 
certainly better to have such a group as rent-holders than the zemindars of Bengal. 
“…I confess I see little or no chance of the great zemindars (or hereditary collectors) 
ever becoming capable of taking part in any regular or good system of internal 
government…”44 It is evident, I argue, that Mackenzie’s representations of proprietary 
rights in land was deeply imprinted with the preference for a certain vision of 
“improvement”, the agent of which was the figure of the cultivating-proprietor. In my 
opinion, the “political” in the North-Western provinces was defined in a double-edged 
manner. It consisted of the simultaneous articulations of framing property as a 
constellation of power-relations, and of an attempt to posit the “cultivating 
proprietor”, or the village Zemindar as the chief agent of “improvement” within this 
power-ridden space. Both these modes of reckoning the “political”, prevalent in the 
agrarian governance of early nineteenth-century British India, were also visible in 
contemporary political economy. But I will turn to that later. For the moment, it is 
important to note that what came out of these debates was, in turn, highly important 
for Cuttack. The settlement of Cuttack, as I have shown earlier, was carried out under 
a Regulation which emerged out of the settlement experience of the North-Western 
Provinces.  
 
A place for everyone: maintaining the calculus of power 
 
Mackenzie’s representations were to form the bulwark of the official regulation 
following which the first survey and settlement took place in Cuttack between 1837 
and 1843. But there was a considerable difference between Mackenzie’s enunciations 
and the final formulation they acquired as a legislative enactment. In this section, I 
will follow those deliberations over which the “political”, as the object of agrarian 
governance, reached its most definite articulation in the first half of the nineteenth 
century.  
It emerges from the previous section that Mackenzie conceived of the village 
Zemindars as a collective of cultivating-proprietors, found to exist in its most 
uncontaminated form in the putteedari tenure. Preference for a certain vision of 
                                                 
44
Ibid, 77. 
 130 
“improvement”, with the figure of the cultivating-proprietor as its agent, informed this 
understanding. That is why Mackenzie wanted the engagements to be made with one 
or two representatives of the multitude of village Zemindars composing the putteedari 
tenure. But at the same time, he proposed that the rights of the rest should be recorded 
in detail.
45
 Arguing against a mode of settling revenue with each cultivating-
proprietor of the collective individually, Mackenzie observed that, “…It would not 
perhaps be desirable to dissolve the village association by a rapid and extensive 
admission of the cultivators of the soil to engagements with Government…”46 
Mackenzie’s posture towards the collective body of proprietors expressed an amalgam 
of two representative frames which simultaneously constituted the “political” in early 
nineteenth-century British India. One of these frames established that proprietary-
rights were vested in a dispersed and contingent cluster of power-relationships, with a 
collective of cultivating-proprietors embodying its most authentic form. This explains 
why it was considered necessary, within Mackenzie’s scheme, to record and retain 
this power-complex, and not break it down into individual, unrelated, discrete units of 
cultivating-proprietors. It was important to maintain the relatedness of the collective, 
as the essential nature of power invested in proprietary-rights seemed to emerge from 
specific equations of relatedness. As I will show in the next chapter, this 
representative frame of power-relations eventually established a diverse field of 
relatedness, going beyond relations of property, as the substance of the “political”. 
The second representative frame, of a certain vision of “improvement”, however, 
managed to graft itself on the first, thereby opening up a possibility of extracting the 
figure of the “cultivating proprietor” from the collective. Mackenzie’s propositions, of 
having as the engagers of Government revenue, a few of the leading men of the 
collective, resonated with an aspiration of orienting this collective towards a mode of 
“improvement” whose leader was the “cultivating-proprietor”. In this framework, 
therefore, the individual cultivating-proprietor could be projected as a potential agent 
of improvement only by virtue of his location within the collective of power-relations. 
Similar opinions in favor of preserving the collective of village Zemindars 
were presented by Charles Metcalfe, one of the leading administrators of the time, and 
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member of the Governor-General’s council. Metcalfe’s views revolved around the 
question of the suitability of a ryotwar mode of settlement. The plan of settlement 
designed for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces closely resembled the ryotwar 
model. As members of the Board of Revenue noted, that “…the main purposes of 
Regulation VII of 1822 could be attained only by means of field surveys, so recorded 
on paper as to show distinctly how every owner or occupant of land in a village was 
connected, either as receiver or payer of rent, with the fields in which his interest 
existed…”47 Metcalfe, however, argued against a ryotwar settlement from a different 
perspective. He noted that it is absolutely essential to retain the method of surveying 
and recording, similar to the ryotwar mode. But the engagers of government revenue 
should be, instead of the individual cultivators, the representatives of the “village 
community”. Here Metcalfe presented an affective appeal for the retention of the 
“village communities”. He proclaimed that, “…I admire the structure of the village 
communities, and am apprehensive that direct engagements for revenue with each 
separate landholder or cultivator in a village might tend to destroy its 
constitution…”48 Metcalfe, with an emotive charge, spoke about the “village 
communities” as the ancient, immutable, eternal, resilient social substratum of 
“India”. He claimed that a ryotwar mode of settlement would individualize them, and 
demolish the fabric of relatedness that acts as their essence. I will be coming back to 
Metcalfe in the next chapter, as I discuss the centrality of the category of the village in 
the production of the “political” in British India.  
Metcalfe, like Mackenzie, spoke in favour of the ryotwar method of settlement 
as the most useful technique of preventing a concentration of power in the domain of 
property. He remarked that the ryotwar mode of recording rights on land, “…would 
bring to light the owners of every portion of land, and the right of each member of the 
village community, without rendering it necessary to conclude engagements otherwise 
than with the village community jointly represented by their headmen….”49 He 
believed that it would both allow the headmen to exercise legitimate duties with 
respect to the collective, yet preclude them from growing into usurpers of power. 
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 But this was a different vision of the ryotwar, reworked by these deliberations 
which established the putteedari as the most ancient and original tenure-form of 
“India”. The ryot, as a co-proprietor of the state, was no longer envisioned as an 
individual figure. Henceforth, his proprietary identity was viewed in terms of his 
membership in the collective. He became a ryot-in-the-collective, and his proprietary 
status was seen as indissociable from this collectivity. Yet at the same time, an 
individual ryot had to be put forward as a representative figure of this collective. Both 
Mackenzie and Metcalfe wanted this figure to be the engager of government revenue 
and the supervisor of the collective.  
But there was always an anxiety in official circles over the status of this 
figure. It was feared that, by assuming the roles of a leader, he might acquire 
predatory habits, and gradually usurp the rights of his fellow proprietors. In a 
resolution of the Government, which formed the foundation of the principles of 
settlement enshrined in Regulation VII of 1822, a dispatch to the Court of Directors 
was invoked in registering such anxieties. It was noted that since in the forthcoming 
settlement the Government demand would be fixed as a certain share of the rent, it 
would immediately create “…a new property before unknown or comparatively of 
insignificant amount, viz., a considerable surplus profit…after defraying the charges 
of cultivation, the profits of stock and the Government Revenue.”50 Thus, the 
Government pointed out that it becomes fundamentally important to decide which 
group of landholders should avail the benefit of this rent-property. In an implicit 
reference to the village Zemindars it was observed that, allowing a single 
representative individual to enjoy the profit might be harmful “…if particular parties 
or persons are raised in every Mehal above their present level as compared with their 
village associates. All may with advantage ascend together in the general scale of 
society, but the immediate rise of one above his fellows would be felt and would 
actually operate as a degradation of the rest.”51 But on the contrary, the Government 
emphasized, if the “rent” was distributed, among “…all who own and occupy land…” 
the goals of a permanent settlement will be lost. If the “net produce of the land may be 
frittered away among a multitude of needy cultivators”, they believed it would, “serve 
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only the hurtful purpose of enabling the occupants of the soil to waste an useless 
superfluity of labor in its tillage…”52 
In understanding these anxieties it becomes necessary to return to the question 
of the relation between rent, property and production. It must be remembered here 
that James Mill’s prescription of extracting the full rent was rooted in an abhorrence 
of all property arising from rent. Mill believed that any landholder earning rent is 
bound to turn unproductive. He asserted that, “…in general, the persons who own 
rent, and live upon rent, consume it all. That is the rule almost universally with them 
in India, and very generally, I believe, elsewhere…it is accumulation, and that alone, 
which is the source of capital.”53 He believed this to be true for everyone—for big 
landholders like the zemindars, as well as for the peasant-cultivators, or ryots. In 
Mill’s vision of the ryotwar, therefore, the ryot’s right to occupy and labor was 
viewed as a “proprietary” one; any privilege beyond this was considered illegitimate. 
But in the plan of settlement which got implemented in North-Western Provinces, a 
proprietary-right created by the fixing of rent, was considered as an essential incentive 
for “improvement”. The previous chapter points this out through the argument of 
Mackenzie. He believed that it was essential to leave a portion of rent to the 
cultivating-proprietor to guarantee the security of property, and, consequently, create 
an urge for “improvement”. As it will be demonstrated later in this chapter, this was 
also the fundamental premise of John Stuart Mill’s advocacy of peasant proprietors as 
improvers. All of this, therefore, was lodged in a search for individual figures as 
“improvers”. But the ryotwaree vision, being refashioned by the putteedari collective, 
could project individual landholders in a superior form only in terms of their 
belonging to the collective.       
William Bentinck, the Governor-General at that time, was closely involved in 
all these discussions around issues of settlement. In 1832, Bentinck wrote a minute 
which further redefined the “political”, leading to the enactment of Regulation IX of 
1833, under the guidelines of which the settlement in Cuttack took place. Bentinck, 
while retaining to a great extent Mackenzie’s interpretation of tenures, created 
provisions for a significantly different deployment of its tenets. Echoing Mackenzie’s 
representations, Bentinck noted that the “…Putteedari is the original and natural 
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tenure of all the lands in the Country…”54 He also noted, in the line of Mackenzie, 
that the “…Zemindari or Talukdari tenure is adventitious and artificial, being, 
generally speaking, a creation of the Moghul Government, and the Talukdar or 
Zemindar…himself being originally neither more nor less than a contractor with 
Government for its Revenue.”55 Yet he also pointed out that even zemindari and 
talukdari tenures might possess authentic proprietary rights. He argued that those 
zemindars and talukdars who acquired their tenure, in some way or the other, from the 
“village community” should be considered authentic proprietors. He noted that such 
tenures might have been created, “…either from the foundation of the village 
community having been laid by individual capital or from subsequent acquisition of 
the proprietary interests of those by whom or by whose ancestors the first occupation 
was made or from some other competent origin…”56 In this manner, by creating a 
scope for these tenures to become legitimately associated to the “village proprietors”, 
Bentinck enabled the domain of proprietary-rights to expand in its scope, while 
remaining firmly rooted within that collective, which embodied its authentic form.  
Also, by stating that the ryot, as a member of this collective, was endowed 
with true proprietary-rights, Bentinck repeated the earlier tradition of representing 
proprietary-rights in “India” as jointly held by the sovereign and the cultivator. For 
Bentinck, however, the ryot with proprietary rights was only one among the many 
peasant-cultivators bearing the same title. Bentinck pointed out that, “I am of the 
opinion that throughout the country there are three descriptions of ryots. The first 
class I consider as being to all intents and purposes proprietors of the lands which 
they cultivate, the second as having been originally tenants at will, but acquiring in 
course of time a prescriptive right of occupancy at fixed rates, and the third as mere 
contract cultivators.”57 Further, in describing the first kind, Bentinck, repeating earlier 
representations of the “ryot-proprietor”, gave the example of the meerasidars of 
Deccan.
58
 As examples of the second and third kind in the context of Deccan, 
Bentinck spoke of the judeed and pykasht ryots. The meerasidars, however, Bentinck 
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observed, used to possess such proprietary-rights during the ancient Hindu 
government. But over time, during the period of Muslim rule, their proprietary-profits 
were entirely extracted by the state as revenue. As a result they were reduced to the 
status of occupant-cultivators, or the “ryot” of the second kind in Bentinck’s scheme. 
The three-fold classification of ryots was thus reduced to a two-fold one, using the 
recurring explanatory trope of the “local”59.   
The same divisions, Bentinck noted, prevailed in Cuttack as well. There were 
the occupant cultivators, or the thanee ryots, having their residence and rates of rent 
fixed, subject to the payment of Government revenue, and there were the migratory 
cultivators or the pykasht ryots. The thanee ryots, he also noted, were known as the 
khoodkhast ryots in Bengal. This is how, I will argue, Bentinck’s analysis returned, 
after a full circle, to Mackenzie’s portrayal of the khoodkhast ryots of Bengal as 
originally being of the same class as the proprietary-ryots of the “village 
communities”. In the course of these deliberations, however, Bentinck had expanded 
the scope of the domain of proprietary-rights, by elaborating on the various figures of 
the ryots, zemindars, and talukdars, as embodying legitimate, even if distant, legacies 
of the original collective of village-proprietors. In a certain sense, therefore, 
Bentinck’s scheme reinterpreted all these figures as ryots, of varying lineages. 
Finally, keeping in line with the opinions of Mackenzie, Metcalfe and others 
regarding the need to maintain the jointness of such tenures, Bentinck resolved that 
wherever the putteedari tenure was found, engagements for the revenue of 
government would be made with the headmen, as representatives of the collective. In 
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those situations where legitimate talukdars and zemindars existed, Bentinck noted, the 
rights of all subordinate landholders would be recorded, in order to fix equitably the 
legitimate distribution of power-relations amongst them. Bentinck’s resolutions 
received an official sanction in the enactment of Regulation IX of 1833. It kept a 
place for everyone in the “political”. The way he reinterpreted the recurrent vision of 
an ancient, authentic field of proprietary power shared between the state and the ryot-
in-the-collective, allowed figures like zemindars and talukdars to regain legitimate 
positions in it. These figures had been excluded from this field since the failure of the 
permanent settlement in Bengal. With Bentinck, they re-entered the folds of the 
“political” with newly-discovered lineages of authenticity. The “local”, once again, 
was instrumental in allowing the classificatory imperative to re-imagine these figures 
as sharing a distant ancestry with the original proprietary-ryot.
60
 In four years time, 
settlement operations began in Cuttack.  
 
“Improvement” and mediation 
 
In this section, I will examine the modes of identifying and defining a variety of 
figures on the lands of Cuttack. These operations, as I will demonstrate, need to be 
understood as the unfolding of an intimacy between Cuttack and the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces. As the lands and people of Cuttack got recognized, out of a 
bundle of administrative practices, yet another field of difference was established. 
Tenures in Cuttack were found to be different from those in the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces. In my opinion, however, this difference remained grounded within the 
fundamental principles of the same representative frame of reckoning tenures that has 
been discussed till now. Yet it also had singular ramifications in structuring power-
relations on the lands of Cuttack.    
Cuttack got entangled in the discourse generated from the North-Western 
Provinces even before the commencement of its settlement. In 1831, the Board of 
Revenue on Deputation prepared a list of queries in order to circulate it amongst the 
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settlement officers of the North-Western Provinces.
61
 Cuttack, as an unsettled 
province awaiting settlement, received this list as well. The Board wanted to know, in 
detail, the various capacities in which the different figures on land were related to 
each other. The questions on the list clearly revealed that the object of knowledge was 
only one, namely, the entire matrix of power-relations which formed a “village 
community”. It is in responding to this questionnaire, that Henry Ricketts, collector of 
the Balasore district in Cuttack, put forward a detailed documentation of the figures 
invested with various proprietary-rights in Cuttack.  
Ricketts noted that the “agricultural community” in Cuttack primarily 
consisted of “Zemindars or proprietors paying Revenue direct into the Collector’s 
treasury…mokuddums…Serberakars…Thanee ryots…Paee Ryots…Tenants at 
Will…”62 
In describing the figure of the zemindar, Ricketts argued that since the beginnings of 
administration in Cuttack, the Sudder Malgoozar, or the engager of the revenue of 
Government, has been known by this name. The official regulations, over all these 
years, conferred the proprietary-rights of estates exclusively on such zemindars. These 
zemindars, he observed, ranged from holders of estates worth revenue of several 
thousand rupees to holders of a patch of land worth five rupees. It must be kept in 
mind that the prevailing representations on tenures had, simultaneously, critically 
reviewed the legitimacy of the zemindar as a bearer of authentic proprietary-rights, 
and championed the village-Zemindar as the true proprietor. These formulations, 
expectedly, centrally informed the set of questions that Ricketts was answering. 
Ricketts, however, argued that in the light of these new perspectives the only 
difference in the nature of rights to be granted to the zemindars should consist of the 
introduction of protective measures for the “undertenants” in estates which were big 
in size. It seemed, going against the prevailing opinion, he was in favour of retaining 
the proprietary privileges of the Zemindars. 
Ricketts use of the term “undertenant” has to be scrutinized, as it had 
significant implications both for his analytical scheme and for the different 
articulation of the “political” in Cuttack. Ricketts used this term to denote the 
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mokuddums and serberakars of Cuttack. These were figures which came close to the 
cultivating proprietors, or village Zemindars of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. 
As I have shown earlier, official contentions after the rebellion considered them to be 
true proprietors of the soil. But such debates on the possibility of these figures being 
considered as the real proprietors were never settled in Cuttack. In the context of the 
official admiration of the village Zemindar, Ricketts correctly anticipated that the 
mokuddums and serberakars might be suddenly endowed with a host of new 
privileges. 
Thus, he observed that “The more direct and immediate connection of the 
village zemindars with the soil is calculated to induce the supposition of a superior 
right of ownership there to, and I believe…that alone…has given rise to and 
supported the belief of their right having been superior to that of those selected as 
Sudder Malgoozars whose ostensible connection with the soil was more remote…”63 
Ricketts went on describing these landholders as “underholders”, or “undertenants” or 
even “middlemen”. He emphasized that, “The interests and comfort of all classes of 
underholders and Ryots may be preserved equal to & indeed beyond what they ever 
have been, without bestowing on either rights inconsistent with the zemindar 
ownership. I do not see that the maintenance of the Proprietary right of the Sudder 
Malgoozars and the protection of the interests of the landholders are by any means 
incompatible…”64 He believed that the zemindar, and not the “village Serberakar”, 
should possess all the benefits of being the proprietor of an estate, primarily those 
derived from the improvement and extension of cultivation. He firmly asserted that 
the zemindar as the Sudder Malgoozar should remain the exclusive proprietor of his 
estate, pointing out that, “Cultivation extends yearly and except under the doctrine 
that the zemindars are only subordinate collectors, I do not see on what other principle 
the mokuddums and serberakars are to be permitted to derive exclusive advantage 
therefrom…”65                       
As I have shown, in Mackenzie’s representations, zemindars and talukdars 
were considered to be mere collectors of the government revenue. Mackenzie also 
believed that as “improvers” they were wasteful, and much inferior to the cultivating-
proprietors, or “village Zemindars”. Subsequently, Bentinck created a provision 
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within his interpretive scheme, of admitting some zemindars and talukdars, who had 
their origins in the “village community”, as authentic proprietors of the soil. Ricketts 
seemed to be rejecting both formulations. His unambiguous preference towards the 
zemindar as the exclusive proprietor of an estate, stemmed clearly from his faith in a 
vision of “improvement” which had big landlords as its guiding force. It is this 
political-economic choice that made him re-define those figures which were 
considered authentic proprietors and productive improvers elsewhere, as wasteful 
“middlemen” and obstructive “undertenants” in Cuttack. For him, the proprietor, in 
the manner of a great landlord, had to be the sole improver of his estate. He 
considered the division of proprietary rights, and profits, among a range of such 
cultivating proprietors as inimical to the accumulation of capital and “improvement”. 
Ricketts asked, with great angst, “Is there no danger in any point of view to the 
interests of Government in recognizing a system the direct tendency of which is to 
again subdivide property already so subdivided that the owners are paupers?”66 He 
further noted that, “The Ryots suffer from such recognition as every increase in the 
number of middlemen must be prejudicial to their interests.”67  
These statements reflected Ricketts’s predilections towards a model of 
“improvement”, which aspired for a direct, unmediated relationship between the 
improving zemindar and the cultivating “ryots”. For Ricketts, the proprietor and the 
cultivator, had to be separately defined functionaries; the former, a big landlord and a 
man of capital, the latter, a small peasant and a man of labor. He dismissed that notion 
of “improvement” which had faith in the cultivating-proprietor’s capacities of 
becoming a productive improver. This was articulated in the refashioning of the 
“mokuddums” and “serberakars” as figures incapable of being invested with 
proprietary-rights or improving functions; it enabled Ricketts to view them as mere 
managers and wasteful “middlemen”. 
Ricketts seemed to be equally convinced of his perspective even before he 
elaborated upon it in the report on tenures. In settling Mouza Oora in Talook 
Noanund, previously the property of the Government, he chose as the engager of 
revenue one among a number of Mokuddums, all of whom claimed a right to engage 
for a share of the Mouza. These claimants were from the same family. Ricketts chose 
Permanund Mohapater, the second son of the elder branch of the family, as the 
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engager of revenue. He did so, not “from any supposition that his right is superior to 
that of any of the claimants”, but because “Permanund is the most respectable and 
quiet of the set and his brother Radakissun notoriously the contrary…”68 Expressing 
his fear of subdivision, he noted that, “There are now sixteen persons alive who are 
entitled to share if the tenure is divisible nine of that number have preferred claims 
and the rest will doubtless do the same if those preferred are allowed. Supposing these 
sixteen persons have each three children in the next generation there will be forty 
eight sharers…”69 He argued that these “mokuddums” had no other right than of 
prescriptive occupancy, and since they have not put forward a claim of separation, 
they “must be treated as undertenants and as such I would oppose the right of dividing 
the tenure which is held under and consequently ought to be in some measure under 
the control of the zemindar…”70 
I argue that even though Ricketts’s treatment of tenures displayed a deviation 
from the existing formulations, it was equally strongly informed by the two 
articulations of the “political”. His concern for the protection of the rights of all 
subordinate landholders emerged out of the existing interpretation of tenures as a field 
of dispersed and contingent power-relations. He retained this concern, despite his 
explicit aversion to such “undertenants”. Even in his report on tenures, he emphasized 
that “…not that I am an advocate for delivering all ryots and undertenants unprotected 
and disregarded into the unchecked and undefined power of the zemindars far from it, 
they have not a firmer friend than myself…”71 But, when it came to the second 
framing of the “political”, Ricketts differed significantly from the existing perspective 
on “improvement”. Since he favoured the big landlords over collectives of cultivating 
proprietors, it became difficult for him at times, to combine the imperatives of both 
analytical frames. It was difficult for him to protect the rights of “underholders”, yet 
at the same time consider them obstructions to “improvement”. In settling 
Baumunpoor, he faced such difficulties. Here, Ricketts approved the restoration of the 
village Serberakars who had been ousted earlier. He argued that “There might be a 
finer field for enterprise and the employment of capital on an extensive scale should 
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all these village proprietors be set aside, but there are also advantages attending their 
intervention between the zemindars and the actual cultivators.”72 
But generally, his opposition to these “village-proprietors” was, far more 
trenchant than his urge to accommodate them as legitimate constituents of the field of 
power-relations, or potential agents of “improvement”. When fifteen tenures, of 
parties claiming to be Mokuddums, in Pergunnah Kotdhes, were put on sale for 
arrears of revenue, Ricketts argued that instead of selling, the rights of these 
defaulters should be altogether forfeited. He observed that this should be taken as an 
opportunity to prevent the recreation of such “middlemen”. “…Instead of increasing 
the hold of these middlemen, it should be our policy rather to aim at their extinction… 
The zemindar would benefit and through him and also independently of him the state 
would benefit…altogether extirpated they don’t improve and can’t for they have not 
the means to improve their villages, and they prevent improvements being made by 
others.”73 But Ricketts’s convictions, however forceful they might have been, could 
not decide the fate of “mokuddums” and “serberakars” in Cuttack. As I will show in 
the next section, the possibility of considering them as real proprietors, akin to the 
“village Zemindars” of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces was debated, time and 
again, at different levels of administration in Cuttack. 
 
The new proprietary landscape of Cuttack 
 
In this section, I will look at administrative practices which invested the 
“mokuddums” and “serberakars” of Cuttack with different kinds of rights. Arguments 
over the authentic proprietary status of these figures flew along circuitous pathways of 
the bureaucratic apparatus. In the course of the settlement of each and every village, 
these figures rose to prominence in a manner never known before. Exclusive 
proprietors or not, they surely emerged as lynchpins of the “political” in Cuttack. 
Even here, the trope of the “local” played a decisive role in determining their futures.  
In 1823, the Court of Directors argued in one of their dispatches, that Mr. 
Kerr, erstwhile commissioner of Cuttack, “found a class of persons who are called 
Mourousee Moquddums, and whom he recognized as possessing a right to the 
                                                 
72
12 January, 1838, No. 36, SBOR—Settlement Proceedings, 1836-43, WBSA. 
73
12
 
December, 1837, No. 82, SBOR—Miscellaneous Proceedings, WBSA. 
 142 
soil...”74 The prospect of such a claim was immediately scrutinized using the 
interpretive scheme which defined the “political” of “India”. Once again, the logic of 
the “local” was triggered to apply the same piece of “empirical” evidence that was 
deployed in different contexts, from the 5th Report to Bentinck’s Minute, to explain 
the supposedly specific situation of Cuttack. The Court noted, that  
 
“The name suggests the idea of a similarity with the class of Meerasidars in 
some of the more Southern Provinces of India. That the foundation of the rights of 
these Meerasidars was laid in those of the proprietary class of ryots, known in your 
Provinces by the name of Khode Khast Ryots seems to be sufficiently ascertained. 
Where rights and prerogatives beyond those of proprietary ryots are claimed on the 
part of the Meerasidars they seem in all cases to have been those annexed to the head 
ryots, the managers of villages, and in many cases, when ages of exaction had 
destroyed the rights and obliterated the claims of the general class of Khode Khast 
ryots, the claims of the descendants of these headmen, under the title of Meerasidars, 
seem to be all that are recognized in existence of the rights of the proprietary ryots.”75  
 
 
This dispatch marked the beginning of a serious consideration of the 
proprietary prospects of “mokuddums” in Cuttack. As it is evident, the Court found in 
the “mokuddums” the only legitimate traces of those proprietary-rights which 
belonged to the “Meerasidars” or “Khoodekhast Ryots” in the ancient times. In this 
way, while the peasant cultivator’s ancient proprietary status was retained, at the same 
time it was reinterpreted as belonging in the present to only a select few of those 
“ryots”, who were perceived as its authentic legatees. Such interpretive strategies of 
simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of the archetypal cultivating-proprietor, or 
“ryot”, in the debates over proprietary-rights had significant consequences for the 
status of an immense variety of cultivators.  The “ryot” was fashioned, by the “local” 
as a transformative presence in the discourse of the “political”. This allowed the 
“ryot” to be defined as a peasant-cultivator; yet at the same time, not all peasant-
cultivators were considered proper “ryots”. Such an alliance between property and 
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propriety allocated different locations for the peasant cultivators of Cuttack within 
another matrix of power-relations. This was the “village”, to which I turn in the next 
chapter. 
It is evident that by the 1820s it was resolved at all levels of administration 
that “village proprietors” were the original propertied body on land in “India”. As I 
have shown earlier, there was a strong administrative urge to preserve this body 
wherever it was found in its authentic form. This attitude made itself visible in 
Cuttack as well. In 1824, an extract from a resolution in the territorial department was 
sent to the commissioner’s office in Cuttack, which stated unequivocally, that, “it is in 
no degree the intention of Government suddenly…to break down the communities of 
Village Proprietors.”76 But it was also argued, as I have noted with regard to the 
Court’s dispatch, that in Cuttack the true descendants of these “village proprietors” 
were the “head ryots” or “managers of villages”. Such “village managers” were 
named variously, as “mokuddums”, “serberakars” and “pudhans” in Cuttack. It must 
be kept in mind that in the discussion following the “Paik rebellion”, it was argued 
that the “pudhan” in the Rajwareh and the “mokuddum” in the Moghulbundee, were 
merely different names for the same figure, that is, the “village manager”, possessing 
authentic proprietary-rights in the land. Following the renewed interest in such 
figures, it was considered absolutely crucial to decide their proprietary status.  
“Pudhans” were found mostly in the district of Pooree, located in the southern 
part of Cuttack. In 1833, the Collector of Pooree offered his opinion to the 
Commissioner of Cuttack about the “…privileges to be awarded to the recorded 
zemindars and their subordinate mokuddums or pudhans…”77 Wilkinson argued that 
these zemindars had purchased their situations from the mokuddums and pudhans. 
The latter, according to him, were “…the proprietors of the soil of their respective 
villages.”78 In defining the status of these mokuddums and pudhans, who coexisted 
with zemindars, Wilkinson stated that they cannot be considered the sole proprietors. 
It must be remembered that Bentinck had argued in his minute that those Zemindars 
who acquired their proprietary rights legitimately from the “village proprietors”, 
should be considered bonafide proprietors. In the same vein, regarding the 
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apportionment of the “malikana”, or the proprietary allowance, Wilkinson insisted 
that “the Mokuddums who pay through a zemindar cannot be considered the sole 
proprietors and the zemindars should have some proportion of the Malikana…”79 In 
fact, Wilkinson referred to Bentinck’s minute in confirmation of his views. Finally, he 
suggested that an equal share of both the “malikana” and the expenses of collection 
should be given to each of these proprietors, where they existed together.  
The situation described by Wilkinson existed extensively in Cuttack. There 
were two kinds of landholders in almost all mahals, or units of settlement. On the one 
hand, there were persons known as zemindars, who had been treated as the Sudder 
Malgoozar or the engager of the government revenue in the years before the 
settlement. On the other, there were persons designated as the “pudhans”, 
“mokuddums”, or “serberakars” who had been conceived, with varying emphasis, 
from the time of the rebellion till the present, as bearing traces of the original 
proprietary body of “village-zemindars”. At the eve of the settlement, however, the 
critical attitude towards zemindars, characteristic of Mackenzie, Macaulay and others, 
was counterbalanced by Bentinck, who revalidated their authentic proprietary status. 
More specifically, in the context of Cuttack, a pro-zemindar stance was reaffirmed in 
a different way by Ricketts. But despite such reinvigorated positions of support 
towards zemindars, the landholders in Cuttack considered as proximate to the “village 
proprietors” could not be marginalized in this complex and conflicting field of 
administrative practices. 
The Sudder Board of Revenue, in response to Wilkinson’s proposal of an 
equal distribution of the “malikana”, firmly stated that the entire “malikana” and 
allowances for risks of collection, “…should be assured to the parties under 
engagements with Government as zemindars and not to any of the subordinate 
holders…”80  The Board noted that the “…portion of the proprietary profit which is 
pure Malikana, is an allowance recognized by the state, as belonging to a proprietor 
who has the right of engaging with Government…”81This is how the Board 
unambiguously declared their perception of the zemindar as the exclusive proprietor 
of an estate. The Board further pointed out that the next related matter to be discussed 
was the particular nature of the interests of the mokuddums who existed in the estates 
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of the zemindars. They remarked that if these mokuddums were found to be different 
from the village zemindars or “maliks” of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, “no 
proposition for dividing and allotting the net profit, need be, for a moment 
entertained.”82 Although the Board clearly preferred the zemindar as the actual 
proprietor, they could not set aside other views. They had to take into account the 
proprietary prospects of those figures in Cuttack who resembled the village 
proprietors. Thus, they laid down a number of points which were to be investigated in 
every single instance of settlement, in order to discern whether the “mokuddums” 
were “maliks”. 
The settlement officers were asked to find out whether the mokuddums have 
themselves put forward any claim of proprietorship. They were asked to inquire what, 
if any, kind of proprietary dues the mokuddums received. “Do they receive house rent 
from artisans? Do they enter upon the lands of a thanee Ryot which have escheated? 
Do they receive rent from woods, tanks…or enjoy any other of the perquisites 
denoting the retention of proprietary right?”83 The Board also wanted the nature of 
inheritance of these tenures to be examined. They wanted to know what was 
inherited—an office or real property. These prescriptions defined the manner in which 
settlement practices in Cuttack articulated the complementary and contradictory 
interpretive frames of property in land. A rigorous scrutiny of the status of 
mokuddums was carried out in every estate; their proprietary future depended on 
success in this performative arena.  
But even when they were not considered proprietors, the mokuddums and 
serberakars of Cuttack where granted significant rights as hereditary managers. 
Mouza Ruttadeah in Talooka Baumunpoor was claimed as a mokuddumee tenure. The 
settlement officers granted a prescriptive right of possession to the mokuddum and an 
allowance of 15 per cent on the expenses of collection. Proprietary rights were, 
however, denied. A similar course of proceedings was followed in mouza Oortee.
84
 In 
Mouza Gowalsing, the mokuddums tried to prove their proprietary right. They 
produced deeds of sale showing that they had purchased lands of other villages, and 
annexed these lands to this village. However, the settlement officer remarked that, 
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“Their witnesses failed to establish the validity of these documents and no proofs 
denoting them Maliks of the village were adduced.”85 There were situations as well 
where the mokuddums and serberakars were granted different kinds of rights. In 
Talooka Ramchunderpoor, the serberakars were considered mere managers, and 
granted 10 per cent on the expenses of collection, as opposed to which the 
mokuddums were recorded as proprietors with a higher allowance of 15 per cent, in 
recognition of their proprietary right. In a memorandum on this settlement, it was 
noted that, “…The Mokuddums stand on a different footing, they have a right of 
property apparently, in the soil; which having been conceded, is of course a saleable 
property…”86 But the same memorandum noted that since, in Erdanga and Kespoor, 
the pudhan could not prove any right, the zemindar was registered as the exclusive 
proprietor.  
In the various villages of Talooka Rughoonathpore the mokuddums were 
granted proprietary rights either on the basis of original sunnuds where these rights 
were recorded, or depending on the oral testimonies of old villagers of the 
mokuddums’ rights to grant rent-free lands. In some instances, existence of these 
rights was also inferred from the sunnuds of Lakhirajdars, or holders of rent-free 
lands. The settlement officer noted that in Sandholessur, “The original sunnud was not 
forthcoming but from a Goomnamah…and from the Sunnuds of Lakhirajdars it 
appears that the ancestors of the present Mokuddums purchased the mokuddumee 
from the former zemindar & exercised the usual rights of granting land free of rent.”87 
I had argued in the previous chapter, that these “village assemblies” became, during 
the settlement, very influential constituents of the power-relations that determined 
“rent”. It is evident now that they were equally instrumental in defining the status of 
these village-based landholders.  
The settlement in Cuttack, by investing these figures, which resembled the 
village proprietors, with various kinds of rights, eventually secured a firm position for 
them in that matrix of power-relations which constituted the “political” in British 
India. Undoubtedly, a number of distinctions were made between the different kinds 
of rights granted to these landholders. The malikana was reserved mostly for the 
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zemindar as the sudder malgoozar, or principal engager of government revenue. But 
at the same time the mokuddums in his estate were granted an equal amount of 
allowance, namely 20 per cent on the expenses of collection, as hereditary managers 
with a prescriptive right of possession vested in the office. Malikana was granted to 
mokuddums in those cases, albeit very few in number, where they existed as the party 
under engagement. Wherever these mokuddums were identified as “mowroosee”, 
they were considered as real proprietors. As I have shown, such identification was 
made mostly through the sunnuds of holders of rent-free lands. It was noted, in the 
final settlement papers, that “The Mowroosee, or old hereditary Mokuddums, were 
doubtless the ‘rightful proprietors of the soil’, and their tenures are of a heritable and 
transferable nature.”88 The pudhans, found mostly in southern Cuttack, were treated in 
a light similar to mowroosee mokuddums. Their tenures were considered hereditary 
and transferable in nature, and they were also allowed malikana, being the exclusive 
engager of government revenue. The serberakars, however, were considered only as 
hereditary managers. These tenures were perceived to be hereditary offices of 
management, and granted an allowance of either 15 or 20 per cent on the jumma, as 
expenses of collection.  
It emerges clearly from this differentiation of rights, that these landholders 
were decisively entrenched as mainstays in the economy of agrarian relations in 
Cuttack. The zemindar, despite being recorded as the Sudder Malgoozar in most 
cases, had his authority fractured and distributed among these other landholders. The 
zemindar had always been the pivotal figure in the networks of power on land. But 
these serberakars, mokuddums, and pudhans, for the first time, riding on the wave of 
an overwhelming administrative admiration for village proprietors, wrenched an 
official sanction of their authority. In Cuttack, like everywhere else, the uncontested 
supremacy that the zemindars used to enjoy was eclipsed. There were new players in 
the field of power. 
 
Richard Jones, the “political”, and British India 
 
It is time to return to political economy in contemporary Britain. In this chapter I 
demonstrated how an ensemble of proprietary relations and political power got 
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constituted as the object of agrarian governance. In the previous chapter I argued that 
rent was perceived to be a key marker of this domain of power. Rent emerged as the 
leading conceptual category over which a number of methodological debates took 
place, leading to a reorientation of the epistemological underpinnings of 
contemporary political economy. These changes established the “political” as the 
object of knowledge in political economy. Now, in exploring the “political”, I will try 
to read political economy in the light of the logic of British Indian agrarian 
governance.  
In Richard Jones’s scheme, the interrelation between the political-economic 
categories of rent, wage, and profit, comprising the sphere of distribution, was an 
effect of the “political”. In other words, Jones argued that an ensemble of property 
and political power determined how the different portions of the whole produce, as 
rent, wage, and profit, will be distributed to different groups of society. This 
distribution, he argued, took place differently in different nations, depending upon the 
specific form of the “political” prevailing in them. As I argued earlier, for Jones, 
distribution and production were integrally related domains in political-economy. 
Thus, the specific mode of distribution also shaped the specific potential of 
production. In this manner, Jones established an analytical primacy of the “political”. 
The “political”, in his scheme, was the primary determinant of the productive 
potential of nations.  
In the greater part of the world, Jones noted, a vast majority of the population 
labored on the land to secure the means of subsistence. He argued that a lack of 
employment and capital in non-agricultural occupations kept them “…confined to the 
cultivation of the earth by an insuperable necessity, by adamantine chains, which 
cannot be broken by any human power.”89 In these conditions, rents and wages 
determined each other. Jones pointed out that, “…of the produce of the soil, a part is 
left in the hands of the occupier—it constituted his wages; a part goes to the owner of 
the soil—it constitutes his rent…”90 All of this, he argued, was linked to the 
fundamental absence of capital in these nations. Jones defined capital as 
“‘accumulated wealth employed with a view to profit,’ and only such wealth.”91 It 
was that division of wealth which brought out the greatest productive capacities of 
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nations by organizing production in a specific manner. It acted as the fund from which 
labourers received their wages. It created those conditions of labouring where labor 
could be most continuous, skilful, and powerful. To summarize, capital created the 
best conditions for the production of wealth, by enabling the highest productive 
efficiency of labor.
92
 
Jones argued that the absence of capital, and consequently, of the most 
advanced form of labouring, in the greater part of the world were effects of the 
conditions under which production and distribution were organized there. He traced 
these conditions to the specific configurations of proprietary relations and political 
power. He noted that, “when the lands of a country are appropriated, and the 
agriculturalists are dependent on the possession of portions of them for subsistence, 
political systems are generated, which inevitably secure the political and social 
subordination—we might almost say servitude—of the peasantry.”93 Jones proceeded 
to explain differences in the forms of the “political”, by reconstructing the historical 
roots of such entanglements between proprietary relations and political power in the 
careers of nations.   
He noted that property in land can be divided into “European” and “Asiatic” 
forms. In the “European” nations land belonged to individuals as private property, 
while in the “Asiatic” ones, it was the property of the sovereign. Jones emphasized 
that this difference emerged from the different constitutions of power that 
characterized the ruling groups of these nations. In “Asiatic” nations, the power of the 
state was absolute which made the sovereign the paramount owner of all lands in his 
dominion. Jones attributed this form of power to the political constitution of the 
earliest invaders of these nations. He exclaimed that, “Wherever these Scythian 
invaders have settled, they have established a despotic form of government, to which 
they have readily submitted themselves, while they were obliging the inhabitants of 
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the conquered countries to submit to it.”94 Contrary to this, Jones argued, the 
Germanic tribes established a free constitution in the “European” nations conquered 
by them. The difference between the political constitutions of the earliest invaders, 
which gave birth to different political systems in the two kinds of nations, had their 
roots in the essentially pastoral habitat of one of these invaders. “It may be found 
perhaps, in a great measure, in the different character of their original seats. Amidst 
the fastnesses and morasses of his native woods, the German, when not actually at 
war, was in tolerable security; his habits of military obedience, we know, relaxed…”95 
In comparison to this, the Tartars and the Afghans, who introduced a “despotic” 
constitution in the “Asiatic” nations, never settled peacefully in the lands they 
occupied. Jones proclaimed that, “The task of guarding their property and lives, is a 
constant campaign; and their habits of military submission have no intervals of 
relaxation; they are born and they die in them.”96 Thus, he noted, “…it is certain that 
the Tartars have every where either adopted or established a political system, which 
unites so readily with their national habits of submission in the people, and absolute 
power in the chiefs…Throughout agricultural Asia…the same system prevails.”97                                         
As it is evident, Richard Jones established the “political” as the 
epistemological object of political economy. I have demonstrated in this chapter that 
the same complex of proprietary relations and political power was fashioned as the 
object of agrarian governance in British India. Jones’s analysis, however, did not end 
here. Once the truth of such distant pasts was established, Jones moved on to more 
recent pasts in order to represent the “political” in India as a variegated and complex 
field of relations of power between proprietors of several kinds. Through these 
historical excursions, Jones demonstrated how the despotism of power in “India” 
always remained incomplete. He pointed out that the state could never act as the 
absolute landlord. Instead, property in land was distributed amongst a number of 
landholders and landholding bodies of various size and status, who acquired their 
respective positions over time. Together, they constituted a complex calculus of 
power-relations, which was time and again threatened by foreign conquests, and the 
despotic possibilities of the power of the state.            
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For Jones, this collective comprised of the state, the officers of state, like the 
zemindars, the potails as representatives of a collective body of proprietary power, 
namely the “village”, and the ryots. Jones considered this entire power-matrix as the 
specific “political” of India. He noted that the ryots possessed attributes of both tenant 
and proprietor. Their right of possessing land was hereditary and to a great extent, 
permanent. Jones pointed out that the ryot was never a proprietor, in the sense of 
enjoying a landlord’s rent from his land, or having alienable rights in the soil. In fact, 
while deliberating on the question of the proprietary status of ryots, he referred to the 
writings of reputed administrators of British India, like Thomas Munro and Col. 
Todd. He noted that, “…Sir Thomas Munro declares the ryot to be the true 
proprietor.”98 But he disagreed with Munro in arguing that the only right which the 
ryot had was of hereditary possession; he received it as “a grant from the sovereign on 
certain conditions; resumable at pleasure, although practically rarely resumed…”99 
Similarly, Jones observed, the offices of zemindars and potails also became hereditary 
over time. Just like the British Indian administration, Jones construed various kinds of 
rights, either of possessing land or of possessing offices connected with land, as 
proprietary ones.  
It is the same understanding of the “political” which informed a section of his 
lectures on political economy at Haileybury. In this section, entitled “The Anglo-
Indian Revenue Systems”, Jones marked the failure of the British Indian 
administration in understanding the “political” in India. He began with the blunders of 
the permanent settlement. Pointing out that the policy was “grounded upon 
delusions,” he argued that “great ignorance prevailed at that time…with regard to the 
manifold and diversified rights connected with the soil…”100 The effect of the policy 
was pernicious, as it converted the revenue-farmers into absolute landlords, rejecting 
the entire gamut of proprietary rights that co-existed with them. However, Jones 
remarked, there was an attempt to correct the errors of the permanent settlement in 
Madras. Jones noted, echoing the way the “local” was mobilized to explain the 
“political” of “India” by administrators, that “to the southern parts of India the 
Mohammedans had not penetrated; and there Hindu institutions remained in their 
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completeness and vigour.”101 Here, based on the vision of an erstwhile relation of co-
proprietorship between the ryot and the state, a new settlement was implemented. As 
Jones saw it, the “political” in India was still being misconstrued. Thus, he argued that 
the ryotwari system was “…founded upon a principle just the reverse of that which 
was the basis of the zemindary system, but was equally false and equally fatal. The 
one disregarded the rights of the ryot, its framers having been deluded by a name into 
confounding together an infinite diversity of proprietary claims and interests; while 
the other swept away, suddenly and violently, a multitude of relations, linking the 
highest with the lowest.”102 
Such was Richard Jones’s framing of the “political”. He kept on insisting that 
it is a diversity of proprietary relations, and not the superiority of one to the exclusion 
of others which defined the “political” in India. The British Indian administration, 
time and again, falsely upheld one at the expense of others. The misperceptions 
continued, Jones argued, as another system of settlement was introduced. This was 
based on an imagination of the ancient village as the authentic seat of proprietary-
rights in India. But in an attempt to recreate such a putatively ancient unit of property 
and government, namely, the village, a new exclusive centre of power was created.
103
  
Richard Jones perceived the “political” of India as a distributed field of power-
relations flowing out of a variety of proprietary capacities. As it has been argued in 
this chapter, such a vision of the “political” also informed the constitution of the 
object of agrarian governance in British India. But political economy in contemporary 
Britain underwent other epistemological transformations as well. Even here, the 
reorientations were effected around the category of property. The problematic of 
property was, however, formulated differently from Richard Jones in this strand of 
political-economy. In the next section, with John Stuart Mill, I explore these new 
directions.       
 
Linking property and production: the “political” in John Stuart Mill 
 
The category of property played a pivotal role in fashioning John Stuart Mill’s 
political-economy. As it is well known, the greatest public trial that Mill’s political-
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economic principles faced was over the burning question of the conditions of Ireland. 
While the discontentment emerging from Britain’s political domination of Ireland 
during Mill’s time revolved around a host of issues, grievances over land-ownership, 
unarguably, was one of the most important among them. It is in this sphere that John 
Stuart Mill, as one of the leading public intellectuals of his day, proposed major 
reforms in the existing state of property in land. Mill’s location in this campaign has 
been critically scrutinized by a number of works.
104
 Other works have pointed out that 
the prescriptions Mill proposed for Ireland, were also directed by him towards British 
India.
105
 Recently, it has also been argued that the experience Mill gained of British 
India as an employee at the India House, the change in his own intellectual orientation 
from a strong Utilitarian position in early life to a revised one inspired by his readings 
of romantic and conservative European thinkers, and his engagement with Ireland’s 
socio-economic conditions, all influenced each other in shaping his positions on 
contemporary issues.
106
 In this section, I argue that in order to understand Mill’s 
prescriptions for Ireland and British India, it is necessary to examine the 
epistemological core of his political economy, which was marked by a distinct 
analytical linkage between production and property in land. Such an analytical 
primacy of the category of property, I contend, made Mill’s political economy both 
distinctive, yet at the same time, part of a critical tradition of this branch of 
knowledge. Like Richard Jones, Mill also forged connections between property in 
land and political power in designing his political economy. But these connections 
differed crucially from Jones’s reckoning of the “political”.  
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In J.S. Mill’s “Principles of political-economy”, a large section was devoted to 
“property”, which was a completely new addition to the conventional curriculum of 
such treatises on political economy. The new entry was not a mere, minor additive to 
the established tenets of this body of knowledge. Rather, in a manner much similar to 
Jones, Mill explained “property” as that set of conditions which decisively determined 
both production and distribution all over the world. He noted that “property” was the 
primary institution regulating the “…different modes of distributing the produce of 
land and labour.”107 Since property was intimately involved with production and 
distribution, Mill believed it was essential to explore what it consisted of. He argued 
that “Private property, in every defence made of it, is supposed to mean, the guarantee 
to individuals of the fruits of their own labor and abstinence.”108 He emphasized that 
property essentially consisted of “the right of producers to what they have themselves 
produced.”109 I argue that this integral association between property and production 
was foundational to Mill’s perspective on the state of property in land during his time. 
It is primarily on the basis of this connection that Mill established distinct conceptual 
linkages between property in land, production, distribution, and political power in his 
political-economy.  
Property, as Mill saw it, consisted of the right of the producer to the product. 
There was, however, a problem in applying this definition to landed property. Land 
could not be owned on the basis of this principle, as it was not produced by anybody. 
But at the same time, land could be made productive only by the application of labor 
to it. Most importantly, it was the natural source of mankind’s fundamental means of 
subsistence. By relating land to his conceptualization of property and production in 
this manner Mill was able to argue that there are both individual and collective stakes 
immanent in the category of landed-property. Landed property was different from the 
category of property in general. Mill noted that, “when the ‘sacredness of property’ is 
talked of, it should always be remembered, that any such sacredness does not belong 
in the same degree to landed property. No man made the land. It is the original 
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inheritance of the whole species. Its appropriation is wholly a question of general 
expediency.”110        
Since it was the essential source of human sustenance and a gift of nature, land 
was immanently collective. In that case, Mill argued, the only form of individual 
ownership that can be legitimately instituted in land must be of a productive capacity. 
In other words, individual ownership of land was “…only valid, in so far as the 
proprietor of land is its improver. Whenever, in any country, the proprietor, generally 
speaking, ceases to be the improver, political economy has nothing to say in defence 
of landed property…In no sound theory of private property was it ever contemplated 
that the proprietor of land should be merely a sinecurist quartered on it.”111 This was 
the basis of Mill’s advocacy for peasant-proprietorship in Ireland, or in British India. 
Mill thought that it was an absence of this constitutive connection between property 
and production that characterized land-ownership all over the world. This absence 
was particularly visible in Britain where big landlords existed as unproductive owners 
of lands.
112
  
     It was this distinctive categorization of land based on the vital association 
between property and production that turned Mill’s political economy into a discourse 
of the “political”. I argue that the collectivist claim immanent in Mill’s categorization 
of land transformed the epistemological underpinnings of his political economy. The 
objects of analysis, and prescription, of his political-economy became the “political”, 
which resulted in a connection between production, property and political power. He 
argued that the institution of private property in modern Europe was “…the result, not 
of just partition, or acquisition by industry, but of conquest and violence…The laws 
of property have never yet conformed to the principles on which the justification of 
private property rests…”113 Accordingly, Mill believed that the mode in which 
property in land existed in Europe, and especially, in Britain, was completely inimical 
to the principles of political economy. Thus, when he advocated the creation of 
peasant-properties in Ireland by legalizing customary rates of rent, he thought he was 
working within political-economic postulates. He believed that state-intervention in 
the domain of private property in land was justified due to the peculiar political-
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economic characteristic of landed-property, which harboured the “political” in it. The 
state here stood for the general will of the community. Mill declared that “the 
community has too much at stake in the proper cultivation of the land, and in the 
conditions annexed to the occupancy of it, to leave these things to the discretion of a 
class of persons called landlords, when they have shown themselves unfit for the 
trust.”114 He clearly pointed out that an exclusive ownership to land could be granted 
only if the proprietor was also an improver. That is because, in this capacity, by 
responsibly executing the act of production, he would be fulfilling his duties towards 
the community’s source of sustenance.115 
Mill was, I argue, reworking the Malthusian proposition in conceptualizing the 
link between landed property, production and political power. To be precise, he 
effected a secularization of the Malthusian perception of land as a divine monopoly. 
Malthus did not see a problem in viewing landlords as the legitimate exclusive owners 
of land, because he considered them as natural trustees of this divine monopoly. But 
for Mill, since land, as the source of the fundamental means of life, was a monopoly, 
it was naturally connected to the rights of a community. Thus, it could only be 
appropriated if it served the purposes of the community. In other words, it could only 
be owned if it was cultivated by the owner. The state, therefore, as a representative of 
the community, had the right to determine the nature of its ownership. Thus, he 
pronounced, that, “it is an acknowledged principle that when the State permits a 
monopoly, either natural or artificial, it retains the right, and cannot divest itself of the 
duty, to place the exercise of the monopoly under any degree of control which is 
requisite for the public good.”116 
Moreover, by making the “political” the constitutive element of political-
economy in this case, Mill argued that the state had always been the legitimate owner 
of land, and, therefore, could always ensure that the real cultivators of land possess 
proprietary rights in some form. He gave a few examples to prove his point: “In 
Russia, even when the cultivators of the soil were serfs out of the landed proprietor, 
his proprietary right in the land was limited by rights of theirs belonging to them as a 
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collective body managing its own affairs, and with which he could not interfere…In 
other cases, as in Tuscany, the metayer farmer is virtually co-proprietor with the 
landlord, since custom, though not law, guarantees to him a permanent possession and 
half the gross produce, so long as he fulfils the customary conditions of his 
tenure….”117 Mill further emphasized that although in Britain the landlords were 
considered exclusive proprietors of land “…the theory of the law does not 
acknowledge an absolute right of property in land in any individual; the fullest landed 
proprietor known to the law, the freeholder, is but a ‘tenant’ of the Crown.”118  
It is evident that like his father, Mill was also trying to argue that the form of 
landed-property prevalent in Britain was contrary to both the facts of the world and 
the correct principles of political-economy. In Britain, and in Ireland, such a 
connection between property and production was long lost. Mill argued that the 
landlords of Britain rarely acted as responsible managers of the community’s asset; 
they were not productive proprietors of land. Mill’s critique of big landlords, 
emerging from the alliance of property and production, was combined with an 
influential contemporary strand of opinion in the field of the political economy of 
agriculture to produce his advocacy for peasant-proprietorship in Ireland. Thus, he 
confidently declared that, “…though the self-interest of landlords frequently operates 
to frustrate, instead of promoting, the interest which the community has in the most 
effective use of the productive powers of the soil, there is another party concerned 
whose self-interest does work in that useful direction; and that is, the actual cultivator 
of the soil, if he be either a small proprietor, or a tenant on conditions which secure to 
him the full fruits of his labor and outlay…”119 This was the basis of Mill’s campaign 
for granting security of tenure, and, thereby, legalizing peasant-properties in Ireland. 
As it is well known, he had similar prescriptions for reforming the state of landed-
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property in Britain.
120
 He believed that the “The principle of private property has 
never yet had a fair trial in any country; and less so, perhaps, in this country than in 
some others.”121 
From this perspective when Mill analyzed the state of landed property in 
India, the category of custom emerged as a vital ingredient of the “political”. Like 
Richard Jones, Mill also viewed the form of landed property in India as a dispersed 
field of power. He perceived property in India as various kinds of rights attached with 
land, distributed over a range of landholders and landholding bodies. These rights 
were of revenue collection, management and cultivation. They were possessed, in 
different capacities, by the state, its hereditary officers collecting revenue, the village 
community, and the cultivators. Thus, in India, as Mill saw it, the state, despite being 
the universal landlord, had its proprietary privileges limited by a highly differentiated 
field of rights. But in this power-matrix, Mill argued, custom was the only principle of 
determining the proprietary rights of the actual cultivators. Custom fixed the rent, 
thereby, determining how much of the profits of cultivation would remain with the 
cultivators. In certain circumstances, where landownership was implicated in the 
collective body of the village, custom organized production by ascertaining the share 
of the produce, or the land itself, to be enjoyed by the individual cultivators.
122
 
For Mill, custom completed the constitutive linkage between property, 
production and political power. Mill argued that, “custom is the most powerful 
protector of the weak against the strong; their sole protector where there are no laws 
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or government adequate to the purpose.”123 In India, therefore, it served to protect the 
cultivator’s proprietary right from the despotic power of the state, and the predatory 
propensities of its officers. Custom had a political-economic function. It ensured that 
the cultivator had some proprietary right in land, thereby, guaranteeing a productive 
utilization of the community’s treasure.124 Mill observed that property and production 
could be brought together only if the ryots, or cultivators, were converted to 
cultivating-proprietors. In British India, he argued, such a possibility was inherent in 
the proprietary conditions on land.
125
 But during the early period of their rule, the 
British failed to realize this possibility, and mistakenly made the wasteful zemindars 
the proprietors of the land. The mistake was, however, rectified over time.
126
 
Interestingly, Cuttack found exclusive mention in Mill’s interpretation of the history 
of settlement-practices in British India as a progressive movement towards the best 
form of connection between property and production. Mill noted that, “the revenue 
system of Cuttack is ryotwar; but the attempt has latterly been made to combine the 
advantages of the ryotwar principle, with a portion of those of the system of the 
North-west Provinces…This mixed system of ryotwar and village management, 
having been successful in Cuttack, is in course of introduction into one of our latest 
acquisitions, the districts made over to our permanent administration by the 
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individual, but holding them jointly responsible for each other’s default.” Ibid, 285. 
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Nizam…”127 Mill thought Cuttack exemplified the best form of settlement, where the 
advantages of both ryotwar and mouzawar were combined. Thus, in his scheme of 
things, Cuttack emerged as the most advanced, and therefore, model form of 
settlement, to be replicated in the latest territorial acquisitions of the government.    
Mill chose to explain the settlement practices of these parts of British India in 
the light of his own argument about landed-property, at the centre of which was the 
figure of the peasant-proprietor. While largely adopting the Jonesian complex of 
property and political power, he reconfigured it in terms of the imperatives of 
production. But the new administrative arrangements in British India, to which Mill 
referred, were adopted years before Mill’s publication, mostly in the 1820s and 1830s. 
They neither anticipated, nor simply reflected this emerging consensus around the 
figure of the peasant-proprietor in contemporary political economy. There was 
certainly a favourable attitude towards the cultivating-proprietor, discernible in 
various moments, over different geographical sites in British India. It congealed into a 
particular form in the context of Mackenzie’s representations and the debates of the 
Ceded and Conquered Provinces. In Cuttack, once again, it assumed a different 
character. 
But the organization of agrarian relations in a particular locality, in this case 
Cuttack, was not a simple development of this appreciation of the peasant-proprietor. 
As this chapter shows, it was a complex outcome, the contours of which were 
decisively determined by the trope of the “local”. Within the framework of the 
“local”, there was a productive tension between the two articulations of the 
“political”—one that wanted to keep power-relations distributed, and the other that 
tried to resuscitate the original proprietary figure, the cultivating peasant-proprietor. 
Even then, it was not a simple addition of these two imperatives that produced the 
designs of agrarian power in localities. While there was an undoubtedly an 
epistemological kinship between the “political” in political economy and the “local” 
in British Indian agrarian governance, none of them were copies of the other. Neither 
did they influence, anticipate, or reflect each other. Yet they were woven together by 
strong lines of force, and circuitous pathways of connection. This dissertation argues 
                                                 
127John Stuart Mill, “Memorandum of the Improvements In the Administration of India During the Last 
Thirty Years”, 1858, John Robson, Martin Moir, and Zawahir Moir (ed.) The Collected Works of John 
Stuart Mill, Volume XXX-Writings on India, Toronto, 1990, 127-28. 
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that their visibility emerges only when they are considered as an apparatus, as a 
single, unified analytical field.    
  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has tried to put forward an anti-foundational method of analyzing 
agrarian power in a locality. Cuttack, I argue, remains important to this chapter, and 
more generally to the dissertation, but only as different crystallized moments of a 
much broader geographical and analytical space. The rebellion of the paiks, Stirling’s 
exposition of tenures, Ricketts’s arguments about “wasteful intermediaries”, and the 
new-found rights of mokuddums, serberakars, and pudhans after the settlement 
undoubtedly shed important light on the specificities of the agrarian society of 
Cuttack. But their meanings were neither restricted to, nor produced from within 
singular, irreducible conditions of Cuttack. Rather, they become meaningful only 
when they are seen as produced by an integrated historical field, of which the North-
Western Provinces, the British Parliament, the Bengal government, and texts of 
political economy were equally important constituents. This chapter, therefore, 
performs the task of locating localities by unravelling the logic of the “local”, through 
its relationships with the “political”. 
 I have argued here that these processes established the “local” as the object of 
agrarian governance in British India over the first half of the nineteenth century. But 
this chapter might have hinted that the “local” did not only consist of relationships 
between individual landholding figures like zamindars, talukdars, serberakars, 
mokuddums, and ryots. In the critique of the permanent settlement of Bengal, these 
figures were newly discovered not as discrete individuals, but as variously related 
members of a landholding body, namely, the village. As this chapter has shown, their 
pedigrees as authentic proprietors were graded on the basis of their links to the 
“village community”. Even zemindars and talukdars, who were considered by the 5th 
Report as corrupt outcrops of the recent past and far removed from the authentic 
proprietor-ryot, were eventually granted some position in this hierarchy by Bentinck, 
only if they were found to have roots in the collective of village-proprietors. What 
emerges from these contentions is the centrality of the village, as a landholding body. 
The next chapter will examine the particular manner in which the village emerged as 
 162 
the foundation of the “political”, the seat of the “local”, and the fundamental object of 
agrarian governance in British India.   
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Chapter Five 
 
Grounding the “political”: A visit to the “village” 
 
 
This chapter intends to study the process by which the “village” got identified as the 
bedrock of the “political”, and therefore, the fundamental object of agrarian 
governance, in British India over the first half of the nineteenth century. I argue that 
although the “village” was imagined as the quintessential complex of property and 
political power in India right from the beginning of the nineteenth century, within the 
next four decades, it emerged as the preeminent object and site of governance through 
various reconfigurations of its former formulations. As earlier, I make sense of this 
process by bringing together meanings of the “village” generated in contemporary 
political-economy, and practices of agrarian governance in several localities of British 
India, while visiting Cuttack at times in the light of such spiralling journeys. The 
chapter argues that meanings of the “village” were fashioned out of two articulations 
of the “political”: one in which the “village” was seen as a landholding body 
constituted by a variety of power relations, emanating from proprietary rights, and 
another which perceived it as the basic unit of agricultural production, being both the 
seat of the peasant-proprietor and an expression of custom, thereby resisting the 
predatory impulses of despotic political power. A productivist emphasis acted as the 
main principle of difference between these two meanings. While the former described 
the “village” as a cardinal site of power, it refused to admit its productive potential. 
The latter, however, located the very nature of its power in its capacity to obstruct 
extractive encroachments by superior landholders, and, consequently, stimulate 
production by securing proprietary rights. These articulations were underpinned by 
the claim that, since the “village” was the most basic and ancient unit of 
administration in India, it could legitimately become the authentic object of agrarian 
governance. I contend that this argument about indigenous authenticity was not 
external to contemporary political-economic formulations. Such indigenous 
imaginations were incorporated within contemporary political economy through the 
latter’s reconfiguration in the light of the “political”. Thus, the re-discovery of the 
“village” during this time as the most authentic, and therefore, valid site of agrarian 
governance, was reflective of an epistemological affinity between contemporary 
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political economy and British Indian agrarian governance, forged by the 
foregrounding of the “political” in both spheres.  
Very few works in South Asian history have critically examined the “village” 
as a category of governance in the context of nineteenth-century British India. Louis 
Dumont’s essay can be viewed as the earliest attempt to trace a genealogy of this 
category. But Dumont, and others who have worked in this area, perceive the problem 
differently.  Their interpretation is based on the assumption that the “village” is 
equivalent to the “village community”, which, in my opinion, was primarily a crucial 
category of Henry Maine’s historical sociology, influential in the administrative 
context of late nineteenth-century British India. Dumont, for example, identifies three 
different meanings of the “village community” in three distinct phases. He notes that, 
“We can distinguish three meanings of the expression which seem to predominate in 
three successive historical phases. In the first phase, the village community is 
primarily a political society, in the second a body of co-owners of the soil, while in 
the third phase it becomes the emblem of traditional economy and polity, a 
watchword of Indian patriotism.”1 He believes that the category “community” 
appropriately unites these seemingly disparate meanings. I argue that this reflects a 
typically structural-functionalist interpretation, as he suggests that “community”, as 
an equalitarian principle, tied together different characterizations of the “village”. He 
notes that, “in the prevalent ideology of the period a ‘community’ is an equalitarian 
group…Dominance, and even hierarchy, are not absolutely ignored by all writers, but 
they do remain on the whole in the background …”2  
Clive Dewey points out that “…awareness of the village community was a 
creation of the later nineteenth century.”3 This category, as Dewey documents, was 
the conceptual cornerstone of a comparative evolutionary perspective on civilizations. 
He argues that it was produced out of shared assumptions of metropolitan British 
intellectuals and British Indian administrators. In these currents of thought, the 
“village community” stood as a mark of ancient, primitive societies, the essential 
feature of which was collective ownership of property, structured by kinship. This 
was construed as the original form of all societies, and at the same time, as the past of 
                                                 
1Louis Dumont, “The ‘Village Community’ from Munro to Maine”, Contributions to Indian Sociology, 
IX, December 1966, 68. 
2
Ibid.  
3Clive Dewey, “Images of the Village Community: A Study in Anglo-Indian Ideology”, Modern Asian 
Studies, 6, 3, 1972, 291.   
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Europe, and the present of India. A particularly notable figure in this world of 
representations of the “village community” was Henry Maine. Karuna Mantena’s 
work presents Maine as the critical link between such representations and the imperial 
ideology of late nineteenth-century. The focus of this ideology, Mantena notes, was 
different from the liberal-reformist one which characterized the British Empire over 
the first half of the nineteenth century. Maine’s classification of societies, based on a 
comparative and evolutionary method, was the foundation of this ideological shift. 
She points out that “…nineteenth century theorists such as Maine produced a 
distinctively apolitical model of traditional society…viewing societies as functional, 
cultural wholes. It was a view that stressed the internal cohesiveness and the 
communal/corporate orientation of native society…thus de-emphasizing political 
conflict, change, and agency.”4 The “village” in Henry Maine’s theoretical 
framework, Mantena notes, embodied such a “traditional” society.  
Both Dewey and Mantena seem to assume that the “village community” was 
the only analytical form in which the “village” was produced as a category of 
governance in nineteenth-century British India. They share this perspective with 
Dumont. The only difference is that while Dumont traces the formation of this 
category over the entire nineteenth century, their focus is restricted to its latter half. In 
doing this, they overlook the political-economic conceptualization of this category. 
This chapter, therefore, disagrees with these existing ways of looking at the “village”. 
I argue that the “village” in early nineteenth-century British India was produced out of 
a shared discursive space of agrarian governance and contemporary political 
economy. It was not perceived to signify a cohesive, functional “community”. On the 
contrary, it was persistently presented as a site of conflict, intrigue and dominance. It 
was construed as a seminal marker, and the primary geographical site, of power-
relations and agricultural production. The “village”, as the central category of agrarian 
governance in the first half of the nineteenth century was thus significantly different 
from the sociological “village community” of the late-nineteenth century. It was 
envisioned as an integral component of the “political” in British India. This chapter 
will reconceptualize the “village” by bringing forth its administrative investments. 
                                                 
4
Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism, India, 2010. 
She further notes that, “This model of native society as an integral whole, held together by reciprocal 
bonds of custom and structures of kinship, would provide the theoretical foundation, and even a 
normative justification, for the late imperial ideologies of protection, preservation, and 
collaboration…” 14-15.  
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From administrative treatises on authentic “Hindu/Indian” polities and modes of 
governance, to texts of contemporary political economy, to revenue surveys, to an 
ideology of occupancy, the “village” was carefully developed as the chief object of 
agrarian governance in early nineteenth-century British India.  
 
A seat of power 
 
I begin, once again, with the Fifth Report of the Select Committee on the Affairs of the 
East India Company. A discussion of the 5
th
 Report is unavoidable, as it prefigured 
most of the debates over governance of land that pervaded the first half of the 
nineteenth century. In debating different models of governance, the report, for the first 
time in the nineteenth century, defined the “village” as a distinct object of agrarian 
governance. By favoring a “ryotwar” settlement over a “village settlement”, the report 
inaugurated the possibilities of considering the “village” as a separate, discrete unit of 
governance. In differentiating between the two modes of settlement, it defined what 
the “village” signified, as an administrative unit. 
The “village” was highlighted in the report as the most fundamental seat of 
various power-relations around land, in the context of a discussion on the history of 
land-administration in the Northern Circars, a province in the Presidency of Fort St. 
George. The report defined the “village” as the most fundamental unit of 
(agricultural) production and social life. It depicted the “village” as a composite 
whole of social relations, inhabited by figures performing diverse social roles, 
primarily associated with production and management of land. Land was the epicentre 
of this collective, as all occupational groups unrelated to cultivation were remunerated 
either by parcels of land or by a portion of the harvest. The report documented in 
detail the different occupational roles existing in the “village”: 
 
 “The Potail, or head inhabitant; who has the general superintendence of the affairs of 
the village, settles the disputes of the inhabitants, attends to the police, and performs 
the duty…of collecting the revenues within his village…The Curnum; who keeps the 
accounts of cultivation, and registers every thing connected with it. The Talliar and 
Totie; the duty of the former, appearing to consist…in gaining information of crimes 
and offences, and in escorting and protecting persons travelling from one village to 
another: the province of the latter, appearing to be more immediately connected to the 
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village, consisting, among other duties, in guarding the crops, and assisting in 
measuring them. The Boundaryman; who preserves the limits of the village, or gives 
evidence respecting them, in cases of dispute. The Superintendent of Tanks and 
Watercourses distributes the water therefrom, for the purposes of agriculture. The 
Bramin, who performs the village worship. The Schoolmaster, who is seen teaching 
the children in the villages to read and write in the sand. The Calendar Bramin, or 
astrologer, who proclaims the lucky or unpropitious periods for sowing and threshing. 
The Smith and Carpenter, who manufacture the implements of agriculture, and build 
the dwelling of the ryot. The Potman or potter. The Washerman. The Barber. The 
Cowkeeper, who looks after the cattle. The Doctor. The Dancing Girl, who attends at 
rejoicings. The Musician and the Poet. These officers and servants, generally 
constitute the establishment of a village…”5 
 
This description, I argue, is immensely valuable for understanding the deployment of 
the “village” in practices of agrarian governance in early nineteenth-century British 
India. To begin with, contrary to common historiographical assumptions, this 
description did not posit the “village” as a self-sufficient community, existing outside 
the domain of the state. In presenting a diversity of occupations, it foregrounded 
officers like the potail, the curnum or the talliar, acting as agents of the state. The 
report described these figures as “officers of inspection, whose business it was to keep 
an account of the territorial produce, and of everything connected with the rights of 
the ryots, and of government, as arising from the land…”6 As it is evident, these 
officers were seen as guardians of the main proprietary relation, i.e., between the state 
and the ryot. They were constitutive threads of the assemblage of property and 
political power. In other words, they were key figures in the “political”. Other 
members of the “village”, described as servants, were also tied to the state. Their 
remuneration, consisting of either rent-free land or portions of harvest, came from a 
public fund.
7
 The description in the report, therefore, clearly showed that the “village” 
was, from ancient times, an administratively-controlled unit of production. Land was 
                                                 
5“The Fifth Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company”, P.P., 1812, 
85. 
6
Ibid, 83-4. 
7
Ibid, 85. 
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the fulcrum of this collective, and administration its grand supervisor. The “village” 
was accordingly characterized as a “…simple form of municipal government…”8 
Property, production, and political power came together in framing the 
“village”. It was seen as the quintessential (Hindu) geographical marker of the 
“political”. In fact, that is why, the report argued, it was prone to abuses of power. 
Over time, the report noted, the public officers, originally employed in the village to 
protect the peasantry from the oppression of big landlords and farmers, themselves 
became agents of despotic power.
9
 Even the Company’s government, in its early 
years, let out lands on short or long leases to individuals. These individuals further 
sub-rented these territories in parcels of villages, allowing the under-renters to 
determine the amount and mode of collection from the villages. Quite naturally, all 
these under-renters became corrupt and oppressive overlords of the villages. The 
report noted that as soon as the Company’s government was in possession of greater 
knowledge of their territories, they entered into more specific engagements with the 
head inhabitants of each village. These village-engagers were, in turn, supposed to 
enter into engagements with each ryots regarding the rents payable for each field. 
They were supposed to have formal contracts with the ryots, by granting pottahs, 
specifying the amount to be paid for particular fields. But even under this 
arrangement, the disposition to usurpation of power remained undisturbed. The 
Company’s government found ample evidence of “…the great deceptions and frauds 
practiced by the village renters, in conjunction with the curnums, in order to conceal 
the value of lands, and the actual quality and kinds of cultivation; and also of the 
serious and extensive injuries inflicted on the cultivators by the former…”10    
A potential of despotism seemed to be inherent in such “village” settlements. 
To combat it, a new mode of settlement needed to be devised. The report now turned 
to the ryotwar settlement. Under the ryotwar mode of settling lands, it was argued, a 
much more transparent, unmediated, and protective relationship could be established 
                                                 
8
Ibid. 
9
The report noted that anciently, these public officers were posted in the “village” so that “…the abuses 
and irregularity of the zemindars, renters and managers, and of the inferior agents employed in making 
the collections, could be prevented or restrained…”  But in recent times, it was seen that “…the official 
registers, instead of being checks on the zemindars and renters, had by acceding at first to their views 
and encroachments, from weakness or venal motives, fallen into contempt, and lost not only their 
authority, but their emoluments also. Some contenting themselves with the allowance attached to their 
offices, continued to hold them, as sinecures; while on the other hand, a few who were rich and 
aspiring, acquired a footing of power and consequence, little inferior to that of a zemindar…” Ibid, 84. 
10
Ibid, 119. 
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between the government and the principal agents of agricultural production, the 
cultivators. On the adoption of this principle of settlement, the government faced 
strong opposition from the potails, the former de-facto masters of the “village”. But 
eventually the ryotwar was a great success. The report noted that it “…greatly 
improved the situation of the cultivator, by limiting the bounds of the public 
assessment, and adjusting the actual demand on each person subject to such 
assessment, according to his ability to satisfy it;…and securing him in the protection 
of his property and rights…”11  
But the “village” was never abandoned as an object of agrarian governance. Its 
presence, as a fundamental component of the “political” was retained in a 
reconfigured manner. While the Court of Directors praised the strategy of 
implementing the ryotwar settlement, the Board of Revenue wanted to fall back upon 
the ‘village settlements’. In favor of the latter, the Board argued that it was “…as old 
as the age of Menu.”12 But the report contradicted the Board’s assertion. It noted that 
the authentic regulative function of the “village” was maintained under the ancient 
Hindu government, when rent was collected from the cultivators, who had a partial 
proprietary interest in the soil. In this mode of administration, the village officers 
acted as mere agents of the state. But the practice of farming out the revenues of 
villages was introduced much later, under Mahommedan rule. It is this system of 
farming and sub-farming, the report argued, which gave birth to corrupt and 
oppressive overlords like the Zemindars of Bengal and the Northern Circars, and the 
Potails of Carnatic. Under this arrangement, the Potails in the “village” were no 
longer government-appointed collectors of rents; they became petty tyrants. In this 
manner, as I have noted earlier, the 5
th
 Report drew up a history of land-
administration in India. In this narrative of the past, an authentic, benevolent, Hindu 
rule was succeeded by a corrupt and degenerate Muslim one.  
The abhorrence of a “village settlement”, where the state’s share of the rent 
was settled with the headmen of the village, was grounded in this perspective. But at 
the same time, the ryotwar settlement, which was pitted against it, was considered to 
be inclusive of the original form of the “village”. It was argued that, in the ryotwar 
mode, the village officers remained in their original roles as servants of the state. 
They could not exercise unrestricted power over the cultivators. Thus, the report 
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argued that in districts under the ryotwar system, rents “…were collected by the 
potails, in the name and for the use of government, in their natural and constitutional 
character, as the agents or superintendents of the villages to which they belonged, 
agreeably to the antient practice of the Hindoos…”13 Not only the potails, the report 
noted that in a ryotwar area, other village officers such as the curnums continued to 
perform their original duties and enjoy their perquisites. 
The 5
th
 Report’s differentiation between authentic and inauthentic forms of the 
“village” remained the point of reference for future debates around the category. All 
these debates emphasized that since the “village” was the basic unit of property, 
production, and political power, it had to be the object of governance as well. But at 
the same time, it always embodied tendencies of becoming a seat of corruption and 
arbitrary power. Since relations of power in the “village” were entangled with 
conditions of agricultural production, this power-matrix needed to be closely 
monitored. The report identified the ancient Hindu government with the ideal form of 
this administrative supervision, and it established the ryotwar, incorporating the 
“village”, as an embodiment of these principles. This is how, with the turn of the 
nineteenth century, the “village” was established in administrative discourse as the 
archetypal seat of power-relations around land in India. 
 
The “village” in political economy 
 
The previous chapter has shown how Holt Mackenzie identified the village zemindars 
as the authentic collective of proprietors in India. It might appear from Mackenzie’s 
deliberations that the “village” was merely understood as the proprietary unit of these 
figures. Property was indeed Mackenzie’s central concern, but it could be envisioned 
only as a complex of power-relations around land based in the village. This is because 
what he saw as the authentic form of landed property in India, the putteedari tenure, 
was rooted in the “village”. In mapping this form of tenure, therefore, the “village” 
was construed as a composite whole of power-relations emanating from land, in need 
of meticulous administrative scrutiny and control. A need to know the “village” was 
already high on the administrative agenda. As Mackenzie noted, the Court was eager 
to “receive a full and particular detail of all local tenures and usages…of the 
                                                 
13
Ibid, 157. 
 171 
constitution of the village communities and the rights and interests of the classes 
composing them…”14 In Cuttack as well, since the question of a long-term settlement 
was raised in administrative circles, the Court kept emphasizing the need to know the 
different figures and relations that constituted the “village”. It is evident that by the 
time Mackenzie devised a plan of settlement, authorities in London were convinced 
that the “village” was the primary cluster of power-relations on land in India. The idea 
had taken root that successful governance of land would depend on an effective 
knowledge of, and control over, the “village”. 
Mackenzie maintained that property was the cornerstone of the “village”. But 
he emphasized that the “village” was a collective in which a variety of relations were 
woven around property. He believed that it was important to limit administrative 
interference “…with the constitution of village communities…”15 But at the same 
time, he also argued that, “…it is of course desirable to obtain the most accurate 
possible information regarding them, their leading men and classes, their officers, 
with their respective functions, and means of support, and an explanation of the 
degree of force and vigor in which those institutions exist…”16 I argue that this need 
to know the “village” intimately was grounded in the fear that it always had the 
potential of becoming a playground of despotic power. This potential needed to be 
tamed by the administration. Thus, it was necessary to preserve the “village” as the 
fundamental organization of agrarian power in India, but only in its pristine form 
where the distribution of power remained fair. Mackenzie’s prescription of knowing 
the “village” was, therefore, implicated in this administrative urge of regulating its 
economy of power. 
Mackenzie described in detail the different items to be known in order to 
“…complete the picture of the village community…”17 in the course of a settlement. 
With regard to the proprietors, he noted that “…The origin and nature of their tenure 
should in all cases be particularly specified…”18 Regarding the village officers, he 
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argued that, “…although we are chiefly concerned with the putwarree and police, yet, 
as a record of the remainder, with the perquisites received by them, in addition to any 
land they may hold in jageer, can be made upon the spot with great ease…and the 
perquisites of the different officers must be taken into account in estimating the gains 
of the cultivators.”19 As to the different classes of cultivators, he expressed the need to 
record the nature of all cultivating tenures. Other than these major figures, he also 
proposed the recording of “hired labourers” and “slaves”, if there were any, in the 
“village”. Finally, he suggested that “…a specification of the persons having a voice 
in the management of village affairs, in the disbursement and audit of the village 
expenses...”20 should be entered in the settlement-record. In this way, Mackenzie 
detailed the entire format of a settlement, which was overwhelmingly concerned with 
the recording of power-relations. It is this model of settlement, later implemented in 
Cuttack with some modifications that constituted the “village” as the theatre of 
agrarian power, and the most fundamental unit of agrarian governance in British 
India. With the execution of such village-centric settlements, Mackenzie proclaimed, 
“…we might…soon lay the foundation of a greatly-improved system of 
administration…”21 
Mackenzie’s concern was reiterated in a passionate appeal to protect the 
“village communities” by Charles Metcalfe. At first glance, Metcalfe’s perception of 
the “village communities” as “…little republics, having nearly everything that they 
want within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations…”22 appear 
to be merely the rambles of a romantic.
23
 But it is important look closely at the 
context in which these statements were generated. Metcalfe was defending a “village-
settlement” against a ryotwar one. This is because, like Mackenzie, he also believed 
that the authentic form of property in India was collective, not individual. His “village 
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community” was, thus, primarily the authentic proprietary unit—a collective of 
cultivating-proprietors. The ryotwar settlement, Metcalfe thought, was aimed at 
granting proprietary rights to individual cultivators. Such an intention was based on a 
categorial confusion. Thus, Metcalfe noted, “great confusion of ideas might be 
produced by the misapplication of English terms which is common in our official 
revenue language. We talk of estates, when we mean villages, and of proprietors, 
when we ought to speak of village communities…”24 As I have noted in the earlier 
chapter, with Mackenzie, Metcalfe and their likes, the erstwhile notion of the 
individual cultivator being the true proprietor, along with the sovereign, underwent a 
reinterpretation, by which the collective of cultivating-proprietors, or village-
zemindars were posited as the authentic proprietary unit. Metcalfe’s opposition to the 
ryotwar was informed by the same presuppositions. He believed that settlements with 
individual cultivators would dissolve the fabric of proprietary-relations that 
constituted the “village-community”.  
Metcalfe, however, did not reject the principles of a ryotwar settlement. He 
thought that applying the methods of a ryotwar settlement would be highly beneficial, 
“…as it would bring to light the owners of every portion of land, and the right of each 
member of the village community, without rendering it necessary to conclude 
engagements otherwise than with the village community jointly represented by their 
headmen…”25 He further noted that these representatives must be selected with care. 
As he pointed out that, “There is reason to suppose that in many a village, where the 
real proprietors were once numerous, some upstart fellow has acquired, without right, 
or by fraud, an ostensible pre-eminence, and now pretends to be sole proprietor…it 
will be necessary to be most cautious not to sacrifice the proprietary rights, such as 
they are, of the numerous proprietors of villages, to the pretensions of one or a few 
who may have brought themselves more into notice, and obtained predominance, 
whether by fair means or by foul…”26 With Bentinck’s resolutions on land-tenures, as 
I argued in the previous chapter, such discrimination between true and false members 
of the collective of village-proprietors got enshrined in the legislation that was to be 
the basis of the settlement in Cuttack.  
                                                 
24“Minute of Sir C.T. Metcalfe, dated November 7 1830”, Selections from Revenue Records, North-
West Provinces, 1822-1833, Allahabad, 1872, 214, emphasis mine.  
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It is evident that the formulation of the “village” had changed significantly 
since the 5
th
 report. The 5
th
 report’s preference of the ryotwar was rooted in the 
perception that proprietary rights were vested, albeit partially, in the individual 
cultivator. In the report, the “village”, as a network of power-relations, primarily 
signified an administrative mechanism revolving around that proprietary right. That is 
why greater emphasis was placed on the protection of the cultivators’ rights by the 
state. The advocacy of ryotwar was primarily based on a desire to establish an 
unmediated relationship between the individual cultivator and the state. The “village”, 
as an organic unit of administration, was seen as an aid in establishing and 
maintaining this relationship. However, in determining the authentic domain of the 
“political”, the vision of the ryotwar had to carefully suppress equally powerful 
claims of authenticity by the “village”. Thomas Munro had himself pointed out that 
the “village” was the most ancient unit of agricultural production and social life in 
India. But this was contradictory to Munro’s proposal of the ryotwar, which 
established a direct relationship between the state and the cultivator, as the most 
ancient, and thereby, authentic expression of the ensemble of proprietary relations and 
political power in India. In order to resolve this contradiction, Munro asserted that 
although the “village” had its autonomy as an arena of property and power, the 
sovereign was the ultimate owner of soil in India. Stein notes that by such a 
reinterpretation, “Corporate village membership is transformed by Munro to 
individual membership by the metaphoric equivalence of the ruler and landlord…it 
also altered the idea of ‘raiyat’, who is changed from being a part of a corporate 
village body into an equivalent of ‘tenant’, thereby generating the transcultural 
metaphor or analogy—Indian sovereign or East India Company to landlord, raiyat to 
individualized tenant. In this way, both the corporate village and the individual 
peasant cultivator were preserved as bulwarks against the imposition of the Bengal 
zamindari settlement while at the same time maintaining the purportedly direct 
historical relationship between cultivator ‘tenant’ and government ‘landlord.’”27  
In this manner, the ryotwar was able to present the relationship between the 
landlord-state and the cultivator-tenant as the most authentic articulation of the 
“political”, while retaining the legitimacy of the “village” within this vision. The 
“village” was, nevertheless, pushed to the background as Munro gradually developed 
                                                 
27Burton Stein, “Idiom and Ideology in Early Nineteenth Century South India” in Peter Robb (ed.) 
Rural India: Land, Power and Society Under British Rule, New Delhi, 1992, 50-51. 
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the principles of ryotwar in the course of his administrative experience in Baramahal, 
Kanara, and the Ceded Districts during the first decade of the century. The ryotwar 
scheme was clearly more concerned with the nature of the relationship between the 
state and the cultivator, trying to improve, by various means, the productive potential 
of the latter. An idea of directness between the state and the domain of production was 
at the heart of the ryotwar. That is why, as Stein notes, it was able to defeat the 
alternative proposal of a settlement based on village-lease. Stein points out that, 
“Munro outlined and justified a plan to reduce or obliterate the resource command of 
all superior land-controlling men. These last included not only peasant caste 
leaders…with authority over localities consisting of many villages, but even those 
whose dominance was limited to one or two villages. In effect, Munro was proposing 
to strike at the powers and rights of any magnate by whom major decisions about the 
utilization of men and land were made.”28 Although ryotwar’s legitimacy was claimed 
on the basis of its indigeneity, it was evidently underpinned, as I have argued earlier, 
by a Ricardian vision of the sphere of distribution—in this case, consisting of the 
landlord-state, and the cultivator, embodying capacities of both farmer and labourer. 
Thus, the directness in the vision of ryotwar, expressed a specific political-economic 
conceptualization of the interrelatedness of the domain of production and 
distribution.
29
 This, as I have shown in chapter two, was a reinterpreted Ricardianism, 
but not of the James Mill variety, as it did not insist on a high level of revenue 
demand based on a radical critique of rent-property, and a prescription of extracting 
the full rent. The ryotwar was ready to leave some rent-property in the hands of the 
cultivator, by pitching the demand low, and not taxing the improvements on the land 
carried out by the cultivator.     
But with Mackenzie, Metcalfe and the debates of the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces, the “village” as a collective, replaced the investments that had earlier gone 
into the figure of the cultivator. Unlike the 5
th
 report, the practices of agrarian 
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Stein also hints at this directness as the essence of ryotwar. However, he views it differently, more as 
a question of politics, than political economy. “There is nothing of sentiment for the small farmer nor 
historical precedent here. Munro was proposing nothing less than the completion, by administrative 
means, of the military conquest of the Baramahal territory…by stripping the ancient gauds and 
karaikkars of their locality resource control, and even further by limiting village heads in their 
command over share-cropping labour and converting them into mere subordinate revenue servants of 
his own subordinate tahsildars, Munro was introducing a new and very distant authority—ultimately 
that of London—directly into the South Indian—or any Indian—agrarian system, for the first time.” 
Ibid, 59, emphasis mine.   
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governance now construed a collective—the “village-proprietors”—as the ancient 
authentic proprietor, in conjunction with the sovereign. The “village” was, 
accordingly, seen as a matrix of power-relations woven around this corporate entity. 
The stated administrative intention now was to establish a direct relationship with the 
“village”. Those landholders who could not establish themselves as bonafide 
members of the “village” were seen as obstructions to the establishment of such a 
relationship. As noted in the last chapter, the contempt Mackenzie expressed for big 
landholders such as the zemindars and the talukdars emerged from this perspective. 
However, these figures were subsequently reincarnated as real members of the 
“village” and reincorporated within the administrative scheme of settlement.  
This shift in emphasis, from the individual cultivator to the “village”, was not 
limited to agrarian governance in British India. It was, as I have argued, part of a 
much broader, geographically dispersed, analytical space. I intend to read this shift in 
the light of the critical assault launched by Richard Jones and others against the 
epistemological assumptions of contemporary, predominantly Ricardian, political 
economy. Jones’s critique rested on an analytical primacy of the domain of 
distribution in political economy. Jones demonstrated that this domain consisted of an 
assemblage of proprietary relations and political power, which varied in the different 
nations of the world. This assemblage, or the “political”, emerged as the 
epistemological object of this new political economy. The “political” in “Asiatic” 
nations, Jones argued, was distributed over a range of relations of power on land, 
between different kinds of landholders and landholding bodies. The category of 
“property”, in this framework, was understood as an effect of this matrix of power. 
Jones perceived the “village” as a crucial site of power in the “political”.  
Commenting on the mode of power on land in India, Jones noted that the 
“village” is “…the groundwork of Hindu polity.”30 Interestingly, he used the long 
passage from the 5
th
 report that I have quoted earlier in describing the “village” as a 
conglomerate of various roles, related to agricultural production. Further, he pointed 
out that the “village” is a “…complete, compact and independent body, politic and 
ecclesiastic, containing within itself all the elements of government…”31 It should be 
clear by now that Jones, as if in conversation with the discourse of British Indian 
                                                 
30
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Economy of the late Rev. Richard Jones, London, 1859, 214. 
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administration, presented the “village” as the fundamental fabric of power-relations 
on land in India, and, thereby, the most authentic, ancient unit of administration. In 
times of peace, he argued, the “Indian/Hindu” polity consisted of a network of 
subordinate interests ranging from the sovereign to the zemindar to the potail to the 
ryot. In this network, the “village” was tied to the government by village officers such 
as potails. Jones also noted that in a despotic “Asiatic” nation such as India, the 
“village”, as a self-governed body, acted as a protective to the incursions of 
government. In a comparative light, he observed that, “A system not very 
dissimilar…in the United States of America, is found to bind together a loosely 
constructed society.”32 However, in discussing the different forms of land-settlements 
in British India as part of his political economy lectures at Haileybury, Jones argued 
that “in former days the headman had been under control and responsibility. The old 
village system which we had rashly destroyed, had provided checks to their 
power…The new set of headmen turned out exceedingly avaricious and 
oppressive…”33 Presumably, here Jones was referring to the settlements in Western 
India. He thought it was illegitimate to grant these village-headmen exclusive 
proprietary rights. This is because he understood the “political” of India as a dispersed 
arena of power. The “village” was an important constituent of this arena, but only 
along with other relations of power. 
The “village” featured in John Stuart Mill’s political economy as well. Like 
Jones, Mill also considered the “village” as one of the sites of the “political”. In fact, 
for Mill, it was one of the most important sites where property, production and 
political power were knitted together, because it was also the seat of the peasant-
proprietor. Mill argued that the peasant-proprietor’s proprietary status was embedded 
in a collective, which was the “village”. He noted that, “There were…village 
communities, consisting of the reputed descendants of the first settlers of a village, 
who shared among themselves either the land or its produce according to rules 
established by custom, either cultivating it themselves or employing others to 
cultivate it for them, and whose rights in land approached nearer to those of a landed 
proprietor, as understood in England, than those of any other party concerned. But the 
proprietary right of the village was not individual, but collective; inalienable (the 
rights of individual sharers could only be sold or mortgaged with the consent of the 
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community) and governed by fixed rules.”34 Thus, the “village” was not only a 
proprietary collective, but also the embodiment of custom, which ensured the 
productive role of the peasant-proprietor. The centrality of the peasant-proprietor in 
Mill’s framework made him envision the village as a productive unit of power. This 
was not so for Jones. While appreciating its power in limiting the despotic potential of 
government, Jones found the “village” to be an obstacle to the growth of productive 
capacities. He noted that the “village”, “…by excluding the principle of 
competition…”35 weakened the productive potential of the cultivators.      
I argue that the construal of the “village” by practices of agrarian governance 
in British India shared the premises of both political-economic categorizations of the 
“village”. On the one hand, it was understood as a vital ensemble of power-relations 
on land. On the other hand, it was also seen as the proprietary locus of the peasant-
proprietor, enabling him, through custom, to emerge as the most productive figure 
amidst the sinews of agrarian power.  
 
In the field: agoraphobia and its cure, the khasra 
 
In this section I argue that during this period the production of the “village”, as a 
cluster of power-relations, got embedded in one of the most cardinal practices of 
agrarian governance, namely, surveying. Surveys were never concerned with the 
physical features of the land only. From the very beginning, they attempted to 
generate information on the relationship between the land, its inhabitants, and the 
government. That is why, in narrating a history of cartographic operations in British 
India, Phillimore attached immense importance to the “revenue surveys”. He observed 
that, “In the train of topographical and geographical surveys, there followed the 
special revenue surveys, so essential to sound administration…The tiresome details of 
revenue surveys touch moreover on an important aspect of sociology, the relations of 
Government with the tillers of the soil…The civil officers of the British raj were pre-
eminently occupied with this complicated subject.”36 
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None of the agrarian histories of nineteenth-century Bengal have taken the 
issue of “revenue surveys” seriously enough. As large parts of Bengal Presidency 
remained under the “Permanent Settlement” throughout the nineteenth century, it 
seemed to be an underlying assumption of these histories, that detailed revenue survey 
operations, like the ones taking place in the Southern or Western parts of British 
India, were never undertaken in Bengal. The lack of work on revenue surveys also 
imply that the administrative urge to know land conditions in detail was non-existent 
in Bengal. In this historiography, meticulous administrative investigations of land are 
associated with areas outside Bengal. Bengal is considered to be a short-hand for 
permanently settled areas, where it is assumed that since 1793, administrative scrutiny 
of land was permanently stalled. Such histories ignore the fact that throughout the 
nineteenth century detailed surveys were carried out in many parts of Bengal; mostly 
in the temporarily-settled areas, but also in some parts of the old permanently-settled 
areas.
37
 
As soon as the Company acquired its earliest territories, Phillimore pointed 
out, “Surveys of the new possessions (after Plassey and in 1760 grant of provinces of 
Chittagong, Burdwan and Midnapore) were ordered by the local council, and 
encouraged from London. The first thought was to ascertain the extent of cultivated 
land and the value of their revenues…”38 In the newly-conquered district of Carnatic 
in 1790, there was a proposal for an establishment of Assistant Revenue Surveyors 
under District Officers. Phillimore noted that “…a school was provided for their 
professional training…The first duties of the revenue surveyors was the preparation of 
a topographical map of the district, to which they added much information about 
cultivators and the possibilities of irrigation as would be helpful to the district 
officer.”39 In Bengal, however, elaborate surveys could not be conducted successfully. 
Phillimore tells us that, “The detailed measurement of individual fields was a matter 
for which the native staff remained responsible…The district officers in Bengal had 
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never succeeded in obtaining satisfactory or trustworthy results from such 
measurements and in 1793 Lord Cornwallis authorized the introduction in that 
Presidency of the system of Permanent Settlement, which it was hoped would, 
amongst other advantages, obviate any interference of Government with details of 
revenue collection….”40 
It has been noted in the previous chapters that the critique of the permanent 
settlement was lodged in a desire to know the power-relations around land in every 
locality more intimately. The various settlements in the southern parts of British India 
were grounded in detailed investigations of the land and its inhabitants. Expressing 
similar intentions, the Court of Directors urged the Bengal government for a 
“…patient and laborious scrutiny of individual rights, a careful investigation of local 
peculiarities, together with a minute and detailed survey of the extent, cultivation, and 
productive powers of the territory…”41 The detailed inquiries into relations around 
land characterizing Mackenzie’s plan of settlement, were grounded in practices of 
surveying. I have already argued that the “village” was the conceptual cornerstone 
determining the objects of inquiry. This was reflected in the fact that by the turn of the 
nineteenth century revenue surveys officially adopted the “village” as the 
geographical unit of investigation.  
F.C. Hirst, while describing the revenue surveys conducted in Bengal, Bihar, Orissa 
and Assam during the first half of the nineteenth century, noted that “The information 
collected previous to 1789 regarding the limits and areas of existing estates, was 
incomplete, and, probably, sometimes, very inaccurate, and it is easy, therefore, to see 
that, early in the nineteenth century, Collectors of Districts affected by the Permanent 
Settlement found themselves in difficulties as to what land has actually been included 
in the Permanent Settlement.”42 It is evident from Hirst’s statement that the surveys 
which were conducted in the permanently settled areas used the “estate” as their unit 
of operation. But the new surveys, launched in different parts of British India since 
the permanent settlement, based themselves on the “village.”43 However, Hirst 
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himself was unable to explain this change. He noted that, “whether the area dealt with 
was permanently settled or not, it was found convenient, in all but very exceptional 
circumstances, to adopt the village recognized locally, as the real unit of survey. The 
reason assigned for this is not clear…”44 If inadequate information and inaccuracy 
were conceived to be the only problems of the former surveys, the change in the unit 
of investigation would not have been necessary. Hirst tried to explain the change in 
terms of administrative expediency. He argued that the “village” was the smallest and 
most generally used administrative unit. He also noted that other “ancient land 
divisions”, like the pergunnahs, consisting of similar tenures, soils and customs, had 
fallen out of use for years. Moreover, at present, the administration of estates was 
based on villages.  
The suggested incomprehensibility of this change gives way to clarity when 
we take a look at the discourse of agrarian governance in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century. In that discourse, the centrality of the “village” as the seat of 
landed-power and the starting-point of administration had been established beyond 
doubt. The discourse of surveying was also rooted in anxieties over the geographical 
register of power. Practices of surveying established the “village” as the geographical 
container of the most authentic, fundamental unit of power.  
Bernardo Michael’s essay on revenue surveys is an important exception in this 
otherwise-neglected area of inquiry. Bernardo argues that these surveys were 
primarily intended to reconstruct neat territorial boundaries. However, I think he 
simply misconstrues the significance of the revenue surveys. The main purpose of 
revenue surveys, in my opinion, was to record a power-complex on land. That could 
only be done by basing surveys on the “village”, as by that time, the “village” had 
been established as the site of this power-complex. Bernardo states that discontinuous 
pergunnah boundaries were the main obstacles in the way of basing surveys in 
pergunnahs. But territorial continuity was not the main reason for adopting the 
“village” as the real unit of survey. Even Hirst did not think that this was the primary 
reason behind the change of the unit of survey. The reason resided, as I see it, in the 
discursive production of the “village” as a constituent element of the generality of 
power on land. The aim to connect the village map with a general district map was a 
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territorial concern of administration. The revenue surveys, with their basis in the 
“village” were constituted by greater structural and political investments. The 
boundary question was not the central problematic of revenue surveys, as Bernardo 
claims by highlighting the gradual reorganization of discontinuous pergunnahs; the 
“village” was.45 This will be clearer as I point out the primary object of knowledge in 
such village-based surveys.  
The revenue survey was preceded by a thak survey, the object of which was to 
“demarcate finally on the ground the boundaries of all villages and estates in the area 
for survey.”46 The thak survey was followed by the khasra survey, which recorded 
various details surrounding each plot of land. The khasra chitta, or field book, noted 
down the tauzi number in the collector’s rent-roll in which the field fell, the name of 
the estate to which the field belonged, the names of the proprietor and the cultivator, 
the size of the field, its location with respect to the field measured last, and a 
description of the soil and the crops. Hirst pointed out that these details, before being 
entered in the field book, were “…called out loudly for the information of the 
villagers present at the time…”47  
In the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, as debates over a plan of settlement 
went on, Board of Revenue officials emphasized the importance of surveys in 
documenting the power-relations on land. They observed that, “It was the design, we 
believe, of the Government which enacted the settlement law of 1822, that the rights 
of all persons connected with the land…should be carefully ascertained and 
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recorded…”48 The khasra, they argued, “…seems to constitute the record requisite for 
the purpose.”49 The khasra was perceived to be the bulwark of the settlement; a 
document on which the specificities of power, organized as the “village”, would be 
carefully inscribed. It was envisioned as the archives of power. The officials 
remarked, “It will be seen that this paper connects every person, whether putteedar or 
ryot, lakherajdar or village servant, with the fields in which he has either a permanent 
or temporary interest…”50  
In the discourse of governance, the khasra signified a text of total knowledge, 
which would act as the basis of infallible control. By registering the configurations of 
power, it was supposed to aid the administration in preventing unauthorized 
domination. Mackenzie noted that if the rukba, or the settlement-record, was not 
rooted in such detailed enlistment of the relations of power, “Wyeranee villages and 
waste lands will…be gradually usurped by the neighbouring Zemindars, alluvian 
lands…will never be traced…boundary disputes will be frequent and intricate, and the 
future identification of the lands now assigned for the village watchmen or other 
officers will be a matter of the greatest difficulty; and other lakhiraj land will probably 
be absorbed in the Malgoozaree...”51 
Such mouzahwar, or “village” surveys, based on khasras, were carried out in 
most of the temporarily-settled areas of Bengal presidency, including Cuttack.
52
 They 
were conducted mostly by native personnel. Prominent landholders or engagers of 
government revenue in the villages were involved in these survey operations. But the 
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record was finalized, as it has been noted earlier, in the presence of assemblies of 
cultivators in every village.
53
 In this manner, revenue surveys comprised of an array 
of practices which established the “village” as the geographical core of land-
administration in early nineteenth-century British India. The settlement-record, which 
emerged out of the khasras, was purported to be a mirror-image of the complex fabric 
of power-relations on land in each village. 
 
Membership Matters I: Officers and servants 
 
It is time to turn to the members of the “village”. Matters of such membership were 
painstakingly deliberated and sorted out in the course of settlement operations in 
various parts of British India over the first half of the nineteenth century. I will be 
taking a close look, as earlier, at the settlement affairs of Cuttack in order to depict the 
encounters which fixed disparate figures in their respective locations within the 
“village”. As I argued in the previous chapter, the figures reigning supreme in the 
“village” were proprietors or revenue-collectors of various descriptions. Property was 
indeed the gravitational centre of the “village”. But in the discourse of governance, 
the “village” was imagined as a totality of power, arranged as an economy, distributed 
over a range of figures. Administration was supposed to act as a custodian of this 
economy, regulating its excesses. It has been noted in the previous section that the 
khasras were geared to this purpose. By registering the legitimate configurations of 
power, the settlement-record was supposed to prevent its usurpation by the dominant 
actors of the “village”. For this purpose it was important to delve into the profiles of 
the myriad members of the “village”. Thus, the Governor-General’s list of inquiries 
for every village began with “…a specification of the different members, forming the 
constitution of a village…”54 In this section, I will discuss those figures which were 
styled, in accordance with their roles, as “village officers” and “village servants”. As 
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this section will show, a fortification of their locations by administrative practices 
contributed crucially in outlining the precise contours of power in the “village”. 
Amongst the village officers, the patwari, or the village-accountant, was an 
object of continuous administrative engagement in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. It has been noted earlier that the most significant sphere of transactions 
between different landholders was rent, which was a crucial marker of the “political”. 
In the administrative discourse of the early decades of the nineteenth century, the 
village-accountant was imagined as a figure who could potentially act as a supervisor 
of this domain of power. There was a renewed interest in this office, as the Board of 
Revenue noted, in a letter to the governor-general in 1816, “…We have not thought it 
necessary to prescribe to the Putwarees any particular form of accounts… A specimen 
of the series of accounts generally kept up by the Putwarees in the district of 
Cawnpore was submitted to your Lordship…by our accountant Mr. Newnham who 
has long directed his attention to the study of Revenue accounts and of the village 
details of the territorial assessment. That series in the mutual connection of its several 
parts with each other appears to possess every requisite of clearness and 
accuracy…”55 Around the same time, the collector of Cuttack emphasized the need to 
retain the village and district accountants, so that the records kept in the vernacular by 
the former could be translated into Persian abstracts, without “…the inconvenience of 
removing local accounts to a great distance from the places when they may be 
constantly required…”56 This statement indicated that a need to have the village-
accountant, as a record-keeper of power, located within the village was being acutely 
felt in administrative circles.  
There were other concerns as well. The figure of the patwari had to be 
sanitized in order to be vested with the crucial responsibility of preventing abuses of 
power. It had been argued in the 5
th
 report that such village officers often, in alliance 
with superior landholders, became instruments of fraud and oppression. Keeping in 
mind such tendencies, administrators argued that the patwari had to be kept out of the 
influence of the landlords. In 1827, the collector of Hidgelee, an area adjacent to 
Balasore, noted that he had chosen, as patwaris, individuals from the “…present 
Bisooeis or Village Collector of Rents to make these officers the joint servants of the 
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Ryots and the state.”57 It was suggested by officials in Cuttack that the patwaris 
should be paid partially in land and partially out of the rents of the ryots. Such a 
practice, it was argued, had been followed in Khoordah, which made these officers 
there, known as the Bhoees, “…equally independent of the heads of villages and of 
the Ryots…”58 In 1831, the Commissioner of Cuttack rejected the collector’s 
suggestion of allowing the zemindars to pay salaries to the patwaris. He remarked 
that, “If they are to be appointed solely by the zemindars and looked upon as their 
servants they will assuredly carry on the system hitherto pursued, they will fabricate 
papers to promote the sinister interests of their employers, they will defraud the 
Government and oppress the Ryot…The Zemindar might be permitted to select but 
the voice of the Village Community should be consulted previous to confirmation and 
the Collector should have the power of rejecting any individual proposed for the 
office…”59 
In this manner, it was emphasized that the appointment of the patwari should 
be made under the vigilance of the collector and other members of the “village”. The 
administration, however, was not in a position to totally control these appointments. 
For this reason, a deep sense of anxiety prevailed wherever the patwaris were seen as 
capable of transgressing the legitimate limits of power. As the collector of Pooree 
noted, “In a great portion of this District, that office is not on a proper footing, as the 
Mokuddums, who are the proprietors of their respective villages and interested in 
benefiting themselves at the expense of the Cultivator, are the Patwaris…”60 But 
given the centrality of the “village” in the discourse of administration, the patwari was 
also envisioned as a legitimate member of this field of power. Despite so much 
skepticism, he had to be granted admission to the “village”.  
Much greater administrative discretion was exercised in matters of 
appointment related to the “village police”. A village officer of great importance, the 
“village police” was viewed as an organic caretaker of law and order in the “village”. 
In Cuttack, the paiks, as former members of the landlord’s private army, were 
considered naturally suited to this role. The paiks, in their former capacities, enjoyed 
lands free of rent granted by the landlords. As it has been noted in the previous 
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chapter, the rebellion in 1817 was perceived in administrative circles to have been 
fuelled by an extensive resumption of these lands in the early years of the Company’s 
rule in Cuttack. Since the rebellion, the government had already adopted a more 
cautious strategy with respect to resumption of such lands. Moreover, once the 
“village” was established as a legitimate field of power-relations in the discourse of 
administration, these village officers were readily preserved in their respective 
locations as bonafide members of this collective. 
A great number of such rent-free service lands were in existence in Talooka 
Panchgurh, southern Cuttack. The collector noted that, “…any interference with these 
tenures, whether held under former orders of Government or otherwise, is much to be 
deprecated.”61 Similarly, in pergunnah Phulwur, zillah Balasore, large quantities of 
lands were held by fifty-two paiks. The settling officer recommended a full-scale 
resumption of these lands. The commissioner disagreed with him. He noted that at 
present the Paiks attend the Balasore thannah. But the earning from the land is so less 
that they fulfil their duties by rotation in groups of ten. He insisted upon retaining 
these men by pointing out that they are a “useful and cheap class of officers…”62  In 
most cases the paiks were included within the fold of the “village” as deserving 
candidates for the office of the village police. In pergunnah Searee, for example, the 
collector noted that, “The Police establishment attached to this Pergunnah consists of 
2 Sirdars 6 Paiks and 3 Digwars. The office (and lands appertaining thereto) held by 
these individuals appears from local inquiry to have been handed down to them as 
their hereditary right…”63 Although paiks were preferred for the office of the village 
police, they were not the only group which took up such responsibilities in Cuttack. In 
Killu Mootree, the collector remarked, “I wanted the former Paiks to undertake the 
Chokeedaree duty, but the office is considered so degrading that no one though many 
was well inclined would venture to break through the deep rooted prejudice against it, 
and accept the appointment. There being no low caste men in these villages fit for the 
office, the former Chokeedars 3 in number Mussalman and servant of the zemindar’s 
were entertained…”64   
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A variety of “village servants” involved in non-agricultural occupations were 
allowed to retain their service lands. As described in the 5
th
 report, they were 
perceived as important constituents of the “village”. In Balasore, for example, a 
settlement report noted that “The…Barbers, Dhobees, Blacksmiths, Carpenters have 
been allowed to retain their Jageers.”65 In pergunnah Saibeer, the village astrologer 
was allowed to retain the six beegahs of land that he enjoyed rent-free.
66
 The 
settlement reports of almost all villages bore testimony to such administrative 
strategies of maintaining an entire network of “village servants” as hereditary and 
legitimate members of the “village”. The “village”, however, did not only consist of 
officers and servants.
67
 These functionaries owed their existence to production on 
land, which was carried out by a variety of cultivators. Agricultural production, as the 
fountainhead of government revenue, was the bedrock of power on which these 
figures acquired their own footholds. It becomes necessary, therefore, to turn to those 
who were viewed by the administration as cultivators of land, in order to get more 
acquainted with the “village”.  
 
Occupancy as ideology 
 
From the beginning of the nineteenth century the ryot, or the peasant cultivator, 
remained entangled in the vision of the “political”. As I have shown in the previous 
chapter, the figure of the ryot, or the cultivating-proprietor, was continuously 
reconfigured over myriad sites of governance during this period. Using the spatio-
temporal classificatory framework of the “local”, traces of the authentic cultivating-
proprietor were identified amongst a variety of landholders, ranging from the big 
landlords to representatives of villages. The logic of the “local” invested the vision of 
the “political” with an expansive potential, by virtue of which the original ryot could 
be discovered almost everywhere in British India. But the figure of the ryot, or the 
original cultivating-proprietor could not remain as an undifferentiated category. 
Further hierarchical classificatory indices emerged which started differentiating 
between different kinds of cultivators, and determined the status of the ryots in British 
India during this period. These hierarchies, I argue, were produced out of transformed 
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political-economic categories, and emerged as crucial constituents of the category of 
the “village”.    
It will be useful here to briefly recapitulate the journey of the “ryot” within 
changing articulations of the “political”. Thomas Munro envisioned the figure as 
embodying in itself capacities of landlord, farmer and tenant. Describing the ryot-
proprietor, Munro noted that, “The demand for public revenue…affects his share; but 
whether it leaves him only the bare profit of his stock, or a small surplus beyond it as 
landlord’s rent, he is still the true proprietor, and possess all that is not claimed by the 
sovereign as revenue.”68 By postulating that authentic proprietary rights in land were 
vested in the “village-zemindars”, Mackenzie repositioned the ryot, by grounding his 
proprietary status in the “village”. It is here that the question of occupancy in the 
“village” emerged as a crucial mark of authenticity for the cultivating-proprietor. 
Mackenzie noted that such “village-zemindars” were not the only cultivators of the 
soil in the “village”. The cultivators were primarily of two kinds. The khoodkasht 
ryots were firmly attached to their cultivating fields, possessing a prescriptive right of 
occupancy, dependent on the payment of a rent based on fixed rates. The pyekhasht 
ryots, on the contrary, were traveling cultivators, without a fixed residence in those 
villages, the lands of which they cultivated. Mackenzie further argued that where the 
“village-zemindars” were cultivating-proprietors, he considered “…the only real 
description of khoodkasht Ryots to be of the family of the Zemindar…”69 As it is 
evident, the question of occupancy, as the marker of authenticity, operated to 
segregate different kinds of cultivators. Mackenzie’s preference for a “cultivating 
yeomanry” now got hooked to the question of occupancy.  
But Mackenzie’s formulations were crucially redefined by Bentinck in his 
minute on land tenures. Bentinck’s reappraisals were particularly important as they 
laid the guidelines for the settlement in Cuttack. Echoing Mackenzie’s 
representations, he noted that the collective of “village-zemindars”, or the 
“…Putteedari is the original and natural tenure of all the lands in the Country…”70 
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But he proceeded beyond Mackenzie’s framework by delineating the respective status 
of various cultivators with regard to the authentic proprietary form. Like Mackenzie, 
Bentinck began by emphasizing that among the ryots, the true proprietors were only 
those who were genuine members of the cultivating collective of putteedars. Bentinck 
pointed out that, “I am of the opinion that throughout the country there are three 
descriptions of Ryots. The first class I consider as being to all intents and purposes 
proprietors of the lands which they cultivate, the second as having been originally 
tenants at will, but acquiring in course of time a prescriptive right of occupancy at 
fixed rates, and the third as mere contract cultivators.”71 Further, in describing the first 
kind, Bentinck, repeating earlier representations of the “ryot-proprietor”, gave the 
example of the meerasidars of Deccan.
72
 As examples of the second and third kind in 
the context of Deccan, Bentinck spoke of the judeed and pykasht ryots. The 
meerasidars, Bentinck observed, lost their proprietary status during the Muslim rule, 
and were reduced in status to occupant-cultivators, or ryots of the second kind in 
Bentinck’s scheme.  
Thus, according to Bentinck, “…originally in all parts of the country, there 
were two classes of resident Ryot, the one belonging to the class of original 
proprietors and possessing a right derived by inheritance from the original occupants 
of appropriating the surplus produce of the soil after satisfying the Government 
demand, the other having no defined rights, but still entitled to consideration, on proof 
of prescriptive occupancy…”73 In this way, residence in the village became a mark of 
the proprietary lineage of the ryots. All resident cultivators were, however, not 
considered to belong to the league of the original proprietor-ryot. But they were 
considered higher in rank than the migrant cultivators. The same classification 
prevailed in Cuttack as well. In describing the tenures of Cuttack, Andrew Stirling 
noted that he could not find traces of the original proprietor-ryot. But in the 1820s, a 
discussion ensued amongst the Court of Directors and officials in Cuttack where the 
mourosee mokuddums of Cuttack were seen as similar in status to the meerasidars of 
the south. In this discussion the mokuddums of Cuttack were believed to embody 
traces of the original class of proprietary ryots. Over the course of a long debate 
finally it was determined that proprietary rights would be granted by separately 
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investigating the proprietary claims of mokuddums in every mouzah. Following such 
a procedure, some mokuddums were indeed granted proprietary rights. In being 
admitted as proprietors, these mokuddums were perceived as cultivators. But their 
cultivator-status was envisioned entirely in terms of a legacy of the past. In the 
present, they were not necessarily cultivators. The present cultivators of Cuttack were 
grouped according to Bentinck’s framework, as hereditary occupants and migrants. 
These were the occupant cultivators, or the thanee ryots, having their residence and 
rates of rent fixed, subject to the payment of Government revenue, and the migratory 
cultivators or the pykasht ryots.
74
 
As it has been argued, in the discourse of governance, the “village” was 
considered the most fundamental unit of agricultural production around which 
relations of power were distributed. Surveying reflected the importance of closely 
monitoring the “village”, as the smallest geographical unit of power and production. 
In tune with this imperative, during the settlement in Cuttack, cultivators were classed 
according to their varying functions with respect to cultivation within the “village”. In 
this scheme of ranking, “occupancy” was much privileged over “migrancy”. Being 
physically located in the “village”, instead of being a visitor to it, was considered 
more beneficial for agricultural production.  
Bentinck had already observed that the thanee ryot, or the occupant cultivator 
enjoyed quite a few privileges. Their rents were fixed, rights to grazing of cattle on 
waste land, and use of forest produce were reserved, and they were allowed to have 
the lands on which their houses were built rent-free. These endowments were rooted 
in the premium laid on occupancy in the “village”. These ryots were considered chief 
cultivators of the “village”. In Cuttack as well, administrative practices tried to secure 
their conditions of cultivation. In a letter to the commissioner, Mr. Mills, the collector 
of a district in Cuttack, noted that, “It must be borne in mind that it is our interest to 
maintain the Thanee Ryots in possession of their house and lands…”75 Attaching the 
ryot to his lands and homestead, reflected the preference for a “cultivating yeomanry” 
which was always articulated in the discourse of agrarian governance throughout the 
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first half of the nineteenth century. In spite of the differences in their perspectives, 
Munro and Mackenzie both envisioned the peasant-proprietor as the leading 
cultivator. However, as the “village” got foregrounded as the fundamental unit of 
power on land, the domain of cultivation also got arranged with reference to it. An 
assumed hereditary presence denoted a permanent and superior membership of the 
“village”. Accordingly, it both capacitated and disempowered different groups of 
cultivators.  
E. Repton, acting collector of Balasore emphasized that “With regard to the 
Thanee Ryot…A definite rate must be fixed, and the necessity of an interchange of 
Pottahs and Cabooleuts has been so frequently urged by the Court of Directors and the 
authorities in this country that I can hardly imagine it can be negatived.”76 Fixing the 
rent of thanee ryots was considered a necessary incentive for improvement. These 
ryots, as I have mentioned, were considered potential improvers, primarily due to 
their fixed, hereditary location within the “village”. In their improving role, they were 
often compared with English farmers. As R. Hunter, commissioner of Cuttack noted, 
“A khoodkasht ryot should, like the English farmer, be encouraged to go hand in hand 
with his landlord in improving his lands and if such is effected by the aid of the 
landlords funds…” 77 It was strongly believed that fixed rates would ensure protection 
from exactions by superior landlords, and enable agricultural improvement. It was 
noted by Repton that, “If the Zemindar, when the season for tilling commences, may 
demand an increase of rent or turn the former cultivator out, what encouragement is 
held out for an industrious labourer? No man will expend money in the improvement 
of his land, if he is thus liable to be ousted at the will of his landlord…”78 A low rate 
of rent was prescribed in order to leave enough scope for improvement in the hands of 
these ryots. In Talooka Bishnubur, Mr. Hunter fixed half of the calculated gross 
produce as rent. With regard to such a strategy, the commissioner, Mr. Mills observed 
that, “…I would have rather allowed him half of what remains from the gross produce 
of the land after deducting all expenses balancing such calculations with the rents 
actually found to have been paid…”79                
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Thanee ryots were privileged in many ways, primarily because of their settled, 
occupant status within the “village”. The issue of location comes out clearly when the 
strategies aimed at the pahee ryots are considered. The pahee ryots, Ricketts noted, 
“Are those tilling lands in villages in which they do not reside…”80 The settlement 
officer in Pergunnah Searee, Balasore district described the characteristics of pahee 
ryots in detail: “The Pahee Ryot has no hereditary or transferable property whatever 
in the land he cultivates…These ryots are constantly changing their lands. Should the 
past season’s experience induce them to think that the soil they then cultivated is not 
sufficiently fruitful to repay them…they resign their engagements at the end of the 
year and enter into fresh ones…for some more productive lands in another 
village…”81  
Interestingly, the “village” figured in the classification of cultivators in such a 
crucial manner that the same cultivator was granted different designations and 
awarded unequal privileges depending on his different locations, within or outside the 
“village”. Accordingly, it was noted in the settlement report of a particular area in 
Cuttack, that, “The Pahee Ryot is generally an inhabitant or the son of an inhabitant of 
one of the villages in this or a neighbouring Pergunnah in which he holds lands as a 
Thanee Ryot.”82 Rents of these ryots were not fixed owing to their migratory status. 
Settlement officers suggested that their rents should depend on the bargains they are 
able to strike with the zemindar. The Board concurred partially with this opinion, and 
ordered that the formation of a detailed list of pahee ryots is unnecessary. But at the 
same time since rent was perceived to be the effect of power-equations between 
superior landlords and cultivators, it was considered essential to provide some 
protection to even pahee ryots. Thus, lands occupied by pahee ryots were classed at a 
particular rate, which was entered in the settlement record, so that the zemindars 
could not place illegitimate demands on them.
83
   
Occupancy, as a virtue, was also central to the exaltation of the figure of the 
peasant-proprietor in contemporary political economy. Property, in this vision, was 
translated as belonging. It expressed a relation of cultivation between a person and the 
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objects he owned. Property was a relation which made the person feel at one with 
these objects, through actions of continuous care, attention, and nurturing. This is how 
William Thornton presented the life-world of the peasant-proprietor. Physical 
residence in his property, and an unwavering attention to it defined the peasant-
proprietor. His industriousness was proverbial; his self, a purely productive one. 
Evidence presented from several countries of Europe brought out in vivid detail the 
worlds of such peasant-proprietors: “Anywhere in the neighbourhood of Zurich, in 
looking to the right or left, one is struck with the extraordinary industry of the 
inhabitants…every shrub, every flower is tied to a stake; and where there is wall fruit, 
a trellice is erected against the wall to which the boughs are fastened, and there is not 
a single twig that has not its appropriate resting-place.”84 About Switzerland 
generally, Thornton noted: “The little spots of land, show the same daily care in the 
fencing, digging, weeding, and watering.” The owners, he continued, “have a kind of 
Robinson Crusoe industry about their houses and little properties; they are perpetually 
building, repairing, altering, or improving something about their tenements.”85  
However, the same vision which celebrated the peasant-proprietor also 
denigrated another kind of producers, namely, the day-labourers, or contractual 
cultivators. It was argued that while the former was reputed for their industry, the 
latter was notorious for their indolence. Once again, property was seen as constitutive 
of productivity. Thornton emphasized that it was the lack of a proprietary title in the 
case of the day-laborers, which generated their careless and wasteful nature. He 
observed that, “the small farmer…is subject to no immediate compulsion. No one can 
forbid his sitting down as soon as he is tired, or taking a holiday whenever he feels 
inclined;…But although he is exempt from the same compulsion, he is stimulated to 
exertion by influences much stronger than any that affect the hired labourer…He has 
little or no inducement to exert himself further; he has no certainty of gaining an 
increase of wages by so doing…”86 John Stuart Mill repeated the same hierarchy. He 
saw the day-labourers as possessing all those vices which were engendered by an 
unproductive existence. Mill argued that, “Day-labourers…are usually improvident; 
they spend carelessly to the full extent of their means, and let the future shift for 
itself…The tendency of peasant proprietors, and of those who hope to become 
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proprietors, is to the contrary extreme; to take even too much thought for the 
morrow…They deny themselves reasonable indulgences, and live wretchedly in order 
to economize.”87  
Such were the inclusions and exclusions of the contemporary political-
economic investments in the figure of the peasant-proprietor. I argue that agrarian 
governance in British India privileged the thanee over the pahee ryot following the 
same logic. The thanee was imagined as the archetypal peasant-proprietor, occupying 
the village lands, and improving agricultural production. As opposed to this, the pahee 
was perceived as the migrant, contractual cultivator, without a dwelling in the village, 
and, therefore, without a productive commitment to its lands, always in the hunt for 
better opportunities elsewhere.    
Long occupancy of lands in the “village” was not only the basis for classifying 
cultivators. In the discourse of land-administration, occupancy generally signified 
authenticity. The right of holding lands lakhiraj, or rent-free was also verified on this 
ground. The resumption laws declared that, “By the orders of the Supreme 
Government…Lakherajdars who have enjoyed long possession and whose tenures 
have been held in good faith are on resumption of their lands to be allowed possession 
at half rates for thirty years…”88 In several instances, even if the lakhirajdar was 
unable to produce valid documents, namely, grants confirming the rent-free status of 
the land, simply on the basis of his physical occupation of the plot of land at that time, 
and certification of his conditions by witnesses from the “village”, the lands were not 
resumed.
89
 Deputy collectors were instructed to choose these witnesses carefully. It 
was noted that only elderly people of the “village” could act as witnesses, in 
validating long occupation. It was also emphasized that these witnesses had to be, 
either physically resident in that particular “village”, or related to it in some official 
capacity. In the circular to his deputies, the commissioner observed that, “Young men 
cannot be witnesses of what happened…years ago, neither do I think that inhabitants 
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John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume II—The Principles of Political 
Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy (Books I-II) [1848] ed. John M. 
Robson, Toronto, 1965, 261.   
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June 12, 1838, No. 20, SBOR—Miscellaneous Proceedings, WBSA. In this letter, the Commissioner 
observed, after discussing the opinions of the collectors, that, 14
th
 October 1791 should be admitted “as 
the date of possession since which is to be considered long possession.”  
89
As examples, see September 4 1839, No. 42, July 17, 1839 Nos. 55 and 57, SBOR—Miscellaneous 
Proceedings, WBSA. 
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of different villages and estates can know much about the matter…”90 He further 
noted that if these methods failed, the “village ruqba”, or the old village records, 
should be examined in order to verify claims of possession of rent-free lands. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have shown how the “village” was fashioned as the 
archetypal site of the “political”, and thereby, the chief object of agrarian governance 
in British India over the first half of the nineteenth century. The “village” was 
envisioned as a reservoir of agrarian power. Since it was represented as the most 
ancient form of social organization around agriculture and, the primary geographical 
unit of governance, it was also perceived as incorporating the greatest range of these 
power-relations. Further, it was seen as the protective abode of the most productive 
agent in Indian agriculture, namely, the peasant-proprietor. Its characteristic as a 
circumscribed territory had the potential of addressing administrative anxieties, which 
had grown, since the permanent settlement, out of a failure to locate power 
geographically. The distaste towards big landlords, or the zemindars of the permanent 
settlement, was rooted in the perception that men on the spot, of various kinds, were 
the true players in the field of power. That is why figures who had occupied lands 
within the “village” for a long time were judged as key actors in the ensemble of 
power. Privileging village-residence went hand in hand with denigrating outsiders. In 
contemporary political economy as well, celebration of the sedentary peasant-
proprietor was tied to deprecation of the day-labourer.  Also, in order to discern such 
figures, visiting the spot, by adopting village-based surveys, was necessary. The 
“village” was found to be a suitable remedy to such an administrative unease with 
‘distance’. For all these reasons, it was perceived as the most authentic form of the 
power-ridden spot, which needed to be mapped for good governance.  
The upcoming chapter will open up another range of reconfigurations of the 
“political”. Through a close examination of several petty, quotidian disputes around 
land in Cuttack, I will show where the logic of the “political” broke down, and where 
it got strengthened, in new ways. By focusing exclusively on evidence from Cuttack, 
                                                 
90“Circular No. 55, To DC’s employed in Resumption, from E. Repton, September 1, 1838”, Acc. No. 
72B, Old No. 109, March 1838 to January 1842, CDR—Revenue, OSA. 
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it will bring out in detail a variety of situations which shaped the specific articulations 
of the “political” in a locality. The chapter will highlight workings of power amidst 
different actors in a locality, and demonstrate how the field of the “political” acquired 
its own bearings in Cuttack over the first fifty years of Company rule.  
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Chapter Six 
 
Debating directness: subjects and disputes in Cuttack 
 
 
This chapter intends to explore the ways in which the “political” got articulated in a 
locality. Unlike the previous chapters, here I present evidence only from Cuttack, 
analyzing a variety of disputes around land over the first fifty years of the nineteenth 
century. These disputes appeared, got debated, and were adjudicated at various layers 
of the judicial apparatus of the district. In studying the myriad issues at stake in these 
legal battles, this chapter attempts to perform two related analytical tasks. On the one 
hand it traces the ways in which the matters in conflict engaged in a continuous 
conversation with the twin articulations of the “political” which, as I showed in the 
previous chapters, formed the organizing principles of agrarian governance in early 
nineteenth century British India. On the other, it also charts out a field of dispersal 
and simultaneous rearticulation of this framework and its constituent categories. I 
demonstrate these dispersals through a variety of disputes amidst different kinds of 
landholders in Cuttack, which while remaining grounded within a general 
governmental logic, also hinted at its limits, thereby opening up fresh ground for 
reconfigurations.  
The specificities of these disputes in Cuttack, I argue, need to be located 
within a continuous network of organization, dispersal, and reconfiguration, which the 
categories of “rent”, “property” and “village” underwent within classificatory grids of 
the “political” and the “local”. In the previous chapters I argued that it is through a 
complex circuit of travelling localities that the figures of zemindars, ryots, village-
proprietors, pudhans, mokuddums, serberakars, meerasidars and many more were 
assembled as chief actors in the agrarian landscape of British India. These figures 
were defined differently and accordingly, acquired varying degrees of prominence in 
the field of power in different localities. As I have shown, since the critique of the 
zemindary settlement in Bengal, there was a general negative disposition towards big 
landlords in matters of agrarian governance. This was followed by a recasting of the 
peasant cultivator as the original proprietor of the soil, with various grades of 
cultivators being allotted different degrees of proprietary rights. These different 
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denominations of proprietary cultivators were then rearranged and redistributed 
within the category of “village” in the North-Western Provinces. The “village” was 
imagined as the most ancient and authentic bedrock of power-relations on land. 
Consequently, the “village-proprietor” acquired a degree of eminence in the 
variegated field of proprietary power that it had never enjoyed before. But at the same 
time, as I have argued earlier, another articulation of the “political” construed 
proprietary power as partial and distributed, which is why the “zemindar”, the 
“village-proprietor” and the “ryot” remained invested with some degree of 
proprietary-right in land.  
This chapter narrows down at one locality to explore how different kinds of 
agrarian subjects were formed from within contentions between these two different 
visions of the “political” in British India. In discussing these contentions, it 
simultaneously highlights how the chief components of the “political”, such as “rent”, 
“property” and “village” were pushed beyond their general formulations by the force 
of events. The first section, for example, discusses a situation where certain complex 
relations of exchange of goods between a group of potters and the temple of 
Juggernauth, were reduced to progressivist, modernist binaries of abstract-concrete, 
barter-money, and other similar ones by Company officials. Through these processes 
of abstraction, the potters were recast into normal, rent-paying agrarian subjects, or 
“ryots”. The section highlights the strategies of resistance adopted by the potters in 
the encounter, and the failure of the officials to understand the irreducible singularity 
of the economy that existed between the temple and the potters. The section shows 
how the governmental framing of “rent” was deployed in this case to tame 
heterogeneous and different relations of power.   
The second section introduces the discursive logic which framed a huge range 
of conflicts in the locality, and shaped different agrarian subjects in the process. I 
describe this logic as a relentless striving to achieve directness, or immediacy, in the 
exercise of agrarian power in a locality. This chapter shows that it was shared by all 
actors, ranging from the government to the individual ryot. It kept reappearing in 
various guises in different disputes, engendering complex, often contradictory 
alliances, and shifting targets. It often fought against the framing of dispersed power; 
but at times also mobilized the latter towards its own ends. The second section shows 
how the government insisted upon defining “property” in terms of possession, or 
immediate/direct presence on the lands, often going against other important attributes 
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of “property” like rights of alienability, if it clashed with the former. I argue that this 
insistence did not always produce certain results, as proprietors in many cases could 
not be matched with possessors.  
The third section shows how agrarian actors in Cuttack, like the zemindars, 
defined their proprietary status in the language of directness, using the term 
“intermediary”, to depict village-level landholders as obstructions in the path of a 
direct relation of power between zemindars and ryots. The fourth section shows how a 
general negative predisposition towards zemindars in the discourse of governance 
construed the claims of the former as deceitful. This was complemented by a 
favourable attitude towards village-level landholders like mokuddums and 
serberakars. The latter, this section argues, also couched their claims in the idiom of 
the authenticity of directness, demanding proprietary capacities superior to the 
zemindars. Taken together, these sections also highlight how the figure of the 
“farmer” emerged as the determining principle of authenticity in these debates. The 
classical political-economic construal of the “farmer” as the agrarian capitalist, or 
ideal improver, was entirely discarded here. In these debates the “farmer” stood as the 
negative image of “improvement” and authenticity, as the rapacious contractual 
leaseholder, from whom all other agrarian actors with claims of representativeness 
tried to distance themselves. 
The fifth section argues that claims of directness as authenticity by 
mokuddums were not always lodged within local genealogies. The mokuddums often 
argued for their proprietary legitimacy in terms of a general classification of tenures, 
which went beyond a particular locality. Thus Cuttack mokuddums wanted their 
proprietary claims to be evaluated in the light of regulations pertaining to other 
similar tenures, like patnis in Bengal. Even the government invoked such similarities, 
without necessarily being able to always establish credible registers of comparison. 
But it was clear that the labelling of these village-level landholders as 
“intermediaries”, or “under-tenures” did not always work, as their claims to superior, 
more authentic, and more immediate proprietary positions in the topography of the 
“political” had to be admitted. The last section shows how the category of 
“intermediary” failed to generate any stable, fixed referent, as a variety of agrarian 
actors, ranging from zemindars, to lakhirajdars, to mokuddums, to pudhans all 
directed the term towards each other to claim greater authenticity, and more 
immediate form of authority in the intricate web of power-relations in the locality. 
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This term, “intermediary”, I note, has been used to denote a fixed group of 
landholders, usually the village-level ones, by the government, and even a number of 
notable historians. I put forward a critique of these works by highlighting the 
discursive logic informing changing uses of “intermediary”. I argue that it is the 
problematic of directness of power which defined the tenor of disputes in a locality, 
and determined the multiple referents which the term offered. All along the first half 
of the nineteenth century, therefore, I argue, battles were waged by a range of agrarian 
actors to establish claims over full presence on land, or achieve immediate/direct 
forms of power in the locality.      
In the process there were continuous reconfigurations of agrarian categories, 
from the Ricardian formulation to the Jonesian one, from the administrative practices 
of the Bengal and Madras Presidencies and the North-Western Provinces, to J. S. 
Mill’s engagement with the “political”, from the government’s search for real 
proprietors to varied alliances between different landholders in battles over acquiring 
directness of power in Cuttack. These were all acts of localization, whereby the 
“political” was performed and created at every successive site of reconfiguration, 
indicating the limits of its constituent categories, and opening up fresh pastures for 
further change. The “local”, therefore, was not a single, bounded geographical 
locality, but an analytical possibility invested in a variety of sites, textual or 
otherwise, within which categories of the “political” got organized, revealed their 
limits, and generated new reorganizations.  
These were also processes of subjectification of agrarian actors. Following 
Deleuze’s reading of Foucault’s dispositif, I argue that in this agrarian apparatus, 
subjects were created by the various lines of force that the “political” and the “local” 
generated in different contexts. The lines of force in the apparatus turned, twisted, 
clashed against each other, broke away from fixed paths of movement, to create 
subjects, as excesses of the established networks of knowledge and power. As 
Deleuze notes: “Foucault discovered lines of subjectification…the discovery of this 
new dimension arose out of a crisis in Foucault’s thought, as if it had become 
necessary for him to redraw the map of social apparatuses [dispositifs], to find for 
them a new orientation in order to stop them from becoming locked into unbreakable 
lines of force which would impose definitive contours. Leibniz gave exemplary 
expression to this state of crisis which sets thought on the move again when one 
thinks a resolution has been found: we thought we were in port, but we were cast back 
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out into the open sea…”1 This chapter thus tries to understand what such movements 
in the apparatus meant for the various agrarian groups in the locality. By highlighting 
the immediate, specific, and quotidian issues at stake in the locality I underscore the 
specific dynamics of a field of subjectification. A study of this dynamics, I argue, will 
explain the structuring of the relationships of dominance and marginality, generated 
out of changing alliances between the major agrarian subjects in the locality. The 
chapter will show that while the village-level landholders were undoubtedly the 
leaders of the locality in Cuttack, they had to continuously compete with other groups 
to reach this position.   
            
 
Why were the Coomars, of Coomarpara, asked to pay “rent”? 
 
In 1812, the acting collector of Cuttack reported to the Board of Revenue that the 
ryots of mouza Coomarpara in the Suttais Hazaree mehal refused to pay revenue to 
the farmer. In order to explain the dispute, G. Warde, the acting collector, elaborated 
upon the situation of these ryots. The ryots of Coomarpara, he noted, were potters 
who got exempted from the payment of revenue by a sunnud granted by one of the 
ancestors of the Raja of Khoordah on the condition that they would supply their 
earthen pots for the use of the temple of Juggernauth. For years, therefore, the potters 
supplied their pots to the temple, in exchange of which they got a certain quantity of 
Mahapersaud (the holy food offered to the deities and shared by the devotees). Warde 
noted that the Coomars, in turn, sold the Mahapersaud. Such a fixed and regular 
supply of pots, he argued, was the only form of payment that was taken from the 
Coomars, which quite evidently, did not entail any use of money. Warde, however, 
insisted that this supply of goods, and the Mahapersaud granted in exchange, was 
perceived not only as a certain kind of “revenue” payment, but also as a very definite 
one, measured in terms of an exact monetary value. He argued that this exchange had 
always been translated into a monetary arithmetic in the accounts of the temple and 
the revenue receipts of the Government, which included a certain amount of revenue 
imposed on the potters. He described the arithmetic in the following terms: “It does 
not seem…that they ever actually paid any revenue, for as the cost of pots which they 
                                                 
1Gilles Deleuze, “What is a Dispositif?” in Michel Foucault Philosopher, ed. Timothy J. Armstrong, 
New York, 1992, 161.   
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supplied exceeded the amount of revenue they were never called upon for any 
payment. In exchange for the pots which they furnished, they were allowed 
Mahapershaad…to the value of 2350 Khawuns, which they disposed of. This sum 
with the amount of the Jummah assessed on the Mehals making together 2770 
Khawons was the price of their annual supply of pots.”2  
The amount of revenue taken from the potters was, therefore, 450 Khawuns, 
which consisted of a tax on their profession and ground rent. As the Company’s 
government had, by policy, abolished all forms of Sayer duties or taxes on items of 
commerce, Warde noted that it could still legitimately demand from the potters the 
amount remaining under the head of ground rent. Translated further into Company 
Sicca Rupees, this amount was considered to be Rs. 53.10, which the Tehsildar or 
farmer of the mehal was supposed to collect from the potters.  
I will argue that three exercises of abstraction, and consequent reconfiguration 
of certain relations of power, were simultaneously deployed by the Company’s 
government in reaching the category of “rent”. Firstly, a concrete exchange of goods 
was recast as having been always also understood in an abstract monetized form. This 
operation was aimed at dismissing the possibility of conceiving this exchange in terms 
of an irreducible singularity, by refiguring it as always and already convertible into 
generalized terms. This convertibility enabled a second reconfiguration, of 
understanding the monetized form in the light of established governmental categories 
of “sayer duties” and “ground rent”, which subjectified the actors involved in this 
transaction as simultaneously potters and ryots. This opened up space for the final 
operation of abstraction, by which the subject could be reproduced as being 
implicated in a specifically agrarian form of relations of power. As the “sayer duties” 
were abolished, now the taxable subject could be exclusively represented as a rent-
paying “ryot” in relation to a rent-receiving “farmer”.3 The actions of this “ryot” 
could now be made meaningful in terms of the familiar category of “rent”, which was 
the entry-point to the field of the “political”, indicating, as I demonstrated in the 
previous chapters, a generalized mode of agrarian power, that between dominant and 
subordinate landholders. These abstractions were processes of creating subjects of 
                                                 
2“To Secretary to the Board of Revenue from Acting Collector, Cuttack”, May 29, 1812, No. 35, BRP.  
3
In the discourse of agrarian governance, the tehsildar of a government estate was perceived as a tax-
collector, embodying the functions of a farmer. Such a categorization rested on the landlord-farmer-
ryot classification, in this case portraying the farmer as the “improver”, and also the collector of rent, 
on behalf of the landlord-state. 
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agrarian power; they were aimed at making Coomars ryots, or legitimate actors in the 
sphere of the “political”.4   
These operations of abstraction were, however, punctuated by certain actions 
of the Coomars of Coomarpara. The Coomars not only refused to pay rent, but also 
withheld their regular supply of pots to the temple on being charged for ground rent 
by the farmer. Warde, of course, came up with an explanation of their behavior by 
first positing and then trying to further analyze, a gap in the generalizability of 
conversion. He suggested a necessary incompatibility or an unbridgeable gap between 
the two units of conversion. This incompatibility, however, was not seen as indicative 
of an irreducible singularity of the act of exchange. Rather, it explained the exchange 
in other, equally general terms. The dispute arose, Warde argued, because, “…the 
Coomars had never made any payment in money…”5 Thus, he thought that “…they 
either did not comprehend the transfer made in the accounts of the temple & that the 
amount of their revenue was deducted from the quantity of Mahapersaud supplied to 
them or they apprehended that if they paid the revenue an additional supply of holy 
food would not be furnished to them equal in value to the amount of it.”6 Warde 
analyzed the dissent in terms of the Coomars’ failure to understand the convertible 
monetary arithmetic of their exchange. Since the Coomars’ never paid actual money, 
they were perceived by Warde to be without the capacity to understand their concrete 
actions of exchanging goods in equivalent abstract terms of paying money. The 
Coomars in this mode of explanation were once more subjectified in the generalized 
terms of the category of the primitive, who could not look at their concrete “actions” 
in terms of abstract “thought”, and, therefore, understand the convertibility of goods 
into money. That is why Warde also thought that the Coomars believed that if they 
paid money, they will no longer receive Mahapersaud; in other words, if they entered 
into a monetary form of exchange, they will not be allowed to participate in the older 
exchange of goods. The Coomars’ intransigence was explained in terms of an 
                                                 
4
Following Foucault, I look at these processes as those of subject-formation produced by the exercise 
of discursive power. Foucault notes that subjects are created in a double-edged manner: “There are two 
meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own 
identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates 
and makes subject to.” See Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power” in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul 
Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Chicago, 1982, 212. With the 
Coomars, as the section will argue, these strategies of subjectification were majorly interrupted. The 
Coomars refused to get subjectified within the folds of the “political”.      
5“To Secretary to the Board of Revenue from Acting Collector, Cuttack, May 29, 1812”, No. 35, BRP.   
6
Ibid.   
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either/or, a binary between “barter” and “monetised exchange”. It was seen as 
reflective of a “primitive” mentality which could work only within a simple binary 
logic.    
Ultimately the Coomars were recast as rent-paying ryots, or normal agrarian 
subjects. Warde’s perception of their primitivity made him request the Board of 
Revenue for a remission of their rent. However, as the Coomars had already been 
presented as rent-paying ryots, Warde also argued that the tehsildar might place 
illegitimate demands on them. This was pretty much in line with the contemporary 
perception of Government-appointed revenue-collectors as having the tendency of 
becoming rapacious farmers oppressing the ryots.
7
 But the Board wanted the Coomars 
to remain within the specifically agrarian form of power that was woven around the 
category of “rent”. They pointed out that, “it would be more regular for the farmer to 
collect what is an item of Jummah in his farm…If the farmer collects more than he is 
entitled to the Coomars may seek redress in the Court.”8 
Does the reticence of the Coomars towards becoming rent-paying “ryots”, or 
normal agrarian subjects, tell us anything beyond its official explanation in terms of a 
certain primitivity? Was the resistance merely one of those edgy “transitional” 
moments in an otherwise inevitable evolution of a “primitive”, “barter” economy into 
a “modern” “exchange” one? Was it the story of an essentialized opposition between 
the “concrete”, as goods, and the “abstract”, as money? When the Coomars stopped 
supplying pots to the temple, an alarm was raised at the corridors of governance by 
the temple authorities. It was reported to the collector, that, “…unless some 
adjustment be effected great inconvenience will be experienced in the temple on the 
approaching festival of the Chandan & Snan Jattra from the want of earthen pots…”9 
It’s clear from this anxiety that the regular supply of pots was crucial to the 
functioning of the temple. I have noted earlier that the Coomars seemed to believe 
that if they paid rent in money, they would receive a lesser quantity of Mahapersaud 
than before. While the collector understood this as a primitive resistance towards 
participation in a monetized exchange, it is evident that the Coomars found the 
Mahapersaud to be a peculiarly valuable item in this context, because they used to sell 
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Such a perception strongly articulated itself in the context of the Paik rebellion when it was found that 
the tehsildar of Khoordah, a government estate, had severely oppressed the ryots for many years. It was 
believed by the district officials that it had a significant role to play in exciting the grievances of the 
inhabitants of that area.  
8“To Acting Collector, Cuttack, from Secretary to the Board of Revenue”, May 29, 1812, No. 36, BRP.   
9“To Secretary to the Board of Revenue from Acting Collector, Cuttack”, May 29 1812, No. 35, BRP.   
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it regularly. An exchange of pots for Mahapersaud, in my opinion, used to work to 
their advantage in two ways. Firstly, they had a fixed and monopolised market for 
their pots, and secondly, by exercising another monopoly over the reception of a 
culturally valued object, the Mahapersaud, they could turn it into a commercially 
valuable one. In the relations of power embedded in this exchange, they enjoyed a 
particularly advantageous position. This, they feared, might be disturbed if they 
entered, as “ryots” into a typically agrarian power-relation with the farmer.10  
This was the unclassifiable singularity of the exchange between the Coomars 
and the temple. It is not difficult to imagine that this exchange, unlike a simple and 
symmetrical dependence often associated with the category of “barter”, entailed the 
use, by the Coomars, of both goods, in the form of pots, and money, by selling 
Mahapersaud, in distinctively strategic ways. Entering into a relationship with the 
“farmer”, the Coomars apprehended, might make them lose their double-edged 
control over the items of this economy. A clearer view of the specific contours of this 
exchange is historically irrecoverable.
11
 The Coomars were eventually forced to enter 
into rent-paying relations with the farmer of the mehal. But it is evident that they did 
not like it, and the panic that was created in the temple by their withdrawal indicated 
the strength of their position in the power-equation. I have complemented a critical 
reading of Warde’s analysis, reflecting a form of governmental rationality, with an 
alternative way of reading the actions of the Coomars. In doing this, while I do not 
suggest the possibility of reconstructing the Coomars’ actions as a coherent, self-
conscious strategy of resistance, I am also not ready to entirely discard a hermeneutic 
engagement with them.        
 
Entanglements and directness 
 
                                                 
 
11
In providing this reading, I do not want to indulge in economism by suggesting that the dynamics of 
the situation necessarily implied that for the Coomars the cultural value of Mahapershaad was entirely 
reducible to its monopolistic commercial use. But as I have pointed out, from this fragmentary 
correspondence, the possibilities of other meanings being immanent in this practice of exchange is 
unfortunately historically irrecoverable. For this reason, I have tried to create a distinct form of 
“economic” meaning of this exchange, in order to use it as a heuristic tool for an engagement with the 
Coomars’ action of withdrawal. The economics of this exchange must be understood as a reconstitution 
of a culturally valuable object into a commercially prized one. This, I believe, will enable at least one 
critical reading of the power-equations at play.   
 207 
When Bhuwanee Purshaud, the proprietor of talukas Tulpuda and Juggernauthpore 
fell into arrears of revenue in 1811, C.S. Waring, the collector, argued that it was a 
benamee purchase, and, therefore, the amount should be recovered from his brother 
Ram Kanoy, the real proprietor. In order to prove his contention, Waring cross-
questioned a number of characters who were involved in these talukas in different 
capacities. These questions tried to establish Ram Kanoy as the real proprietor in 
terms of his personal involvement in the affairs of the talukas. Waring examined 
Ruseekchurn Maintee, the tehsildar of taluka Tulpuda, Laloo Maintee, an erstwhile 
servant of Bhuwanee Purshaud, Kisooree Maintee, who expected to be employed by 
the two brothers, Nitye Naik, a ryot of Tulpuda, and Sobah Sing, an inhabitant of that 
area. His queries tried to intercept, in many ways, the real constitution of authority 
over the administration of the talukas.  
Rent, as I have argued in elaborating upon the “political”, was conceived as 
the primary entry-point into the networks of agrarian power and authority. Quite 
obviously, therefore, Waring began the process of understanding the nature of 
authority in this case by asking who was in charge of the collection of rent from the 
talukas. In answer to this query, Ruseekchurn, the tehsildar, who carried out the 
collections, said that he “…sent it to Ram Kanoy & received receipts from him.”12 
Nitye Naik, the ryot, noted that it was collected by Ram Kanoy’s servants. Kissoree 
Maintee pointed out that the Serberakars and Ryots paid revenue to Ramkanoy, and 
finally Soobah Sing also came up with the same response. While this set of responses 
seemed to vindicate Waring’s suspicion that Ramkanoy, as the receiver of rent, was 
the real proprietor of the talukas, answers to other questions left the matter 
unresolved.  
On being asked, “Whom did the Ryots know as the proprietor…”, 
Ruseekchurn pointed out that, “They took Pottahs from Bhuwanee Purshaud but sent 
the revenue to Ram Kanoy.”13 He further remarked that he used to obey the orders of 
Ramkanoy. Waring, in order to confirm his suspicion about the real seat of authority, 
wanted to know why he did so, despite being a servant of Bhuwanee Pershaud. In 
reply, Ruseekchurn argued that although Bhuwanee Pershaud was the real proprietor 
of the talukas, “Ramkanoy being the elder brother of Bhowaneeoershaud & manager 
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Collector, Cuttack”, June 7, 1811, No. 47, BRP.   
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Ibid.  
 208 
of all their affairs, I therefore obeyed him.”14 It is by invoking such a familial domain 
of authority, marked by brotherhood, trust and mutual cooperation that most of 
Waring’s respondents maintained both positions—of Bhuwanee Pershaud being the 
real proprietor, and Ram Kanoy being the key operator in the affairs of the talukas—
as mutually consistent.
15
 This mode of persuasion also allowed them to agree with 
Nitye Naik’s (the ryot) statement that the ryots considered Ram Kanoy to be the real 
proprietor.
16
 They seemed to suggest that the ryots falsely understood the person with 
whom they had immediate and more regular contact, especially in relation to the 
payment of rent, as the real proprietor. Interestingly, Nitye Naik, the sole spokesman 
of the ryots, appeared to have reached a different conclusion about the real 
proprietorship from a perspective similar to the zemindary servants. Even Nitye Naik 
claimed to know that the talukas were jointly governed due to a familial intimacy 
between the two brothers. But he reversed the proprietary authority in this familial 
domain. He remarked, that “Ram Kanoy was the proprietor & Bhowanee Purshaud 
was his confidential manager.”17      
Waring’s attempt to pinpoint the real proprietor was not successful. The Board 
of Revenue, after going through his inquiries, noted that they, “do not consider the 
Benamy purchase alleged to have been made by Ramkanoy as sufficiently established 
to enable them to enforce payment from him & they accordingly direct that you 
confine Bhuwaneepershaud in the Dewanny Jail unless he shall discharge the arrears 
due from the lands purchased in his name.”18 Waring’s questions were underpinned 
by a crucial assumption of the governmental framing of “property”. His insistence on 
a search for the real proprietor suggested that an effective administration of property 
would never be possible without identifying the immediate figure of authority in a 
taluk. As I noted earlier, especially in the chapter on the “village”, that over the first 
half of the nineteenth century discursive practices of governance privileged 
directness, as the most authentic form of power on land. Waring’s attempt to prove 
                                                 
14“Re-examination of Ruseekchurn Maintee, enclosure to a letter to Secretary to the Board of Revenue 
from Collector, Cuttack”, Ibid.  
15Laloo Maintee, “Ramkanoy is elder brother to Bhuwanee Purshaud and manager of his affairs.” 
Soobah Singh, “Both of them used the profits as if equally concerned.” “Deposition of Laloo Maintee, 
inhabitant of Mouza Joytollung Pergunnah Balookissee, enclosure to a letter to Secretary to the Board 
of Revenue from Collector, Cuttack”, Ibid. 
16Consider Laloo Maintee’s statements: “Who did the Ryots consider as the real proprietor? Ramkanoy. 
Do you know if the ryots truly considered Ramkanoy to be the real proprietor? Yes and the Ryots (if 
called upon) will affirm the same.”, Ibid. 
17“Deposition of Nitye Naik, ryot, Taluka Tulpuda, Mouza Sodkund”, Ibid.  
18“To Collector, Cuttack from Secretary to the Board of Revenue”, June 7, 1811, No. 47, BRP.  
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the purchase a benamee one indicated that he perceived the illegality of the matter as 
a failure to configure the category of property in terms of direct/immediate forms of 
power on land.  
The Board, however, resisted this redefinition. It believed that there was no 
contradiction in Bhuwanee Pershaud being the formal proprietor, and Ram Kanoy the 
real manager. Nitye Naik’s testimonial, I imagine, could not prove, even in these 
formalist terms of the Board, the illegality of the purchase. Perhaps the servants’ 
depositions were considered more authentic with regard to the requirements for an 
essentially formalist definition of proprietorship. I could guess as much that the ryot, 
was also understood by the Board to be necessarily representative of a simple and 
short-sighted peasantry, and, therefore, incapable of making a distinction between the 
formal and the real. Unfortunately, both for Waring and Nitye Naik, the gap between 
the formal and the real could not be bridged. It showed that, in spite of tendencies 
towards the reverse, there were instances when the redefinition of the category of 
property in the image of a directness of power, was interrupted.  
In matters of property, there were many more such entanglements. When 
Kaleesunker Ghose, proprietor of taluk Kishenpur in pergunnah Ankora asked for 
help from the government in getting possession of certain villages in mouza 
Govindpur, which he argued was part of his estate, and unjustly withheld by 
Koonjbeharry Chowdree, the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut rejected his application. The 
court order noted that, “the disputed villages remain in the possession of the person by 
whom they were then enjoyed (Koonjbeharry Chowdree) and that Kulee Sunker 
should be referred to establish his claim by instituting a regular suit.”19 This made the 
collector report in detail on the settlement of Ankora which was at the root of this 
dispute.  
The collector noted that in the year 1811 taluk Kishenpoor, the property of 
Koonjbeharry Chowdree was sold for the recovery of arrears of revenue, and 
purchased by Bhyrubsunker Chowdree and Rajchunder Shome. “Shortly after the 
purchase,” the collector continued, “these persons conceiving they had not received 
possession of all the lands included in the sale presented a petition… when the 
assistance usually afforded to purchasers at public sales was applied for to the Zillah 
court thro’ the Government Vakeel, this assistance I believe was not afforded and 
                                                 
19“To Acting Secretary to the Board of Revenue from Acting Collector, Cuttack”, June 13, 1815, No. 
20, BRP.  
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Bhyrubsunker Chowdree did not obtain possession of the villages.”20 Next year, they 
disposed of the property to Kaleesunker Ghose, the present proprietor. But in the 
matter of acquiring possession of the disputed portions, even he “was no more 
fortunate than his predecessors.”21 In the light of these circumstances, the collector 
argued that Kaleesunker would not be authorized by the existing regulations to 
acquire the disputed villages unless his claim is supported by a separate suit instituted 
for the same property by the person from whom he purchased Kishenpoor. The central 
question to be answered in this entanglement, as the collector put it succinctly, was 
““what is Kulee Sunker entitled to as purchaser at private sale of Kishenpoor””22  
The collector argued that Kalee Sunker cannot be entitled to a property which 
was sold by a person who never got possession of it, because the seller, in the first 
place, could not have sold a property without his own claims on it being established. 
He maintained that “If Kalee Sunker purchased lands by private sale and does not get 
possession of all, he must look to the vender for remuneration, the vender cannot refer 
him to Government because he purchased those lands at a Public Sale, it was the duty 
of the latter during the period he held Kishenpoor to have called upon Government to 
put him in possession of all the lands and not to have disposed of them before he got 
possession of all he conceived included in his purchase.”23 What was it that 
engendered such complex entanglements out of a simple case of successive transfers 
of a piece of landed property?  
I argue that the complexity was generated by a failure to place the two central 
principles of “property”, namely, a concreteness of possession, and an abstraction of 
absolute alienability, in the same person.  Kulee Sunker’s property rights never got 
admitted within the governmental framing of property because he was not considered 
to possibly have a “property” right in something which he does not “possess”. So the 
sale/ purchase of a property right in these lands, to begin with, was considered null 
and void. In this framing of property, property right did not remain only an abstract 
relation to land, conceived in terms of absolute transferability/alienability of land as a 
commodity, but rather was made contingent on the supposedly concrete category of 
possession. The issue of benamee purchase was seen through the lens of the same 
anxiety, which made the collector search for a real proprietor in Ram Kanoy. But in 
                                                 
20
Ibid.  
21
Ibid.  
22
Ibid.  
23
Ibid.  
 211 
this case, property was refigured in terms of the “concrete”, as Kulee Sunker was 
allowed to not pay revenue till he possessed the lands. The Court declared that the 
revenue demand of those disputed villages were to be suspended till Kalee Sunker 
received possession. The discursive practices of agrarian governance, in framing 
“property”, did not always necessarily invest in the same person a right of transfer and 
a right of possession. On the contrary, as I argued in the previous chapters, property 
was structured as a partial and plural set of rights, relating to both transfer and 
possession, distributed in varying combinations among a host of figures. Within this 
framework, in the case of Kalee Sunker, the combination of both rights in the same 
person was perceived to be a legitimate one, in contradistinction to Kunjbeharry 
Chowdree, whose possession of the lands was considered an illegitimate right. In the 
case of Ram Kanoy it was thought that he is the proprietor even if he did not have 
possession. In Kulee Sunker’s case, however, he was not considered a proprietor 
because he did not have possession. In the second situation, therefore, we see that the 
attribute of directness, or immediate presence, determined what “property” meant in 
the discourse of governance. 
Questions of possession, produced by the problematic of the “local”—as 
concreteness, and directness of power—pervaded the governance of property disputes 
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. In the 1840s, a conflict arose over 
the rent of a certain amount of land in mouza Jutni, pergunnah Khoorda. Seewuck 
Barick, the rent-payer, argued that in 1806 Pudolab Mahapater executed a kubooleut 
with the government for 6 battees, 24 ghoonths, 2 biswas of land in mouza Jutni, and 
held undisturbed possession of it, with his son Minjugdeb, till 1841. Seewuck paid 
rent for a portion of this land to Pudolab till his death in1849. After this, he was 
supposed to pay the rent to his son when Huree Raotra and his brothers claimed the 
rent. They argued that the land was originally Pudolab’s but after a butwarra in 1836, 
became theirs. The judge, however, ruled out their claim. 
The judge noted that, “It is quite evident that a family dispute existed between 
the mozahim and the defendants, regarding the right to the land in mouza Jutni since 
1836 A.D…and although it is alleged that Pudolab…executed a deed or 
relinquishment of his right in the 33 batees, 2 mauns and 4 biswas…in Jutni and other 
mouzas, the document or deed filed in the suit does not altogether bear out the 
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allegation.”24 He was more convinced of the absence of any butwarrah, by the fact 
that the dispute had been brought earlier to the deputy collector who in 1843, that is, 
seven years after the alleged butwarra had recorded Minjugdeb as the proprietor “in 
succession to his father, Pudolab…on the grounds of their ascertained 
possession…”25 From Huree Raotra’s subsequent petition to be put in possession, he 
also inferred that for all these years he was not in possession of these lands. Once 
again, it is evident that the issue of possession played a deciding role in judging the 
authenticity of contending claims to property and rent. Huree Raotrah and others 
presented quite a few documents to establish their proprietary status. This included a 
kubooleut issued by them in the name of Seewuck Barick, as well as a ladavee 
showing the butwarra. But actual possession was considered a greater evidence of 
proprietary status. In the discursive practices of governance, possession became a sign 
of complete presence, without which the category of property seemed to remain 
hollow and incomplete. 
That is why in 1852 when Brindaban Oopadya claimed property-rights in a 
portion of land in chuck Sardung, mouza Meerpore, his claims were dismissed, and 
the lands were settled with Puhlad Das. Brindaban put forward a plaint against the 
decision of the deputy collector, stating that when in 1838, in execution of a decree 
against him, some lands in Meerpore were sold, the purchaser Puhlad Das falsely 
represented that the entire mouza was sold, and managed to get possession on the 
lands which belonged to him. The moonsiff, however, refused to accept Brindaban’s 
claim, noting that, “it was fully proved from the evidence of the witnesses examined 
before the court, and the pottahs, poutees, and bisoduns granted by the zemindar to 
the defendant from 1246 to 1249…that the defendant had been in possession for 
upwards of twelve years…”26 He dismissed the suit on the ground of lapse of time. 
Against this decision, Brindaban filed an appeal, further pointing out that he 
did not appeal earlier, because in 1839 although Puhlad was awarded the value of 
                                                 
24
February 11, 1854, No. 62 of 1853, Appeal from the decision of Gourbullub Ghose, Moonsiff of 
Pooree, dated 30
th
 April 1853, Hure Raotrah, Gobindhuree, Chundun and Somnath Chotrah, 
(Defendants,) Appellants, versus Seewuck Barrick, (Plaintiff) Respondent, Bengal Zillah Courts 
Decisions, 1854, Cuttack, 11.    
   
25
Emphasis mine, Ibid. 
26
September 23, 1852, No. 67 of 1852, Appeal from the decision of Moonshee Gurriboolah, Moonsiff 
of Balasore, dated 21
st
 April 1852, Brindaban Oopadya, (Plaintiff) Appellant, versus, Puhlad Das 
Mahapater (Defendant) Respondent, Bengal Zillah Courts Decisions, 1854, Cuttack, 109.  
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some fish that Brindaban took from a pond situated in chuck Sardung, this did not 
prove Puhlad’s possession on those lands, as Puhlad’s claim to the rent of the lands 
surrounding the pond was not admitted. The judge admitted that there was a flaw in 
the sale of these lands. He also noted that the sale could have been cancelled, had the 
plaintiff applied for a reversal of this decision in time. But in the light of the present 
circumstances, he argued, that Brindaban “has himself solely and entirely to blame for 
allowing his property to pass from his hands…”27 The judge upheld the decision of 
the moonsiff on the same ground of continuous possession by the defendant for a 
period of more than twelve years since the property came under dispute, and the 
plaintiff got dispossessed. Once again, despite the dispute over Puhlad’s claim to 
proprietary rights over the lands around the pond, the merits of possession determined 
the fate of proprietorship. Even though the government admitted its own mistake in 
allowing the property right of the disputed lands to slip out of the hands of the true 
owner, it overruled everything on the basis of what was perceived to be the greatest 
vindication of property right, namely, the reality of continuous, undisturbed 
possession for a certain period of time. The disputes discussed in this section, I argue, 
expressed a growing consensus over the category of “possession” as constitutive of 
property. These contentions displayed that “property”, as a gamut of rights and 
relations around land had to be continuously recast in the image of a directness of 
power and presence, which I have described as the problematic of the “local”. 
Governance, here, signified a relentless striving towards full presence.
28
 Possession 
seemed to offer that promise of presence, which was, however, as I will show in the 
subsequent sections, never guaranteed in that battlefield of power-relations called 
land. 
 
Battles of the Locality 
 
In the years following the completion of the settlement, incessant battles were fought 
over control of land in the judicial amphitheatres of Cuttack. Claims to possession of 
land, in a variety of ways, by a range of landholders flooded the courts in the district. 
As I demonstrated in the previous chapters, by the time of the settlement in Cuttack, a 
                                                 
27
September 23, 1852, No. 67 of 1852, Appeal from the decision of Moonshee Gurriboolah, Moonsiff 
of Balasore, dated 21
st
 April 1852, Brindaban Oopadya, (Plaintiff) Appellant, versus, Puhlad Das 
Mahapater (Defendant) Respondent, Bengal Zillah Courts Decisions, 1854, Cuttack, 110.  
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map of legitimacy had been established, in which different kinds of possessory and 
proprietary interests in land were distributed over a number of figures. But despite 
these emplotments, the design of possession was never stable. It relentlessly churned 
conflicts between different agrarian groups in the locality. Governmental practices 
tried to steer through the contestations, and settle the issue of possession according to 
its calculus of legitimacies, in the process opening up space for newer articulations of 
the problematic of the “local”. 
As I noted earlier, the principles of settlement in Cuttack was informed by a 
range of debates which took place in different times and at different sites over the 
nature of the “political” in India. These debates travelled to Cuttack, and got 
reconfigured in a manner which allowed governmental practices to deal with the 
major landholders of the district from within the analytical presuppositions of an 
agrarian structure that had been assembled through these debates. Big landlords like 
the zemindars and talukdars, as I showed earlier, were clear objects of criticism in this 
agrarian imaginary. The ryot, in the image of an ancient peasant cultivator, was 
perceived as the authentic proprietor of the soil. But by the time of the settlement of 
Cuttack, the emerging figure of the village-proprietor, construed as embodying the 
traces of the ancient peasant cultivator, was foregrounded as the most privileged 
figure in the matrix of proprietary rights on land. Quite obviously, these 
reformulations did not destroy the rights of the old zemindars and talukdars. But, as I 
will demonstrate in the subsequent sections, they created a new dynamics of power on 
land. The zemindars and talukdars suddenly found themselves in tough combats with 
village-proprietors of various sorts. As the rights and interests of the latter got more 
sharply defined, combined with a critical attitude in administrative circles towards 
bigger landlords, property and possession in Cuttack started experiencing tremors and 
settlements of new kinds. 
The serberakars and mokuddums of Cuttack, who were identified by the 
settlement as legitimate holders of various kinds of proprietary privileges became the 
immediate enemy of the zemindars. Official recognition of their rights made them 
strong contenders in the dispersed matrix of power on land, and zemindars utilized 
every opportunity to get rid of these figures from their estates. Such strategies by the 
zemindars can be read as yet another articulation of the problematic of the “local”, 
namely, attempts to institute directness as the modality of agrarian power. In other 
words, the zemindars, through these battles, tried to establish a direct relation of 
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power with the cultivators, by excluding village-proprietors of different descriptions. 
The Company’s government was trying to achieve the same thing, and so were the 
various other landholders of the locality. But as I have argued earlier, the twin 
articulations of the “political” made governmental practices organize the “local” 
simultaneously as a dispersed field of proprietary relations yet woven around the 
privileged location of the village-proprietors in that field as the most authentic agents 
of the “political”. The centralizing tendencies inherent in the choice of such a 
representative figure laid the ground for contending claims of representativeness. 
Since the zemindars lost their formerly established distinction in this new economy of 
representativeness, reclamation wars had to begin. Battle lines were drawn in the 
nineteenth division of Bengal presidency. 
The potential for contestations was opened up by a decision of the government 
passed against the serberakars of Puttamoondee in 1844. As I showed in the fourth 
chapter, the government had put down a set of criterion for judging the authenticity of 
the proprietary status of serberakars, mokuddums, and pudhans in Cuttack. In 
Puttamoondee, the government pointed out that these serberakars cannot claim 
proprietary rights, because they held land from the zemindars as moostajirs or 
farmers.
29
 This ruling introduced one more type of landholder in the field of agrarian 
power as another level of distinction against which the authenticity of the proprietary 
figures of Cuttack had to be established. Moreover, since the figure of the moostajir, 
or ijaradar, or farmer, embodied both the possibilities of resembling, or being 
different from, the putatively authentic proprietary figures, it became the rallying 
point for reclamation strategies on both sides. Henceforth, zemindars always tried to 
prove that the village-level landholders in their estates were mere farmers, devoid of 
superior proprietary rights. 
The definition of the farmer, therefore, became of crucial importance in these 
conflicts. The government construed the farmer as a contractual and short-term 
leaseholder of lands, lacking ancientness, authenticity, and, consequently, legitimate 
                                                 
29“Commissioner, Cuttack to Secretary to the Board of Revenue, July 19, 1844, No. 12, Board of 
Revenue Proceedings”, as cited in Tarun Kumar Mukhopadhyay, The Agrarian Society of Orissa: 
Nineteenth Century, Kolkata, 2008, 37. Mukhapadhyay goes on to argue that, “The zamindars, relying 
on this precedent, did everything to reduce the muqaddams to the position of farmers.” But this chapter 
will show that the same precedent also worked against the zemindars. This was because what 
Mukhapadhyay presents as his analysis, namely, the strategic use of this precedent by the zemindars, 
became soon an indispensable part of official perception in Cuttack. Accordingly, whenever this 
precedent was used by the zemindars in such disputes, the use was seen as necessarily fraudulent by the 
officials.  
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proprietary capacities. So if the zemindars could prove that the landholder, whose title 
was in dispute, held the lands on the basis of varying, short-term “farming 
kubooleuts”, as they did in Puttamoondee, his claim to a proprietary status was 
rejected. As I demonstrated in the previous chapters, a vigorous search for ancient and 
authentic proprietors, who were also imagined to be the most appropriate improvers, 
marked the discursive practices of agrarian governance in early nineteenth century 
British India. This was complemented by a distrust of “farmers”, understood as short-
term, contractual leaseholders, and, therefore, feared as an extortionist, parasitic 
presence on land. Unlike Ricardian political-economy, where “farmers” were 
considered to be agrarian capitalists, agrarian governance in British India construed 
this figure as an enemy of agricultural improvement. This was particularly evident 
with reference to the farmers/tehsildars of government estates. During the paik 
rebellion, the illegitimate collections and generally rapacious conduct of the tehsildar 
of Khoordah was identified as one of the major grievances of the inhabitants leading 
to the uprising.  
However, the category of the “farmer”, like all other categories of Ricardian 
political economy, was never entirely discarded. Rather, it was reconfigured, and 
incorporated within the search for a combination of authentic proprietors and 
appropriate improvers. That is why, as I noted in the earlier chapters, in describing the 
meerasidar, Thomas Munro argued that they were the ideal agents of improvement 
because they combined the capacities of proprietor, farmer, and cultivator. Even in 
Bengal, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, administrators pointed out that the 
ryots were farmers, and not mere wage-labourers. It was argued that since they were 
the authentic proprietors and the cultivators of the soil, they possessed capacities of 
improvement, like farmers. A senior member of the Board of Revenue, F.J. Halliday, 
deputed as supervisor of the settlement in Cuttack, argued that thanee ryots of Cuttack 
possessed attributes of farmers. In a memorandum on the settlements of Cuttack, he 
insisted that the rent of the thanee ryots should not be fixed, as by doing that they 
would be mistakenly converted into proprietors, whereas in reality they were merely 
hereditary farmers. He further noted that, “…in order to avoid trenching upon profits 
and wages which we are of course utterly unable to define and which after all may 
often be infringed we are obliged to exceed the other way and trench upon rent. But a 
farmer who receives in addition to wages and profits, a share of the rent is pro tanto a 
proprietor, which the Thanees do not claim to be.” Halliday believed that, “The 
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Thanee Ryots are resident farmers who have become hereditary merely as it appears 
to me from the tendency which every title in India has to become hereditary.”30  
Andrew Sartori has recently argued that in the debates surrounding the Bengal 
Rent Act of 1859, ryots, or peasant cultivators, were viewed as capitalist improvers.
31
 
Sartori points out that the deployment of the category of custom in this context was a 
political-economic one, as the categorization of the ryot as a proprietor and an 
improver, was considered to be rooted in the ryot’s productive function of mixing 
labor with the soil, and all of this was understood to be based on “custom”. It is 
evident from Sartori’s argument that in this debate, the ryot was classified as both 
farmer and proprietor. But in Cuttack, the “farmer” was differently imagined. 
Although Halliday represented the ryot as a farmer, he insisted upon its difference 
from a proprietor. This distinction was maintained even in the disputes in Cuttack 
between zemindars and mokuddums, which crucially revolved around the figure of 
the farmer. In these disputes, once again, the farmer was perceived as a contractual 
improver, different from, and inferior than improving agents like the village-level 
landholders who were also ancient proprietors. 
The figure of the farmer, in Sartori’s analysis of custom, remains within the 
framework of classical political economy. However, I argue that the classificatory 
framework of property which was assembled across multiple sites in early nineteenth 
century British India, represented the farmer in terms of certain radical 
reconfigurations of classical political-economic categories. In a reconfigured state it 
was neither a combination of Lockean and Ricardian categories, as Sartori 
understands it, nor could it cling to a more classically Ricardian identity.      
Negative predispositions towards the figure of the contractual farmer 
structured the strategic reinvention of the figure in Cuttack in a number of disputes 
between the zemindars and various village-level landholders. In five mouzas of taluk 
Pandua, Dwarkanath Tagore, the zemindar, managed to prove that the landholders in 
his estate claiming to be hereditary mokuddums, were mere ijaradars. The decision 
against the proprietary claims of these landholders was based on the evidence of their 
                                                 
30“Memorandum on Khureedgee Putna Buheepore, Pergunnah Kowul Kund, Zillah Cuttack, Settling 
Officer, Mr. Taylor”, Copies of Memoranda on certain Settlements in Bauleah, Cuttack, Chittagong 
and Murshidabad Divisions by Mr. F.J. Halliday, Secretary to the Board of Revenue, Deputed to 
Settlement work, 1837-1838, SBOR—Settlement Proceedings.         
31Andrew Sartori, “A Liberal Discourse of Custom in Colonial Bengal” Past and Present, No. 212, 
August 2011, 163-97.  
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having exchanged farming kubooleuts of varying rents with the zemindar.
32
 The claim 
to a surburakaree title over some mouzas in taluk Kishenpoorah was challenged by 
zemindar Juggernath Pershad Mullick on the same ground. Although the deputy 
collector, collector, and commissioner upheld the rights of the surburakar, the Board 
of Revenue overruled their decision. The secretary to the Board noted that, “The 
claims of all the middlemen in the Kishenpoorah Taluk were…rejected by me, on the 
grounds that they had held as mere managers for a long period on lease periodically 
renewed.”33 As it is evident, this judgment was based on a prevalent perception which 
construed these village-level landholders as contractual “managers” and wasteful 
“middlemen”. As I noted in an earlier chapter, amongst the officials in Cuttack, Henry 
Ricketts was a strong proponent of this view. This perception was rooted in a classical 
political-economic assumption which envisaged a direct, unimpeded relationship 
between big landlords or zemindars and small cultivators or ryots as particularly 
advantageous for agricultural “improvement”. It reflected, once again, an urge to 
establish unencumbered forms of power on land. But the design of directness it had to 
offer contained a specific equation of power, or a defined set of relationships, which 
could be instituted only by dislodging other sets. The articulation of the “local” 
opposed to it upheld a different relational calculus between a range of landholders, 
privileging the rights of serberakars, mokuddums and pudhans. Even this was an 
articulation of the same logic of directness; but it wanted to locate agrarian power 
within a different design. These were, therefore, conflicts over different claims of 
directness—one voiced by the zamindars, which labelled the village-level landholders 
as illegitimate encroachers, short-term “farmers”, or “middlemen” between zemindars 
and ryots, and the other by the village-proprietors, who presented themselves as 
authentic proprietors, thereby claiming direct control and possession of lands.     
Several village-level landholders were denied the status of authentic 
proprietors in Cuttack. Tarun Mukhopadhyay argues that the Puttamoondee judgment 
served an important point of reference in most of these disputes. In the dispute over 
mokuddumi rights in mouza Danpore, Mukhopadhyay notes that “In his petition 
Radhamadhub quoted the decision in the Puttamoondee  case. On consideration of the 
                                                 
32“Extract from the Commissioner’s Proceedings in the Settlement Department, March 18, 1845, No. 8, 
Board of Revenue Proceedings”, as cited in Mukhopadhyay, The Agrarian Society of Orissa, 38. 
33“To Secretary to the Board of Revenue from Commissioner, Cuttack”, September 2, 1845, No. 36, 
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case the government rejected the claim to the mokuddumi right over the mouza…”34 
The same strategy was adopted by the zemindar of Boorapara and Noapara. Referring 
to the Board’s order in the case of Puttamoondee he argued against the mokuddumi 
claims in his estates. He tried to prove that these landholders were mere farmers, and 
was successful in his attempt. Invoking a number of such instances, Mukhapadhyay 
concludes that there was a generalized dispossession of such village-level landholders 
in Cuttack in the years after the settlement. On this point, I disagree with him. It is 
evident that in a number of such disputes the village-level landholders lost the battles 
with the zemindars. But they also won their rights in a considerable number of 
instances, which I am going to discuss in the next section. However, the more 
important point is that the exact number of victories and losses cannot be pinpointed. 
This is where, I believe, Mukhapadhyay misunderstands the significance of these 
battles.
35
 Mukhapadhyay’s conclusions can be contradicted statistically as well. Sakti 
Padhi, after a close statistical scrutiny of the tenancy structure of 19
th
 and 20
th
 century 
Orissa, argues that “…what we do find in the end is that the sub-proprietors as a 
group were very much able to hold on to their own: they maintained their share in the 
total gross rental as well as their area share in the total assessed area. Moreover, they 
increased their share in the gross rental that they were collecting, (from 20.2 per cent 
to 32 per cent between 1837 and 1897) and continued to get the same preferential 
treatment vis-à-vis the zemindars in the 1927 settlement—they were pocketing 32.1 
per cent of the rent they were collecting, as compared to 15.4 per cent going to the 
zemindars.” 
The growing number of these disputes in the years following the settlement 
shows that the settlement, by redefining the relationships between zemindars and 
village-level landholders, set them up as the primary domain for contests over 
agrarian power in the locality. As I have demonstrated earlier, the recasting of these 
relationships was structured by a preference for village-level landholders over big 
landlords. Although the Puttamoondee verdict can be taken as exemplifying a 
contrary tendency, a closer look at more disputes will reveal that a generalized critical 
disposition towards zemindars in the administrative circles outweighed the benefits 
they derived from it. As the practice adopted by zemindars of using kubooleuts of 
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varying rents as evidence to turn the distinction between “farmers” and “proprietors” 
to their favour got regularized, administrators soon identified a potential for 
fraudulence in it. In this manner the Puttamoondee case very easily got reinterpreted 
in negative terms for the zemindars. It was understood by administrators to have 
implanted in the structure of legislation a strong potential for deceit; a precedent 
which they believed necessarily lend itself to inappropriate and false uses.  
This reinterpretation of the Puttamoondee verdict came out clearly even in 
situations where mokuddumi claims were eventually dismissed by the administrative 
apparatus. In Booraparrah and Noaparrah, the Commissioner pointed out that, “The 
claim to hold these villages as mokuddumi was admitted by the settling officer, the 
Collector, and by myself in appeal. The zemindar’s plea, of the mokuddum having 
entered into engagements with him as farmer was overruled, because there is strong 
reason to believe, that the mokuddums were inveigled into the execution of these 
engagements. The zemindar recognized their title, as mokuddum, from the time he 
purchased the property in 1219 until 1246 when having become acquainted with the 
Board’s orders, in the case of the Pattamoondee estate, ruling, that the execution of 
farming documents nullified summary cognizance of mokuddumee claims, he got 
these mokuddums to style themselves as farmers.”36  
Although, as I mentioned earlier, the vindication of these claims by the district 
officials was overruled by the Board, apprehensions about cunning zemindars 
remained deeply entrenched in the various echelons of governance. As my argument 
in earlier chapters bring out, it had to be this way, because by this time the zemindars 
had lost the guarantee of a privileged position in the changing matrix of agrarian 
power. The time was ripe, and the field had been opened up for new participants. It is 
evident therefore, that the issue of directness of power, or concrete possession of, and 
thereby, effective control over lands set the context for contentions over the nature of 
proprietary power, or the specific, “local” articulation of the “political” of India. 
These contentions clearly suggest that the official framing of the problematic of 
immediacy, or directness of power, as the key object of governance, gradually came 
to be shared by all other actors as the defining feature of power struggles in a locality. 
This section has shown that while zemindars, by putting forward their own 
justification of authentic immediacy, won some of these battles, there was an 
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emergent governmental disposition in Cuttack, which turned the tables against them 
in greater number of situations.   
     
Leaders of the Locality 
 
The same Radhamadhub Banerjee, zemindar of taluk Kistopore, who managed to 
disenfranchise Markund Pundah from his claim to mokuddumi rights in mouza 
Danpore, was caught up in a more complex state of affairs in the dispute over the 
mokuddumi rights of mouza Joomrah. In this case, the different levels of the 
administrative apparatus seemed to be in absolute disagreement with each other. The 
moonsiff dismissed the mokuddumi claims, the collector reversed the moonsiff’s 
decree, the commissioner reaffirmed the moonsiff’s decision, the senior member of 
the Board of Revenue thought that mokuddumi rights should not be upheld, while the 
junior member was convinced that these rights were well-established. I do not know 
what finally happened to the case, as it was sent to the Government of Bengal for the 
ultimate judgment. But what strikes as more revealing to me than the finality, is the 
radical potential of difference embedded in disputes of this kind, which were shaping 
the question of agrarian power in the locality in sharply polarized terms.  
When mouza Joomrah came under settlement, Jankeebullubh Ray put forward 
his claims to the mokuddumi of the mouza to the deputy collector. The deputy 
collector admitted his claims, and submitted his case for the orders of the collector. 
The collector, Mr. Mackintosh, dismissed these claims on the basis of certain 
kubooleuts which had been taken at varying jummas for the mouza. The 
commissioner cancelled the collector’s order, confirming Junkeebullubh’s claims, 
arguing that the mouza was purchased as a mokuddumi in 1834 by the latter. Baboo 
Radhamadhub Banerjee appealed against this decision saying that he had “always 
received Izardary Kabooleuts for the mouzas comprised in it.”37 He also pointed out 
that the above-mentioned sale was a mistake on the part of the civil court, as the 
sellers in question were mere Izaradars. He further argued that the erstwhile 
zemindars of this taluk were its only proprietors, which can be inferred from the fact 
that they granted lakhiraj lands in the mouzas. As I noted in the fourth chapter, the 
right to grant lakhiraj lands was considered as one of the most authentic markers of 
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proprietary rights by the government during the settlement of Cuttack. This right was 
evaluated primarily with regard to the issue of the proprietary privileges of the 
village-level landlords like serberakars, mokuddums, and pudhans. But as it is 
evident, in this renewed context of contests, they were strategically used by zemindars 
as well. This shows, once again, that the zemindars’ proprietary status was no longer 
guaranteed. It had to be wrenched out from a number of oppositional claims.  
The zemindars, especially the absentee ones, in the context of a generalized 
preference for direct forms of agrarian power, had lost their credibility amongst 
administrators as well. Responding to Radhamadhub’s appeal commissioner Mills 
noted that “The petitioner is a non-resident proprietor and like all of this class, in the 
Province of Cuttack refuses to acknowledge…the Mokuddumi tenure, it has been the 
uniform policy of these zemindars to reduce the mokuddums to the situation of 
farmers…Dwarkanath Tagore, and other influential zemindars, have in order to attain 
this object goaded the mokuddums to enter into farming engagements. This practice 
has been more particularly followed since the Board’s orders in regard to the 
Serberakars of Patamoondee were passed…and the zemindar relying on this precedent 
have left no means untried, to make their mokuddums hold from them as farmers.”38 
The logic of agrarian governance in this period was such that it pretty obviously 
enabled a precedent like that of Puttamoondee to be turned against the zemindars. 
Mills argued that the mere execution of a farming kubooleut should not be treated as 
adequate proof of the illegitimacy of claims to a superior proprietary status of village-
level landholders in relation to the zemindars. Instead, he pointed out that, “Each case 
must of course be decided on its merits but as many appeals of this kind will, if the 
present are successful be preferred, I may add, that I have looked on all Moostajiri 
Pottahs, which purport to have been executed subsequent to the Board’s orders on the 
Puttamoondee settlement, with much distrust and suspicion, and it is of great 
importance, to the protection of the mokuddum’s right, that the point should receive 
serious consideration.”39  
It is, in my opinion, not the general and abstract sense of the irreducible 
individuality of each case, declared to be inherent in the constitution of law, which 
generated the possibility for such radical differences in opinion over disputes of this 
kind. On the contrary, it is the particular and concrete set of preferences for either big 
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landlords or village-level landholders, expressed in the strategic reinvention of the 
figure of the farmer that determined the apparent dynamism of the legal field. As I 
will show in this section, such dynamism became the mark of these disputes in 
Cuttack. But this dynamism became generalized, due to a particular set of oppositions 
produced out of the structural logic of an agrarian imaginary. The dynamism was 
immanent to, and constituted by the structural logic. It did not reflect singularities of 
the disputes in question.  
Admitting Junkeebullubh’s statement about the purchase of the mouza as a 
mokuddumi to be true, the senior member of the Board argued that a settlement of the 
mouza was subsequently concluded as a moostajiri by the mutual consent of both 
parties. He pointed out that Junkeebullubh voluntarily executed moostajiri qubooleuts 
in 1840 and 1841. Mr. Lowis, junior member of the Board argued in favour of the 
mokuddumi rights on the basis of a number of points. He noted that the mouza was 
entered as a mokuddumi in the papers of the record-keeper of the Maratha 
government, Gopal Pundit, which certified the ancientness of the title. He further 
noted that moostajiri tenures are not saleable, yet this mouza was sold at a public 
auction. Responding to the senior member’s primary area of contention, Lowis 
pointed out that the voluntariness of Junkeebullubh in the execution of the farming 
kubooleuts is by no means established. He maintained that “the voluntary 
execution….besides being denied by the respondent is open to suspicion as having 
been given or invented after the orders in the Patamoondee settlement had set the 
ingenuity of all the zemindars in the province at work to destroy the undertenures in 
their respective zemindaries…”40 It is clear that the legal ground for settling such 
disputes, between zemindars and village-level landholders, revolved around the 
category of the “farmer”, which had been defined in a particular manner in the 
Puttamoondee  case. Quite obviously, advocates of both zemindari and mokuddumi 
rights had to work their way around this precedent. Since the potential for 
disagreements got entirely structured by the precedent, a deeply entrenched 
scepticism towards zemindars always allowed a pro-zemindar argument to be 
reinterpreted as a falsity inherent in the precedent. That is why, as I will elaborate, in 
almost all such disputes, facts presented in favour of the zemindars were understood 
to be already tinged with untruth and deceit. Thus, questions of truth and falsity in the 
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assessment of evidence was pre-figured in a particular manner by the structural logic 
of an agrarian imaginary, which had already classified village-level landholders as the 
most appropriate agent of property, power and “improvement”. 
Preferences for village-level landholders were so strong that practices of 
governance even invented new grounds of legitimacy, or redefined old ones, in order 
to establish the rights of these figures. In 1847, a dispute arose over the proprietary 
rights of mouza Koorkora and its under-tenure Kureempoore, part of taluk Randeah in 
Balasore. Gopeenath Dukhin Rae and others claimed these lands as their mokuddumi. 
Zemindar Anund Ballab Rae Mahashoy argued that they held the lands as mere 
farmers. In defense of his contention, the zemindar noted that the claims of the rival 
party were inconsistent. The evidence showed that when the taluk came under 
settlement in 1842 Gopeenath and others had claimed these lands first as mokuddums, 
then as serberakars, and finally again as mokuddums. The district officials were, 
however, convinced of the authenticity of their mokuddumi rights. As an appeal was 
put forward against these decisions in the civil court, the sudder ameen upheld the 
serberakary right of the defendants, dismissing their claims to a mokuddumi status. 
Against this decision both parties appealed, maintaining their respective original 
positions.  
Gopeenath and others denied ever having executed farming kubooleuts. They 
claimed to have held possession of mouza Koorkora as mouroosee mokuddums since 
1658 A.D., when it was granted to their ancestor Ramchunder Jenna, together with the 
title of Dukheen Rae, by the Rajah of Orissa. Kurreempore, they argued, was 
subsequently purchased. They further remarked that, “although it was true that they 
first claimed the right of possession as mokuddums, and afterwards as serberakars 
before the settlement officer, they were inveigled into doing so by the plaintiff, and 
when they discovered that he was endeavouring to deprive them of all title to the 
lands, they resolved on urging their original and genuine claim as mokuddums.”41 
Once again the zemindar’s assertions were presented as a general untruth, reflecting a 
standard strategy of deceit. This had become an accepted wisdom, which is why the 
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district judge also accepted it as “self-evident”42. But the judge ruled in favour of the 
mokuddumi claim on the basis of a number of other kinds of evidence. He traced the 
ancientness of the title from a variety of documents. These were a farakhuttee, 
executed in 1766 by Neeladhury Jena, described as one of the shareholders who 
relinquished his rights in the mokuddumi in favour of Radha Churn Dakhin Rae, 
which bore the seals of both the pergunnah cazee and the zemindar, a sunud, drawn 
by Joogul Kishore Ray Mohasoy, one of the former zemindars, in the name of 
Nursing Jena, a talpotro pottah granted in 1804 by Kishen Pershaud Ray Mohasoy, 
and the copy of Gopal Pundit’s jumma-wasil-bakee papers. The judge noted that all 
these documents, “…were filed before the settlement officer, and in all of them the 
ancestors of the applicants are styled mokuddums…”43 To this list, he also added a 
hookumnamah, issued by the ancestors of the mokuddums, conjointly with other local 
landlords and officers of the pergunnah, like the chowdree, canoongoe, and the 
gomashtah, declaring the grant of certain rent-free lands for the worship of village 
idols and maintenance of fakeers and Brahmins.  
Interestingly, the proprietary claim of the mokuddums in this case was 
granted, but its legitimacy was derived from a framework of the “political” which did 
not match the “political” of Cuttack that had been assembled over a number of sites in 
the earlier decades of governance. As it was highlighted in the fourth chapter, the 
mokuddums and pudhans of Cuttack were considered to be ancient proprietors of the 
soil. During the Paik rebellion, when these tenures were put to a rigorous scrutiny, it 
was argued that they “were the only class besides the sovereign who could claim a 
proprietary right in the soil…and…no middleman had anciently a right to intervene 
between them and the Government…”44 In these investigations, pudhans, or the 
village-level landholders found in the district of Khoordah, were considered to be 
representative of the most ancient form of proprietors of land. As Khoordah was the 
seat of the ancient Hindu Rajah of Orissa, it was inferred that pudhans got their 
proprietary titles from the ancient sovereign. It was further inferred that the 
mokuddums of the Moghulbundi, or the area which later came to be ruled by the 
Mughals, originally resembled the pudhans, in being ancient proprietors of land. 
Following a similar logic, when Andrew Sterling outlined a property-map for Cuttack, 
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he noted that the Mughal administration merely replaced the Oria names of these 
ancient proprietors with Persian ones, designating them as mokuddums, chowdrees 
and canoongoes.  
Although Stirling maintained that he could not find definitive proof of the 
existence of proprietary rights in the soil amongst these tenures, he surely identified a 
proprietary right in their offices, by virtue of which they controlled sale and purchase 
of lands in the district. Interestingly, all these genealogies of property in Cuttack, and 
subsequent ones, which were drawn up during the settlement, identified these village-
level landholders as ancient proprietors, who derived their proprietary titles from the 
ancient sovereign of Orissa. The mokuddums of mouza Koorkoorah seemed to 
confirm this classification by arguing that their title was acquired from the sovereign. 
But the judge upheld their title on the basis of evidence which established that the title 
was conferred by zemindars. As I noted in the earlier chapters, in the classificatory 
scheme of ancientness, zemindars were considered to be mere tax-collectors, and 
corrupt, recent outcrops, in contradistinction to the village-level landholders as the 
original proprietors of land. But in this case, the proprietary status of the mokuddums 
of Koorkoorah was vindicated by proof of recognition granted by the zemindars. This 
shows that a preference for these tenures had become deeply embedded in practices of 
governance, and they often redefined established classifications to uphold it.  
 Such village-level tenures were admitted even in situations where they could 
not be defined in terms of any of the available categories. In 1846, a dispute emerged 
over a lease of mouza Saontrapore granted by Maharajah Ramchunder Deo, who at 
that time held the title of the ancient Rajah of Orissa, and also acted as the 
superintendent of the temple of Juggernauth. It was supposed to be a farming lease for 
12 years, granted to Lalla Pursooram Rai. Lalla argued that as soon as he had 
collected a portion of the rents, Permessur Podhan, the zemindar, through whom the 
rents were realized previously, drove away the person he had deputed for collections.  
Permessur and others claimed that the Raja had no right to grant the lease to 
anyone. Further, they argued that the right to collect rents from the mouza belonged to 
them, as they held possession of it through their ancestors from time immemorial. The 
principal sudder ameen dismissed these contentions. He noted that in a different case, 
Permessur’s serberakary claims to Saontrapore had been rejected by the government, 
as the mehal in question was defined as government property, with the Rajah as its 
superintendent. The titles involved in this case lacked any clear definition. While 
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Lalla described Permessur as a zemindar and himself as a farmer, Permessur claimed 
to be the surburakar of the mouza, and argued that his title was independent of the 
Rajah’s will. Permessur and others argued that when the Mahrattas granted the mehal 
for the support of the idol they paid their rent to the temple authorities. Later, when it 
was transferred to the British government, and the Raja was appointed as the 
superintendent, they paid annually to him. Unlike the previous case, here it can be 
seen that village-level tenures often denied their dependence on the will of the 
sovereign. Permessur and others maintained that their right to the collections from the 
mouza surpassed the official recognition of any particular government. Eventually the 
district judge upheld their rights, but still he could not name the tenure.  
He noted that it is not clear whether “whether they are to be viewed in the light 
of mokuddums, serberakars, or farmers…”45 However, on the basis of documentary 
proof of their undisturbed possession since the time of the Mahrattas, they were 
granted a prescriptive right which was “…superior to that of khoodkasht or thanee 
ryuts, though they may not possess a proprietary or transferable right in the 
mouza…so long as they continue to pay the customary or proper rent, the rajah…has 
no power to oust them or to farm the mouza to any other party…And although the 
appellants hold no pottah or certificate, either defining the nature of their tenure, or 
showing that they are entitled to possession at a fixed jumma, the non-possession of 
such a document can in no way prejudice their claim to possession…”46 It is evident 
from this case that the government in order to maintain all forms of ancient village-
level tenures, did not mind reconfiguring the established classificatory frames, or, at 
times, even discarding them. It seemed to be not even important to be able to define 
the tenure according to established categories, as long as its ancientness was 
established. 
There were many more directions in which such redefinitions went. Quotidian 
practices of governance even challenged the central premise of differentiation 
between village-level proprietary tenures and contractual farming ones. In 1847 
Hurree Naik petitioned the district court claiming mouza Neelconna in taluk 
Bulbhudderpore as his hereditary mokuddumi. The defendants were Rajnarain 
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Chowdree, who had purchased half of the taluk, and other zemeendars, namely 
Kasseenath Chowdree, Rughoonath Chowdree, and Koontilla Dey, who had 
mortgaged the other half to Rajnarain. They simply stated that the plaintiff was 
merely a farmer. They based their assertions on the jummabundee accounts of the 
mouza of 1804, where it was entered as the ijarah of Bhagut Maintee, some 
moostajiree kuboleeuts said to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of the 
zemeendar from 1831-33, and an ikrarnamah of 1827, on account of an arrear of rent, 
which was supposedly signed by the plaintiff as a moostajir.  
The district judge upheld the mokuddumi rights on the basis of a host of 
documents, issued at different times by different authorities of the locality, which 
endorsed the mokuddumi title. But more importantly, the judge did not dismiss the 
validity of the farming kubooleuts that the zemindars had presented in defense of their 
claim. Rather, he argued that, “the execution of such kubooleuts even if they were all 
genuine…cannot be considered as a relinquishment on the part of the plaintiff of his 
mokuddumi claim…”47 The mokuddumi title, he thought, had been sufficiently 
established by other documents. He also pointed out that, “If it had been satisfactorily 
shown by the defendants, that the line of succession had been interrupted, or that the 
mouza had ever entirely lapsed from the hands of the plaintiff’s family, and that on 
recovering possession, they executed farming kubooleuts, the case would be 
different…it has been satisfactorily proved that the plaintiff and his ancestors have 
been in undisturbed possession…in my opinion amply refutes the defendant’s 
assertion that the plaintiff was only a farmer or tenant at will…”48 Interestingly, what 
we see here is that the earlier form of critical engagement with these disputes, which 
was structured primarily in terms of a perceived falsity, or possibility of deceit, 
inherent in the problem, had changed into an outright reinterpretation of the problem, 
based on the rejection of the central premise of distinction between “farmers” and 
“mokuddums”, namely, the short-term kubooleuts. Many more documents, belonging 
to periods of both pre-British and British governments, were considered authentic 
markers of mokuddumi titles. These were supported by proof of undisturbed 
possession. 
                                                 
47
January 15, 1850, No. 15 of 1849, Appeal from the decision of Tarakanth Bidya Sagur, Principal 
Sudder Ameen of Cuttack, dated 29
th
 December 1848, Hurry Naik, (Plaintiff) Appellant versus 
Rajnarain Rai Chowdree, Kassenath Das Chowdree, Rugoonth Chowdree, and Musst. Koontilla Dey, 
widow of Somnath Chowdree, deceased (Defendants) Respondents, Bengal Zillah Courts Decisions, 
Cuttack, 1850, 3.  
48
Ibid, 4.  
 229 
But there was hardly a consensus over documents as well. It has been noted 
earlier that the papers of Gopal Pundit, the central authority of revenue accounts from 
the Maratha period, was used in most of these disputes to prove the ancientness of 
mokuddumis.
49
 However, when this ubiquitous standard of authenticity was used by 
zemindars against mokuddumi claims, it got challenged. In 1849, Sheeb Churn 
Saontra and Gobind Churn Saontra petitioned the district court, stating that mouza 
Juggernathpore in taluk Mobarackpore, Balasore, was their mouroosee mokuddumi. 
Oordhub Churn Das and Unoopram Mhaintee based their opposition to this claim, 
amongst other documents, on Gopal Pundit’s papers where the mouza was allegedly 
recorded as paikasht. The judge upheld the mokuddumi claim, after examining and 
challenging all the documents presented against it. With regard to Gopal Pundit’s 
papers, he noted that, “that the said accounts are not only unauthenticated by any 
signature whatever, but it is well known that abuses of various kinds have been 
practised with respect to them…”50 He noted that these papers have been accepted as 
important testimonials in disputes over ancient tenures, but only when supplemented 
by other corroborative evidence. In my opinion, such a critical perspective on these 
papers was somewhere tied to the fact that in the present instance they were being 
used against mokuddums. It is true that in other disputes as well these papers were 
never taken to be a definitive proof of the ancientness of a village-level proprietary 
right. But at the same time, they were not submitted to any kind of critical scrutiny 
where they were used in favour of mokuddumi claims. It is evident that a highly 
favourable attitude towards such village-level landholders had become embedded in 
the discursive practices of governance. It will be interesting to see where such 
landholders were placed, and how they stylized themselves with reference to the 
classificatory framework of proprietary rights that got structured over various sites, in 
and out of Cuttack, in the first half of the nineteenth century. We will take a quick 
look at that in the next section, before developing a critical perspective on the 
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historiographical treatment of the category of “under-tenures” or “intermediaries”, as 
it emerges from these discussions. 
        
Dependent locations: moving back and forth between generalizations and 
localizations 
 
It is evident from the discussion in this chapter that village-level landholders, 
like mokuddums, serberakars and pudhans, fought for an independent proprietary 
status vis-à-vis the zemindars in these disputes. I have argued that their assertions 
were admitted by the government, as the prevailing classificatory frame of property 
defined them as both legitimate and appropriate proprietors, in contradistinction to 
zemindars, who were seen as inauthentic proprietors and wasteful landholders. But 
this did not engender a radical removal of the zemindar from the shared matrix of 
proprietary-rights on land. Practices of agrarian governance, in tune with the 
dispersed framing of the “political”, maintained an entire web of proprietary rights on 
land, while significantly redefining the position of the village-level landholders in it. 
There were, however, limits to this redefinition. The superiority of village-level 
tenures was crucially circumscribed by points at which they remained dependent on 
zemindars. As and when these boundaries were drawn, the juridical category of 
“under-tenures” was used to describe, in a comparative mode, the village-level 
tenures of Cuttack. I have shown in one of the earlier chapters that tenures specific to 
a locality were always necessarily debated and defined in a comparative register, 
which enabled the category of property to be assembled out of concurrent 
localizations. In this section I will show that, in the same vein, the village-level 
tenures of Cuttack were often recast in the light of another comparative field, which 
was that of “intermediaries” and “under-tenures” in Bengal. 
In 1849, Narain Mahapater claimed Rs. 51 as rent of a portion of land situated 
in mouza Irda, taluk Gujrajpore, from Mahadeb Das. Narain argued that Mahadeb 
cultivated the land as a pahee ryot, and had not paid rent for three years. In response, 
Mahadeb denied that he was a pahee ryot, stating that the taluk was his zemindaree. 
He further pointed out that Irda was a mokuddumi mouza belonging to Kirpasindoo 
Swain and others, who granted him, on payment of Rs. 15, an istemraree pottah (by 
which a land can be held at a fixed rent) for 5 mauns of land in the mouza, at an 
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annual jumma of 1 Rupee.
51
 While the moonsiff of Cuttack rejected the evidence in 
favor of the istemraree pottah, the district judge accepted it, dismissing Narain’s 
claim. Narain appealed to the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, arguing that since he had 
purchased the mokudumee of Kirpasindhoo Swain which was sold for arrears of rent, 
the istemraree tenure was no longer valid. As the case came back to the district court 
for a re-trial, the judge upheld Narain’s appeal, declaring that the istemraree pottah 
had become void by the sale of the mokudumee. He noted that, “Although it is no 
where, that I am aware of, definitely laid down, that sales held in execution of decrees 
for arrears of rent, under Regulation VIII of 1831, are to have the same effect with 
regard to the cancelment of all leases or under tenures created by the defaulting 
tenant, as sales for arrears of Government revenue held under Act I, 1845, I am of 
opinion that with reference to the provisions of Regulation VIII of 1819, which 
declares that in the event of a sale of a putnee taluk for arrears of rent, all such 
incumbrances, the acts of the defaulters, become cancelled…”52  
It is evident that the decision was arrived at by comparing mokuddumis of 
Cuttack with putnee taluks of Bengal. However, the judge also admitted that such a 
comparison was difficult to make because “mokuddumi…is a superior kind of tenure 
to that of a putnee taluk, inasmuch that the zemindars themselves possess the power 
of creating putnee tenures, and they possess no such power with regard to 
mokuddumis…”53 This is precisely how the force of comparison operated in the 
governance of property. The comparative analytic was such that it enabled 
generalizations, despite localizations. That is why, although Cuttack mokuddums 
were considered different from Bengal putneedars, their proprietary capacities were 
ultimately circumscribed in the light of similarities with the latter.  
In positing the distinction between mokuddums and putnidars, the judge also 
commented on the mode in which these two “under-tenures” were related to 
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zemindars. He emphasized that mokuddumees, unlike putnee taluks, cannot be 
created by zemindars. But in his judgment, he assessed the mokuddumi as an “under-
tenure”, or a dependent tenure, similar to a putni taluk which, therefore, did not have 
the right to create further tenures. The structure of dependence between 
mokuddumis/serberakaris and zemindaris got elaborated over a range of disputes in 
Cuttack. For example, when Kuroonee Jenna wanted to sell a portion of his 
mouroosee serberakari tenure, the judge remarked that he had a right to do so 
irrespective of the zemindar’s consent.54 Bhugwan Rai Singh argued that when Pudlab 
Senapatty and others, mokuddums in his estate failed to pay rent in 1847, he went 
ahead and attached their property. He further noted that once the rents due were 
collected directly by him, he restored the mokuddums to their positions, and asked the 
ryots to pay to them. But again in the following year they failed to pay the rents, and 
Bhugwan sued them.  
The principal sudder ameen of Cuttack dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, 
arguing that, “according to Regulation VIII of 1819, he had no right to dispossess the 
defendants and collect the rent himself…”55 The district judge, however, challenged 
the ameen’s decision. He pointed out that the ameen misinterpreted the legislation. He 
argued that, “…in Clause 11, Section XVIII of the said law it is clearly laid down, 
that when a summary suit for arrears of rent alleged to be due may have been 
instituted against an under-tenant, it shall be competent to the party who may have 
instituted it to…attach and collect the rent from the cultivators. And as the plaintiff 
asserted that he sued the defendants…for the rent of 1254…the first issue on which 
the principal sudder ameen should have required proof was whether the plaintiff did 
or did not sue for the rent of 1254?—because if he did, his subsequent attachment of 
the tenure was perfectly legal…”56  
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Once again, it is noticeable that the mokuddum is described as an “under-
tenant” in relation to the zemindar, and the latter is allowed to independently exercise 
a major proprietary function, namely that of rent-collection, if the mokuddums failed 
to perform it. This was also another instance of directness in power, which the 
zemindars tried to deploy whenever they got an opportunity to do so. But the 
mokuddums challenged these contours of dependence, by presenting counterclaims of 
directness. And in doing so, they consciously imbricated themselves in a wider, 
comparative field of land-tenures, denying the specificities of locality, and claiming 
lineages of generality. This also reconfirms my earlier arguments about the category 
of rent. The situation outlined above demonstrates that “rent”, unlike its Ricardian 
formulation, defined the complexities of the field of the “political”. In this case, while 
the sudder ameen argued that the zemindar cannot dispossess the mokuddums and 
collect rents directly, suggesting the independent proprietary capacities of that tenure, 
the judge argued that if the zemindar sued the mokuddums for non-payment of rent, 
he can attach the property and collect the rents directly, even if he is not allowed to 
dispossess. For this statement, one of the Bengal regulations was quoted where such a 
tenure had been defined as an under-tenure, suggesting certain restrictions on the kind 
of independence the sudder ameen found in it. But the judge also suggested that, if it 
be proved that the mokuddums collected the rents, it had to be inferred that they got 
back into possession. So, a complex case of possessory and proprietary rights were 
sketched out by the category of rent.  
But let me now turn to the issue of comparisons. Comparisons, and interplays 
between generalities and localization, got reinstituted from a different direction in 
Cuttack when it was claimed that mokuddumi mouza Bingarpore was not an “under-
tenure” of Kotdes zemindarry. The mokuddums, Damoodur and Kirtebas wished to 
hold it as an independent estate, paying directly and separately to the government. 
The plaintiffs argued that the Kotdes zemindarry, in which the mouza is situated, was 
formerly the property of the Rajahs of Orissa. During their rule, the plaintiff’s 
ancestor, Gopal Das Punda acquired Bingarpore as a grant, for which he used to pay a 
small quit rent to the Rajahs. But when the Moguls came to rule the region, their 
nazim assessed it and converted it into a mokudumi. The plaintiff’s ancestors, at that 
time, retained the proprietary right, and paid rent for the mouza directly to the 
government. After this, the Maratha rule began, during which he continued to pay rent 
direct into the government treasury.  
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Over the several years of Maratha rule, the plaintiff’s ancestors paid rent to 
different officials of the government, including the son of the Amil, Narain Chotra, 
for a brief while. When the British arrived, they initially paid, as before, straight to the 
government. But in 1806, Narain Chotra somehow managed to pose as the zemindar 
of Kotdes, and offered the collector 1000 cahuns in excess of the jumma paid by 
Bhugwan Das, the plaintiff’s father, for Bingarpore. The collector at that time 
attached it, with other mokuddumis and villages, to Kotdes, refusing to hear Bhugwan 
Das’s claim to independence and separation. Subsequent to Narain Chotra’s death, the 
plaintiffs paid rent to Ketrabas Mungraj, the zemindar, holding on to their dependent 
capacity, awaiting the future settlement. When they put forward the claim for 
separation to the settlement officer, he referred them to the civil court.  
The defendant refused to admit any right of the plaintiff to hold Bingarpore 
independently, arguing that it was always part of the Kotdes zemindary. He also 
denied that the plaintiff possessed any mokudumi title, stating that “as the Mahratta 
Government, which was despotic and tyrannical, conferred the entire estate, Kotdes, 
on his ancestors, it matters not what rights any other persons might previously have 
possessed therein, as they were all cancelled by the said grant…”57 This statement is 
suggestive. It shows that constitutive linkages between “despotism” and “property”, in 
defining the “political”, were not drawn only by British administrators. They were 
strategically deployed by local landlords as well. In this case, the zemindar seemed to 
argue that since despotism, or absolute powers of the sovereign, was the foundation of 
property, the variety of ancient interests attached to land got overrun in the violence 
of its originary moment. I have shown that within British administrative discourse, or 
different framings of the “political”, the relation between “despotism” and “property” 
was understood in different ways. While James Mill characterized pre-British 
governments in terms of a despotic practice which destroyed all forms of property in 
land, other administrators, and Richard Jones, admitted “despotism” more as a 
potential than as a regularized practice, which allowed them to identify different 
tenures in different localities as embodying traces of a variety of proprietary rights. 
However, the zemindar in this case, echoing Mill, defined despotism as a successful 
practice of the Maratha government.  
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After going through the details of the case, the principal sudder ameen argued 
that the provisions of Rule XI of Regulation XII of 1805, which declared that “…in 
all cases in which the revenue of a village had for upwards of five years past, been 
paid direct to Government by the hereditary mokuddum, the settlement of such village 
should be made with the hereditary mokuddum…”58 should be the basis for the 
decision. In this instance, he pointed out that although the plaintiffs possessed the title 
of a mouroosee mokuddumee in the mouza, and paid revenue direct to the 
government from 1801 to 1805, it was not proved that they did so for upwards of five 
years prior to the date of the proclamation, that was 15
th
 September 1804. It was 
found that till 1800 they paid through the zemindars. Accordingly, he dismissed their 
claim. 
Against this decision, the mokuddums argued that their claims should not be 
judged by the Regulation XII of 1805, which was meant specifically for Cuttack. 
They pointed out that in this case “…all other laws and regulations promulgated for 
the trial of civil suits in the provinces of Bengal and Orissa were applicable, and that 
more especially, according to Clauses 3 and 4, Section 5, Regulation VIII of 1793, 
their claim to separation had been established.”59 The regulation quoted by the 
mokuddums declared that the revenue demand should be settled with “the actual 
proprietors of the soil, of whatever description, whether zemindars, talukdars, or 
chowdris.”60 The play of generalization and localization continued. In this case, it was 
the mokuddums of Cuttack, who refused to be classified strictly as an incomparably 
local form of landholders. Instead they demanded to be recognized as similar to the 
chowdris of Bengal, thereby, also suggesting, like Harrington, that provisions 
admitting a variety of landholders, other than the zemindars, as actual proprietors of 
the soil, were embedded within the regulations of the permanent settlement itself. This 
shows that their claim for an independent proprietary status was couched within a 
self-stylization that resisted the definition of the “local” as an irreducibly specific 
form of the “political”. By drawing legitimacy for such a self-representation from the 
permanent settlement regulations of Bengal Presidency, these mokuddums challenged 
the particular discursive deployment of the twin specificities of time and space, by 
                                                 
58
Ibid.  
59
Ibid.  
60
F.G. Wigley (ed.), The Eastern Bengal and Assam Code,  In Three Volumes Containing The 
Regulations and Local Acts in Force in the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, Volume 1, Calcutta, 
1907, 28.    
 236 
which, as I argued earlier, forms of property in different localities were arranged in 
the first half of the nineteenth century. While their mode of negotiation was crafted in 
the language of the prevalent discursive classification of property, it simultaneously 
overturned the fundamental tools of that operation, by reconfiguring the established 
relation between generalizations and localizations. Such were the various limits of the 
independent proprietary position of the village-level landholders in Cuttack, each of 
which, in the process of contestation, opened up ground for new interplays between 
generalizations and localizations.  
 
Different alliances, same aims: the unending games of power 
 
Contests between zemindars and village-level landholders, however, did not exhaust 
the field of power around land in Cuttack. There were many more disputes over 
proprietary privileges between these groups and landholders of other grades. 
According to the particular dynamics of each dispute, alliances and enmities were 
developed between these landholders. But once again, in each of these changing 
situations, superior landholders always tried to oust, or disempower inferior ones, in 
order to achieve a mastery over the “local”, that is, be enabled to exercise a direct 
form of power over land. As I have argued in this chapter, directness, as a form of 
power, defined the “local”, and emerged as the quintessential logic of governance of 
the “political” in the first half of the nineteenth century. Among the several 
landholders in Cuttack as well, attempts to achieve directness marked the domain of 
disputes. Not only did this logic characterize the conflicts between the more powerful 
landholders, it shaped strategies of struggle between every member of this field of 
power. 
In the dispute over the proprietary right of mouza Mundalow, pergunnah 
Asseressur, the usual locations of power seemed to be in disarray. Here the 
mokuddums, contrary to their usual position, acted as rent-payers to a lakhirajdar, 
who, in turn, was the rent-receiver. The mouza was granted in 1782 to Rajesh Bhutt as 
a rent-free holding. He was succeeded by his son Juggunath, who being childless, 
adopted a son, called Rughoonath. The latter died suddenly of snake-bite in 1839. At 
this point the dispute arose over the proprietary right of the mouza. While 
Rughoonath’s aunt, Nulleta Bhai claimed the mouza as her property, mokuddum 
Bhowree Naik argued that since “…he had all along held the estate as mokuddum, 
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upon a jumma of 1200 Kahans of Cowries, which has been paid from the date of the 
Lakhiraj sunnud, to the Lakhirajdar.”61, the proprietary right should devolve to him. 
There were two issues at stake here. On the one hand, the government tried to find 
out, through pundits, whether a Bremutter land could pass on to a person who is not a 
lineal descendant of Juggunath Bhutt, to whom the lands were originally bequeathed 
by the donor. On the other, the mokuddum’s claim that the mouza formed part of his 
mokuddumi had to be validated, as Nulleta Bhai stated that he was merely a 
gomashtah. The matter could not be settled as opposing decisions were passed by 
different officials. While the deputy collector admitted the mokuddum’s claim, the 
commissioner cancelled it, and ordered that Nulleeta should be put in possession as 
the rightful proprietor. Eventually the case was sent for further review. 
Even without knowing the final judgment on the case, it can be inferred that 
the mokuddums, as rent-receivers, were involved in a subordinate capacity with the 
mouza, which they tried to get rid off, as soon as an opportunity arose of questioning 
the proprietary status of the lakhirajdar. Just as the zemindars tried to do with the 
mokuddums, here, the mokuddums reproduced the same strategy of ousting the 
lakhirajdar—who, in this case, was posited as an “intermediary” vis-à-vis the 
mokuddums—and effecting direct power over land. The particular constellation of 
power at play in this case also reformulated the category of the village. The “village” 
was imagined as a field of power, all members of which, through different forms of 
relations to land, remained under the general domination of the village-proprietor. In 
this imagination, the lakhirajdar was understood as one such bonafide member of the 
“village”. However, as this dispute revealed, the lakhirajdar was the proprietor of a 
village, and the mokuddum, or the village-proprietor, was subordinate to him.  
The language of the battles between zemindars and village-level landholders 
got rearticulated in an amazingly exact manner when the lakhirajdar of mouza 
Oopurbust wanted to oust the pudhans of the village, claiming that they were merely 
contractual farmers. The village had been measured and settled by a government 
official in 1830 at Rs. 225-8-18 which the pudhans engaged for, and paid to the 
lakhirajdar for eleven years. At the end of this period, the lakhirajdar petitioned the 
authorities wishing to get rid of the pudhans “…on the grounds of the term of their 
engagement having expired, and of their being only farmers, and to have new 
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engagements taken from the ryots to pay their rent directly to himself…”62 The 
demand of the lakhirajdar was admitted by the deputy collector, whose decision was 
confirmed by the collector. Accordingly, the lakhirajdar, after the new settlement 
increased the rents of the mouza. At this point a thanee ryot of the mouza instituted a 
suit against him, arguing that earlier when he paid rent to the pudhans, he had to pay 
less, but the new settlement makes him pay more to the lakhirajdar. The pudhans, in 
combination with the thanee ryot, claimed that the lakhirajdar is only entitled to a 
fixed amount of rent, that is, the “sudder jumma assessed on the village from them.”63         
It is evident that the persistent logic of removing “intermediaries” as 
obstructions in the path of a direct exercise of power was at play here. But it was no 
longer an exclusively governmental discourse; rather, it was being shared by all actors 
in the locality. Thus, the figure of the “intermediary” changed according to the 
specificities of conflict in different contexts. The lakhirajdar was entitled to an 
amount from the land, which is the full rental, including the amount classified as 
revenue, otherwise payable to the state. But due to the existence of the pudhans he got 
a truncated amount, after deducting the allowances of the former. Since what is 
involved in this dispute is a rent-free land, it is to be kept in mind that for this land the 
state did not receive its share of the rent, categorized as revenue. This share went to 
the lakhirajdar, who, in this dispute, therefore, wished to exercise a total and direct 
authority over its property, by extracting the full dues from it, and, in the process, 
destroying the shared and plural matrix of rights that was perceived as proprietary, 
and upheld in their respective locations by strategies of governance. In this case the 
district judge eventually ruled that the pudhans also had a proprietary right in the 
mouza, and could not be ousted. He noted that the settlement had to be formed with 
them, although there could be a re-assessment of the assets of the mouza. However, 
he insisted that under no circumstances can the lakhirajdar collect directly from the 
ryots. Proprietary rights were retained as plural and distributed. This also reflected the 
advantages gained out of such plurality by lower-scale landholders/cultivators.  
Thus it can be argued against Sirajul Islam’s conclusions, that tiers of 
landholding did not always exercise pressure on the cultivators, because, unlike the 
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permanently-settled regions of Bengal, in Cuttack, where village-level landholders of 
various kinds were recognized by the government as authentic proprietors, and the 
mofussil jumma was settled with them, the difference between the sudder jumma and 
the mofussil jumma increased with greater numbers of such legitimate 
“intermediaries”. And this situation was known to the ryot, who could therefore 
mobilize it to his own advantage. The more such “intermediaries”, the less the ryot 
had to pay as rent, which is why, in this case, the removal of the pudhans translated 
into an increase of the rent for the thanee ryot, and he united with the pudhans to resist 
the directness of power aimed at by the lakhirajdar.
64
 
Sirajul Islam, echoing Ratnalekha Ray, explains the rise to prominence of 
particular agrarian groups in Bengal in the early decades of the nineteenth century in 
terms of purely indigenous structures and processes. These groups, namely, the 
jotedars, guntidars, mandals, pradhans, have been categorized by both scholars, as 
“intermediaries”. Such a labelling is based on the assumption that these groups were 
obstructions to a more direct form of power in agrarian relations between big 
landlords and small cultivators. Accordingly, Sirajul Islam argues that such 
“intermediaries” were a non-productive, extractive presence on land, and necessarily 
detrimental to the interests of the peasant cultivators. The growth of these groups is 
also seen, by both Islam and Ray, as an unintended effect of colonial misperceptions. 
Both scholars, therefore, view the history of agrarian relations in Bengal as a 
relentless struggle between the colonial state and these proliferating “intermediaries”. 
They explain the powerful position of such village-level landholders in different areas 
of Bengal as the development of indigenous forces, lying outside the discursive 
structure of colonial governance.   
In this dissertation, I argue, that village-level landholders could assume 
importance in the topography of agrarian power-relations, not due to the overturning 
of colonial governmental force by indigenous equations of landed power. On the 
contrary, it was the emergent discursive production of the “political”, out of a 
particular articulation of variously reconfigured political-economic frameworks, 
which guaranteed these landholders a privileged position amongst a number of 
agrarian groups. Not only did this happen in Cuttack, or the North-western Provinces, 
where the “village-zemindar” was favoured over the big landlords as the more 
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authentic proprietor and a better improver, but the same logic could also be viewed as 
operational in the permanently-settled areas of Bengal, where, as early as 1812, with 
the legal recognition of the Pattani tenure in the Burdwan division, certain forms of 
village-level landholding got recognized juridically as authentic proprietary titles. As 
Islam notes, by this regulation all Pattani tenures became “…heritable, transferable by 
sale, gift or otherwise, at the discretion of the holder and he would be treated in the 
courts as if he were the zamindar.”65 This shows that even in the older areas of 
Bengal, right from the beginning of the nineteenth century, juridical measures started 
redefining so-called “intermediaries”, like Pattanidars, as authentic proprietary 
landlords.  
By calling these landholders “intermediaries”, therefore, Ray and Islam 
reproduce the same colonial logic, of a desired directness of power, which marked the 
governance of the “political” in this period. As I am arguing in this chapter, this 
discursive logic was shared by all actors in the locality; all of them acted within the 
framework of this discourse. The state, the zemindars, the village-level landholders, 
the lakhirajdars, the thanee ryots—each of these landholders, depending on the 
specific dynamics of the situation, wished to attain a directness of power, and 
described other contestants in the field, as obstructive “intermediaries”.66  
The need to maintain plurality in proprietary rights engendered multiple and 
shifting alliances between various kinds of landholders in Cuttack. These alliances 
often upset familiar equations between zemindars, farmers, mokuddums and ryots. 
The case I am going to discuss offers such an example—of complex and layered 
equations between these landholders giving rise to a property intrigue which went 
beyond the usual calculus of power. In 1849 Nubeen Mahapatur instituted a suit 
claiming possession of a 4 annas share of moqudumee mouza Bayhurpore, worth Rs. 
1512-4-7. The plaintiff stated that when the mouza was advertised for sale in 1843, 
the mokuddums engaged to pay him Rs. 59-2 within a month, and executed an 
instalment bond agreeing to pay the remaining amount with interest in the course of 
ten years. In a few years time, by 1847, as the mokuddums failed to pay the 
instalments, Nubeen sold an eight annas share of the mouza to others and himself 
purchased the remaining eight annas share. Thereafter he collected some rents from 
                                                 
65
Ibid, 27, emphasis mine.  
66
See Ratnalekha Ray, Change in Bengal Agrarian Society: 1760-1850, New Delhi, 1979, and Islam, 
Bengal Land Tenure.  
 241 
that portion, and applied to get his name registered as the proprietor of an eight annas 
share of the mouza. At this point he was told by the Canoongoe of the pergunnah that 
Gocoolanund Mhaintee, the nephew of the former mokuddums, was in possession of 
the property on a lease granted by them since 1847. Nubeen’s claim to the proprietary 
title of the mouza was dismissed by the deputy collector, but later upheld by the 
collector on appeal.  
Now the zemindar in whose estate the mouza was situated, sued Nubeen for 
arrears of rent, and having obtained a decree, caused a four annas share of his eight 
annas to be sold. In order to get the rent due from the remaining four annas, Nubeen 
sued the ryots, but Gocoolanund Mhaintee stated that he held the lease of one half of 
the mouza. The deputy collector dismissed Gocoolanund’s claim, following which the 
ryots appealed to the commissioner against this decision, who upheld their appeal. 
This led Nubeen to institute the present suit, claiming the proprietary rights over a 
four annas share of the mouza. Nubeen argued that, “…if Gocoolanund Mhaintee had 
obtained a lease of the property before it was purchased by him, he would have 
represented the fact at the time of the sale…and the ryots, instead of stating that they 
had paid the rents…to the former mokuddums, when he demanded it from them, 
would have said that they had paid it to the ijaradar; and the ijaradar should have paid 
rent to him, the plaintiff, or, if he would not have accepted it, to the zemindar…and 
not having done so, it was clear that the zemindar and the former mokuddums to 
defraud him had prepared the ijara pottah in favor of Gocoolanund Mhaintee, and 
inserted his name in the putwarry papers…67 Nubeen thought that every stakeholder 
in the dispersed networks of power embedded in the mouza conspired against him. 
From his perspective, the zemindar, the mokuddums, the farmer and the ryots had a 
shared interest in preventing him from acquiring any kind of control over the mouza.  
Quite obviously, the zemindar, the mokuddums, and the farmer denied these 
allegations of collusion. However, the principal sudder ameen refused to accept the 
claim of the farmer. He noted that the ijara pottah was not a genuine document. 
Moreover, he argued that since the mokuddums had mortgaged the property to 
Nubeen, “they were restricted by the terms of the deed of mortgage from alienating or 
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disposing of it, their granting a 21 years’ lease of it was tantamount to selling the 
property, and consequently the lease could not be upheld.”68 The ameen decreed in 
favor of Nubeen, and his decision was upheld by the district judge. Conspiracy or not, 
it is quite evident that Nubeen faced opposition from all quarters as he tried to gain 
control over the mouza. Existent landholders, of different ranks, seemed to have 
suddenly lost the usual enmities amongst themselves when it came to resisting 
Nabeen. That is why the mokuddums, in this case, did not try to fight a farmer; 
neither did the zemindar get into an overt conflict with the mokuddums. Even the 
ryots, instead of paying to Nubeen, paid to the former mokuddums, despite the fact 
that they claimed to have leased out the mouza to the farmer. Once again, it was a 
conflict between directness and dispersal of power. The only difference was that in its 
enactment unusual solidarities, and shifting alliances were developed. Governance 
functioned in its usual manner, by retaining both plurality and directness, by 
discriminating between their legitimate and illegitimate formations. Nubeen was 
granted his right, which inserted him, as one more stakeholder, along with the 
zemindar and the ryots, over the proprietary rights of the mouza. But at the same time, 
the mokuddums and the ijaradar were carefully dissociated from this matrix, due to 
their illegitimate locations in it. In this case, the other contestants in the field used the 
dispersal of power to their advantage in order to prevent the entry of yet another 
claimant to their domain of control. This shows that both dispersal and directness, as 
strategies, were used by different actors to generate changing alliances and shifting 
aims in the by-lanes of disputes in the locality.   
        
Conclusion 
 
This chapter executes an important methodological move. It completes the 
perspective of the dissertation. It brings us back to a locality, and its intimate, 
quotidian affairs. Through this chapter, I wish to reiterate an important theoretical 
point. Analyzing agrarian power in British India in terms of an apparatus, or an 
interconnected discursive space, does not require abandoning a close scrutiny of 
localities. On the contrary, this dissertation has been all about localities. But it has 
refused to adopt the locality as the analytical perspective. I have chosen, therefore, to 
                                                 
68
Ibid, 41.  
 243 
travel with, to, along, and through localities. This analytical strategy has allowed me 
to understand both what happened in the corridors of agrarian power in Cuttack, and 
what happened elsewhere which was important for Cuttack.  In this chapter, therefore, 
I have tried to make sense of a gamut of events, peoples, conflicts, and ideas 
occurring in Cuttack over the first fifty years of the nineteenth century in terms of 
their conversations—both congruent and incongruent—with practices outside 
Cuttack. By taking a deep plunge into these events, I have been able to track the 
emergent configurations of power in Cuttack. The specificities of these conflicts, in 
turn, have enabled me to better understand the nature of the process by which the 
“political” and the “local” came together to determine the topography of agrarian 
power in British India. 
This chapter shows that the twin articulation of the “political”, of dispersal and 
directness of power, fought with each other in localities. The foregrounding of the 
figure of the “village-zemindar”, as a reconfigured deployment of the vision of the 
ancient ryot as the authentic peasant-proprietor, became crucial in determining in 
which direction agrarian power would flow in a locality. Events in Cuttack clearly 
bear out its implications. The governmental urge to uphold direct forms of power as 
authentic ones were shared by all landholders of the locality, as they tried to strike 
each other off from the field. Each claimed authenticity in the language of immediacy, 
depicting the other either as an obstructive, illegitimate, “intermediary”, or as a 
wasteful, inauthentic, contractual “farmer”. While village-level landholders were 
certainly favoured by the government in these battles, due to the presence of the other 
articulation of the “political” which construed agrarian power in India as dispersed, 
there could not be a total victory of the village forces over the big landlords. But the 
power-equations of the locality certainly tended to drift towards the supremacy of the 
former. By the end of the nineteenth century, therefore, the “village”, with its 
attendant figure-heads, became the principal field of power in a locality. Henceforth, 
as the conclusion to this dissertation will argue, the “village” became even more 
important, as new markers of power emerged in the second half of the century with 
their roots in the “village”. The scope of the agrarian widened, its power-bearers 
increased and localities got characterized with new relations of power around land; 
the structure of the “political” which was set up over the first fifty years of the 
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nineteenth century served as the foundation for new kinds of differentiation, 
heterogeneity, and diversification. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Rewriting production 
 
The revenue-production, politics-economics separation 
 
Why is this dissertation about agrarian production, when all that it seems to discuss is 
agrarian power in localities? This has been posed as a question, and answered in 
different ways over six chapters. But in concluding, I will try to restate theoretically 
the argument about production. My perspective on production speaks directly to the 
dominant historiographical characterisation of agrarian affairs in the nineteenth 
century. I have looked at agrarian societies over the first half of the nineteenth-
century. Almost all agrarian histories of British India view agrarian governance in this 
period as delinked from, and also, opposed to, production. Governmental engagement 
with agrarian production, these histories argue, began from the late nineteenth 
century. This thematic separation of periods, therefore, provides us with a definition 
of what these histories consider as agrarian production. The same definition also tells 
us what marked the first half of the nineteenth century—something which is different 
from, in being antithetical to, agrarian production. In the first half of the nineteenth 
century, these histories argue, the government was solely interested in the extraction 
of revenue. The development of different models of settlement in the different regions 
of British India during this period reflected this agenda. These were basically 
programs of revenue-generation from land. To execute these programs, the 
government created its agents of extraction in the various localities. These local 
collaborators emerged as the power-holders of these agrarian societies. In contrast to 
this, later in the nineteenth-century, the government became more interested in 
cultivating knowledge about the practices of agricultural production. It developed an 
entire infrastructure in order to promote methods and implements of production. The 
domain of production was assembled as a distinct object of knowledge and 
intervention over the second half of the nineteenth century, and it continued with 
greater vigor into the first half of the twentieth century. 
The clearest statement of this thematic division of the agrarian past comes 
from David Ludden. In the light of this argument, Ludden remarks about the early 
nineteenth century: “The politics of revenue overshadowed the economics of 
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production in the Company’s relation to agrarian India.”1 This statement, I argue, 
captures the central premise of the differentiation between “revenue” and 
“production”. Ludden makes “revenue” equivalent to “politics”, and “production” to 
“economics”. These equivalences constitute the theoretical core of his argument, 
which understand “politics” as something external and opposed to, “economics”. 
Accordingly, Ludden locates late nineteenth century as the point of departure for the 
governmental interest in production. He argues that it is with the famines in the 1860s, 
70s and 80s—during which departments of agriculture were opened all over the 
country—that the regime of governmental investment in agricultural production 
began. He notes that, “Stimulated by riots and famines, which indicated deep distress 
in agrarian India, a flood of texts ensued on agricultural improvement…”2 
Agricultural “improvement” through scientific methods indeed became one of 
the central concerns of the government in the aftermath of a series of deadly famines 
during the last three decades of the nineteenth century. The first Famine Commission 
wrote its report after the famine in 1866, which devastated the entire region of the 
present-day state of Orissa, its epicentre being the Cuttack division.
3
 The need to 
protect the country against such calamities was expressed in the report. But it was 
noted that without systematic information on agricultural conditions of the area, it 
would not be possible to institute preventive measures.
4
 It was primarily with the 
Famine Commission Report of 1880 that a compelling need to improve an 
agriculturally malignant country was articulated. The report argued that an entire set 
of new knowledge about the conditions of people living on land was required to 
design strategies of agricultural “improvement.” It noted that there was total absence 
“…of trustworthy statistical knowledge as to the numbers of the people, the rates of 
their deaths and births, and the influence on these rates of epidemic disease or local 
distress, combined with an equally insufficient insight into their economical 
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condition, and particularly an absence of agricultural statistics in an accessible form.”5 
The report argued that the peasant-cultivator, or the ryot, was in an impoverished 
condition due to the pressure of land-revenue, and his productive capacities had to be 
urgently energized, in order to nurture the overall potential of Indian agriculture. 
Subsequent Famine Commission reports, of 1898, and 1901, for example, continued 
with the same suggestions. The 1901 report noted that the different constituents of 
agriculture, like crops, seeds, implements, manure, cattle, etc., needed to be protected 
and improved by the government in order to boost the productivity of the ryot.
6
 
 David Arnold argues that such a program of “improvement” can be traced to 
an even earlier time, to the initial decades of the nineteenth century. He notes that the 
establishment of Botanical gardens in different parts of British India, the Agricultural-
Horticultural Society of India and the profound influence of the Kew Gardens of 
London released a current of ideas and activities in this domain. Arnold observes that, 
“The want of capital investment, the deficiencies of Indian livestock, the crudeness of 
Indian agricultural implements, the want of manuring, of hedges and enclosures—all 
these formed part of the litany of complaints directed against Indian agriculture.”7 
Introduction of special plants like Sago Palm and Cassava to protect India against 
recurrent famine, building of canals, which were compared with the great historical 
monuments of Asia, from the pyramids to the Great Wall of China, all informed this 
project of agricultural “improvement”. While agreeing with Arnold, I will emphasise 
that it is towards the end of the nineteenth century that the task for designing a space 
of “improvement” in Indian agriculture began, following the recommendations of the 
Famine Commission reports. “Improvement” had to be effected by and in this space. 
The construction of this space involved the creation of segregated, clearly identifiable 
constituents of agricultural production and then investing meaning in each of them in 
terms of a complementary relationship, directed solely towards the goal of 
improvement.  John Augustus Voelcker, an agricultural chemist from England, was 
one of the most important architects of this space. In 1893, after a rigorous, even if 
short-term, inquiry into the conditions of land and people in the subcontinent, he 
brought out the “Report on the Improvement of Indian Agriculture”. At the level of 
official discourse, this work was considered as one of the seminal contributions to the 
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promising project of agricultural “improvement”. Voelcker’s treatise became almost a 
manual in shaping the directions of the project.  
 The Voelcker report was particularly concerned with increasing the 
productivity of the soil. Voelcker believed that manure will act as the magic-potion 
for the miseries of British Indian agriculture. The report organised itself around a 
classificatory scheme. It was divided into the following chapters: I) Historical 
Introduction, III) Cultivating Classes, IV) Climate, V) Soil, VI) Water, VII) Wood, 
VIII) Manure, IX) Grass, X) Fodder-Crops and Hedges, XI) Livestock and Dairying, 
XII) Implements, XIII) Crops and Cultivation, XIV) Agricultural Industries and 
Exports, XV) Economic and Political Conditions, XVI) Practical Enquiry, XVII) 
Scientific Enquiry, XVIII) Experimental Farms, XIX) Agricultural Education and 
XX) Agricultural Departments.
8
 These were the elements of agriculture, each of 
which was examined closely, arranged in a complementary relation to others, and 
finally oriented towards the grand telos of improving the productivity of the soil. 
These were the beginnings of the productivist regime in the governance of British 
Indian agriculture. It became one of the defining dimensions of nation-building in the 
twentieth century, as nationalists, of various kinds, built their critique of colonial rule 
around the issue of agricultural “improvement”. Ludden notes that, “Economic 
nationalism used data on agrarian conditions against the Raj. Nationalists built 
empirical artefacts from official statistics and joined debates about policy, using 
measures of progress, as others had done before… Congress agreed with government 
that agricultural progress required programs such as catalogued by the Royal 
Commission. Amid oppositions to empire, therefore, a unified paradigm for agrarian 
studies stretched across the political spectrum.”9 
 But in this entire discourse of “improvement”, “production” was understood as 
a domain of “economics”, while “politics” was considered as something external to it, 
obstructing its smooth operation. Agrarian production, which should have been an 
“economic” matter, it was argued, was turned into a sphere of the “political” by 
shrewd strategies of revenue-collection of the British government, which created 
wasteful, unproductive power-brokers in the localities as collaborators of this project. 
This was an argument shared by different positions, from colonial officials, to 
nationalist actors, to historians of agrarian India. Let us take the case of irrigation in 
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late nineteenth century Cuttack. Cuttack was the only area in Eastern India where the 
British invested significantly in irrigation. This investment needs to be seen in the 
context of Arthur Cotton’s vision of canal networks becoming the driving force 
behind the improvement of India’s transport infrastructure in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. 
10
 Cotton, no doubt, primarily viewed irrigation as a question of 
“public works”. Ravi Ahuja has argued quite convincingly that the prevalent 
intellectual discourse on “public works” in Europe arose from the idea of making 
transport infrastructure an essential part of the production process, in order to reduce 
overall costs of production, and increase productivity. But the questions of irrigation 
and productivity were also closely tied to ideas of agricultural “improvement” during 
this time.  
The irrigation project, however, was considered to be a big failure by the 
authorities by the beginning of the twentieth century. It suffered great financial losses, 
as the government kept trying new means to persuade people in availing the benefits 
of irrigation canals and embankments. Rohan D’ Souza explains the failure of this 
project in terms of a misfit between colonial capitalism’s extractive needs and the 
natural hydrological complexity of the Orissa delta. He argues that due to the unique 
hydrological character of the delta, floods were beneficial for the lands in Orissa’s 
deltaic plains. The colonial operations of flood-control, by being insensitive to the 
delta’s natural rhythm, turned a “flood-dependent” landscape into a “flood-
vulnerable” one. He points out that the rapacious colonial concerns of revenue 
generation disturbed the natural ecological arrangement for agriculture in deltaic 
Orissa.
11
 This is how D’ Souza reinforces the analytical separation between 
“revenue/politics” and “production/economics”. Based on this assumption, he argues 
that there was a difference between the ecologically insensitive, revenue concerns of 
the local colonial bureaucracy and the ecologically conscious, scientific-
developmentalist concerns of specialists or colonial engineers. In the latter category, 
he places Captain Harriss, one of the colonial engineers working on flood-protection 
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in the valley, who, according to D’ Souza had a more “organic” understanding of the 
delta. This division, I argue, suffer from a flawed understanding of what I have shown 
in this dissertation as the political economy of production, which, in a reconfigured 
manner, made local power internal to, and a constitutive component of the category of 
production. D’ Souza does not recognise the fact that the “organic” understandings of 
specialists were also geared towards making the delta productive, albeit in a manner 
which is more suited to its hydrological peculiarity. In fact, it was Arthur Cotton’s 
scheme, another such specialist, which inaugurated the revenue-exploiting project in 
the delta. Such separations between “revenue-concerns” and revenue-disinterested 
“specialist science” appear in D’ Souza’s study precisely because he de-links 
production from the local politics of revenue extraction, instead of considering it as 
immanent to the “political” in political economy. 
David Washbrook’s characterisation of early nineteenth century agrarian 
governance is rooted in a similar argument. As I noted in the first chapter, Washbrook 
argues that the governmental treatment of landed property, as embodied in property 
laws and models of settlement, reflected a pragmatic strategy to collect revenue by 
building networks of local agents. He defines the need for this collaboration primarily 
in terms of the contradictory tendencies within law of promoting market enterprise 
and preserving older social forms at the same time. He also points out that the 
Company state deliberately maintained the social relations within which the agrarian 
economy was organised earlier in order to secure extraction of surplus and reproduce 
the conditions of production. This strategy resulted in a stunted growth of property 
rights and a capitalist market around land.
12
 Peter Robb, on the other hand, argues that 
collaborative arrangements in this period were necessary because of a weak 
administrative structure of the Company state, lack of knowledge of the complex 
social relations on land, and resilience of locally dominant social forces. But an 
incapability to penetrate effectively into local structures went hand in hand with a 
desire to establish private property and capitalist market relations over land. Robb 
differs from Washbrook here in the sense that he indicates the presence of an active 
will on the part of the Company state in the early nineteenth century to transform 
agrarian conditions along lines of capitalist improvement. He argues that the 
Company-state “…had strong motives to promote agriculture as the norm, and to 
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order land and people, by force if necessary. There were means enough to encourage 
private property; there were sales laws, resumption proceedings, and a pro-landlord 
bias in government……Washbrook believes that this private property was effectively 
delayed until the later nineteenth century. But for Bengal and Bihar it seems possible 
to trace an earlier grafting of Western concepts on to longer-term forms of land 
control…”13 
Such disagreements, however, do not unsettle the historiographical consensus 
about the agrarian affairs of this period, which posits an opposition between political 
economy underlying governance and “traditional” social forms of land control 
constitutive of local power. This opposition continues to shape the developmental 
discourse of the nation. In the nationalist agenda, it is presented even more 
aggressively, where the development warriors are seen as ready to wage war against 
their most formidable enemies, namely, the local powers. It is a veritable war. In the 
Planning Commission of 1976, one of the bodies which had agricultural development 
as its prime objective was called, “Task Force on Agrarian Relations”. It observed, 
with martial zeal, that local power structures are “insurmountable hurdles in the path 
of the spread of modern technology and improved agricultural practices.”14  
 
Liberalism: another look 
 
Karuna Mantena’s work on Henry Maine covers significant theoretical ground 
in building a critique of the historiography which is based on this opposition. Mantena 
argues that the late nineteenth century imperial strategy of “indirect rule”, by which 
there was a governmentalized re-invigoration of the traditional cultural and social 
structures of India, was not a “practical”/pragmatic accommodation with on-ground 
social realities. She correctly observes that, “imperial historiography has shown a 
marked tendency to emphasize local developments and local (imperial and native) 
actors as the primary agents that both propel imperial expansion and shape 
governance patterns…Indirect rule is thus rendered a rarefied name for a political 
necessity, a practical institutional solution that accommodated itself with “facts on the 
ground,” that is, with local conditions and structures of power. In the self-
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understanding of imperial administrators, indirect rule was likewise conceived of as 
emblematic of the practical, anti-ideological orientation of British imperial 
policy…”15 
On the contrary, Mantena notes, the shift to “indirect rule” was a distinctly 
ideological one, which marked a move away from the earlier universalism of the 
liberal, Benthamite, utilitarian variety towards a culturalism produced primarily out of 
nineteenth century social theory and evolutionary anthropology. These intellectual 
currents and their conceptualisations of “native society” became the ideological basis 
of late nineteenth century imperial governance by “indirect rule”. This ideological 
foundation, Mantena argues, is rendered invisible, and re-presented as “practical 
necessity” by imperial actors and a certain strand of imperial historiography. I see 
Mantena’s argument as similar to mine. Even she thinks that the “practical” and the 
“local” are not categories external to networks of knowledge and governance, in this 
case a specific articulation of imperialist sociology; rather they are constitutive 
components of it. Mantena’s work, however, retains in a different way the 
periodization inherent in the historiography that I critique. She argues that the 
culturalism, or sociological/anthropological theory, underpinning late nineteenth 
century imperial governance marked a move away from the reformist universalism of 
early nineteenth century Benthamite liberalism. This dissertation shows that the 
universalism of early nineteenth century liberalism, especially its political economic 
articulation, was also constituted by a cultural particularism, in which the 
“indigenous”, or the “local”, defined the universality of its major categories, like 
“production”, “distribution”, “rent”, “property” and others. This was produced by 
what I have described in this dissertation as the interconstitutive workings of the 
“political” and the “local”. Mantena’s analytical framework fails to take this into 
consideration.     
Neeladri Bhattacharya also argues that culturalism was the ideological basis of 
late nineteenth century colonial governance with regard to the process of the 
governmental codification of custom in the agrarian society of Punjab. He highlights 
the analytical importance of the governmental presentation of the “local” in the drives 
of codification. As I have argued in my chapter on the “village”, Neeladri also shows 
how “village elders”, and not the “pundits”, the authority on canonical Hindu texts, 
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were considered as the key to an understanding of custom. But more importantly, he 
correctly observes that it was not only a question of “understanding” “local” society, 
by depending on it blindly. It was a case of acquiring legitimacy to represent it with 
greater authenticity than itself. Thus, Neeladri notes, that, “To assert sovereign power 
the masters had to transcend their crippling reliance on native knowledge-brokers and 
claim their own superior right to represent local tradition.”16 While Neeladri’s essay 
makes important points about the governmental production of the “local” in agrarian 
societies, it still does not deal directly with the question of the relation between 
production and local power. A collection of essays edited by M. Desai, S.H. Rudolph 
and A. Rudra tries to tackle this problem conceptually, over a range of studies on the 
past and present of agrarian South Asia. The volume offers extremely rich and 
insightful essays on the relation between power and productivity in agrarian societies 
of South Asia. But it remains committed to the historiographical orthodoxy in 
understanding power and productivity as analytically separate, antithetical categories. 
It argues that classical political economy is devoid of an understanding of power, and 
“indigenous” social forces. It emphasises that from James to John Mill, classical 
political economy has been an ahistorical, abstract, form of knowledge which is 
premised on a notion of “universal history”, taking the European experience of 
commercialisation and industrialisation as the standard for evaluating the rest of the 
world.
17
  
In this dissertation, all along, I have tried to argue that “production” and 
“power” are not opposites. They are both part of discursive practices of political 
economy and agrarian governance. Classical political economy in early nineteenth 
century Britain did not only consist of universals rooted in the European experience of 
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economic development.
18
 It was not a dehistoricized discourse. It was constituted by 
abstractions, but of a different order. These abstractions took “indigeneity” and 
“local” interrelations between property and political power in different nations of the 
world as legitimate explanatory categories of political economy. With this 
reinterpretation, the “political”, as the “local” became the new universal of political 
economy. Accordingly, I have tried to read practices of agrarian governance in British 
India as informed by a governmental rationality which mapped localities in terms of 
their differences from, and resemblances with an original, ancient, Hindu/Indian 
“political”. I have argued that the dynamics of events in agrarian localities worked 
within these frameworks. They undoubtedly challenged the general articulation of the 
“political”, but only in order to produce newer forms of it. This method, I have 
argued, enables us to understand the formation of agrarian societies in different 
localities in terms of internal workings of political economy. This perspective makes 
us look at the development of specific power-equations in localities, like the rise to 
dominance of village-level landed elites in Cuttack, without a total dismantling of 
erstwhile big landlords, and the privileging of the rights of resident peasants, along 
with a denial of the claims of itinerant ones, as productions of a specific articulation 
of a sociologised discourse of political economy. The governmental rationality which 
worked in the nineteenth century to produce agrarian localities in terms of such 
specific, concrete strategies of intervention, generating from within them 
arrangements of power consistent to a political economic imaginary, can be described 
as, following Foucault, the true principle of liberalism. It is a political technique 
which works, as Foucault argues, “in a sphere complementary to reality…within 
reality, by getting the components of reality to work in relation to each other, thanks 
to a series of analyses and specific arrangements.”19 He further observes that it is, 
“…this fundamental principle that political technique must never get away from the 
interplay of reality with itself is profoundly linked to the general principle of what is 
called liberalism. The game of liberalism—not interfering, allowing free movement, 
letting things follow their course…basically and fundamentally means acting so that 
                                                 
18
For a recent unpublished work which looks at political economy in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Europe and the East India Company’s practices of governance as a single, integrated, dialectical, 
discursive space, see Rahul Govind, The Antinomies of Political Economy Within the Dialectic of 
Imperialism: The East India Company as Perspective, 1689-1821, PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 
2008.  
19
Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977-78, 
London, 2007, 69.  
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reality develops, goes its way, and follows its own course according to the laws, 
principles, and mechanisms of reality itself.”20 This thesis, therefore, argues that local 
power was a constitutive condition of political economy in nineteenth century British 
India. It is important to understand production in agrarian societies as internal to 
power. Such are the enigmatic imprints of liberalism on the past and present of 
agrarian South Asia.  
                                                 
20Ibid, 70. For Foucault, as Michell Dean argues, “politics is never, even in the most immediate or 
brutal action of the exercise of domination and power, without some degree of “thought”. This is the 
first part of his thesis on political rationality. The second part is that this “thought”, this political 
rationality, does not simply arise from the rulers consulting their “interests”, or their capacity for 
rational choice, but from historically developed and modified forms of rationality. Political rationality, 
in this sense, is anterior to political action and a condition of it.” Mitchell Dean, Foucault’s Methods 
and Historical Sociology, London & New York, 1994, 182. 
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